Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
9-5-2014 12:00 AM

A Photographer Develops: Reading Robinson, Rejlander, and
Cameron
Jonathan R. Fardy, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Sharon Sliwinski, The University of Western Ontario
Joint Supervisor: Helen Fielding, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Theory and Criticism
© Jonathan R. Fardy 2014

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Theory and Criticism Commons

Recommended Citation
Fardy, Jonathan R., "A Photographer Develops: Reading Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron" (2014).
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 2486.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/2486

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

A PHOTOGRAPHER DEVELOPS: READING ROBINSON, REJLANDER, AND
CAMERON
(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Jonathan R. Fardy

Graduate Program in Theory and Criticism

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

© Jonathan R. Fardy 2014

i

Abstract
This study examines the historical emergence of the photographer by turning to the writings of
three important photographers of the nineteenth century: Henry Peach Robinson (1830-1901),
Oscar Gustave Rejlander (1813-1875), and Julia Margaret Cameron (1815-1879). The
photographic works of each of these photographers has been the subject of much historical and
interpretive analysis, but their writings have yet to receive significant scholarly attention. It is the
claim of this study that this archive opens a new set of questions: What did it mean to claim: “I
am a photographer” at photography’s advent? How did these individuals come to identify
themselves through a new technology, medium, and practice whose identity itself was
constituted by a set of contested and competing techniques, aesthetics, discourses, and critical
perspectives? Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s texts speak to the fractious field of early
photography and to how that discursive field positioned practitioners in novel ways. This study
develops a historically specific and theoretically general conceptualization of the photographer,
making a case for the ways this figure can be addressed as an object of study in its own right.
This study’s focus on the writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron constitutes an effort to
move beyond the well-plowed field of image analysis towards a consideration of how
subjectivity is constituted and shaped by photographic practice.

Keywords
Photographer, Photography, Robinson, Rejlander, Cameron, Autobiography, Nineteenth
Century, Foucault, Sloterdijk
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A passerby takes a photograph. It’s an everyday scene, a contemporary commonplace—a
banality. But this very banality signifies something historically remarkable. At the advent of
photography in the mid-nineteenth century, such a scene was scarcely conceivable. Nineteenthcentury photography was the province of specialists who possessed the requisite skills, science,
and resources necessary for the production of photographs. Over the course of more than a
century, photography exited the sphere of specialists and professionals and came to inhabit the
realm of the everyday. Professional photographers still exist of course. But many who possess
the tools and the technique do not see themselves as photographers. In fact today it is no longer
clear precisely what the term “photographer” denotes. The term “photographer” is sometimes
used to designate one whose livelihood, passion, or art is photography. But one can with equal
justice call one a photographer who simply takes a photograph. Today being a photographer and
taking photographs do not necessarily inhabit a continuous space. How did this happen? How did
the photographer develop?
This study examines the historical emergence of the photographer by turning to the
writings of three important photographers of the nineteenth century: Henry Peach Robinson
(1830-1901), Oscar Gustave Rejlander (1813-1875), and Julia Margaret Cameron (1815-1879).
The works of each of these photographers has been the subject of much historical and
interpretive analysis. But their writings have yet to receive significant scholarly attention. It is
the claim of this study that this archive opens a new set of questions: What did it mean when one
said “I am a photographer” at photography’s advent? Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s texts
speak to the fractious field of early photography and to how that field positioned practitioners in
1

novel ways. These texts constitute an autobiographical archive. Each text is marked by the
narrative struggle to make sense of the claim of what it meant to be a photographer. But this
autobiographical archive is not solely a set of “personal” statements. These texts undoubtedly
reflect the personal interests and concerns of each photographer, but those interests and concerns
are also indicative of the wider regime of early photographic discourse. These texts can be read,
then, as simultaneously reflecting the personal concerns of each photographer and the field of
concern that was early photography. This study develops a historically specific and theoretically
general conceptualization of the photographer. Its overarching aim, therefore, is to make a case
for how the photographer can be addressed as an object of study in its own right. This study’s
focus on the writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron constitutes an effort to move beyond
the well-plowed field of image analysis towards a consideration of how subjectivity is
constituted and shaped by photographic practice. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault and
Peter Sloterdijk among others, this study interrogates the formation of the nineteenth-century
photographer from an “interior” perspective. It focuses on how the process of writing on the
experience of being and becoming a photographer, as evidenced by the texts of Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron, forged novel ways of seeing and constructing selfhood and interiority.
1.1 The Photographer
The nineteenth-century photographer occupied a unique position in the strata of material
and discursive practices that included optics, chemistry, aesthetics, art and science. It is this
complex assemblage that is conveniently called “nineteenth-century photography.” My
conceptualization of “the photographer” as a subject position, node, or point within the
constellation of nineteenth-century photographic discourse and practice draws principally on the
work of Michel Foucault.

2

A subject for Foucault is constituted in and through historically specific discursive and
material practices: knowledge, power, and discipline primarily. These factors or forces
“position” and condition the subject in a particular way at a particular moment in history. The
Foucauldian subject is positioned by an epistemic system—a system of knowledge—that is
regulated by disciplinary procedures, processes, norms, and power. This view of the subject
opposes the conception of the subject enshrined by Descartes.
Descartes’ famous invocation—“I think, therefore I am”—grants sovereignty over
knowledge to the “I” of consciousness and identity. Descartes’ instantiation of the “I” as the
foundation for the possibility of knowledge rests upon the axiom that the “I” of thinking (res
cogitans) is fundamentally different than the world of spatially extended bodies it perceives (res
extensa). The “I” of Cartesian thought maintains a critical distance from the world. It is supposed
that this distance allows the “I” to remain impartial in its judgment of perceptual stimuli. This
conception posits the “I” as an internal eye that judges perceptual objects as true or false. As
Richard Rorty notes in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Descartes’ institutes “a conception
of the human mind as an inner space in which…ideas pas[s] in review before an Inner Eye.”1
Foucault rejects this model of the subject. The subject for Foucault is not the foundation
or final arbiter of knowledge. Rather the “I” is itself a subject of knowledge. For Foucault, the
subject is not the sovereign, immobile center upon which trans-historical knowledge (and truth)
is inscribed, but rather an effect produced by a specific regime of knowledge. According to
Foucault, every system or regime of knowledge produces a particular subject. The subject in this
view is not a causal agent of knowledge, but rather a “knowledge-effect” – an effect of a
particular historical mode of discursive and material practices. Foucault writes: “The positions of

1

Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 49-50.
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the subject are...defined by the situation that it is possible for him [or her] to occupy in relation to
the various domains or groups of objects; according to a grid of explicit or implicit
interrogations” or knowledge practices.2
Discursive and material practices—that is to say, knowledge—define the parameters
within which a historical subject is positioned and, to an extent, subjects the subject to a set of
historically determinate conditions that regulate what it is possible for that subject to say, think,
or do. Foucault, especially the early Foucault, draws a rigorous distinction between a subject and
the individual. The former designates a subject position within a knowledge/power structure; the
latter is a way of speaking about the subject that can be traced to a specific historical situation,
namely, the early modern period. “Subject” for Foucault has effectively the same meaning as it
does in the context of monarchical power. One is called the king’s “subject” in that one is subject
to the king’s power of rule. Similarly, for Foucault one is a subject insofar as one is subject to a
specific regime of knowledge and power that governs and maintains a given socio-epistemic
order. The position one occupies with respect to a knowledge-power structure defines “who” a
subject is or can become. Foucault puts it eloquently and economically when he writes that a
subject position designates both “the space in which we are and which we are.”3 It is in this sense
that here the photographer is defined as a subject position.
The nineteenth-century photographer was historically conditioned by the positions it
came to occupy within the discourse of early photography. The historical category of “nineteenth
century photography” does not name one thing, but a complex set of technological, aesthetic, and
social practices. Even that most privileged metonym of photography – the camera – is not itself

2
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one thing. The camera names a complex amalgam of technologies (optics and chemistry,
primarily) and a host of aesthetic and scientific practices.
The genealogy of the photographic camera traces back to the camera obscura. This
device was known to ancient philosophers including Aristotle and Euclid but it gained
exceptional prominence among artists and scientists of the seventeenth century.4 A camera
obscura is made by completely sealing off a room or small chamber from any light source save
for a pinhole-sized aperture. Light is focused as it passes through the narrow opening, and the
result is that an inverted image of the world outside forms on the inside wall opposite the
aperture exactly as it does in the modern day mechanical camera. Thus the basic technology of
the modern camera was already existent well before the nineteenth century. Seventeenth-century
thinkers including Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz were intensely interested in the camera
obscura and optics generally.5 The device is frequently referenced in their writings. The camera
obscura offered a fitting material analogue to the rationalist conception of the subject as an
“inner eye” (pace Rorty) that sees the world from within the hermetically sealed chamber of the
mind. The idea that the world could be best seen and understood from a specified distance with
the aid of a rational representational schema prepared in advance the discursive space for
nineteenth-century photography.
The technological and discursive continuities between the camera obscura and the
camera notwithstanding, the two technologies are very different. Each technology makes
possible very different modes of observation, and hence gives rise to very different kinds of
observers. As Jonathan Crary notes in Techniques of the Observer, “the camera obscura and the
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photographic camera, as assemblages, practices, and social objects, belong to two fundamentally
different organizations of representation and the observer, and the observer’s relation to the
visible.”6 The observer standing in a camera obscura sees the world as an inverted projection on
the wall opposite the aperture. The observer stationed behind the camera looks out onto the
world. The positioning of the observer—the subject position—circumscribed by the camera
obscura and that framed by the camera lens are spatially and even psychically distinct. The way
the world is seen in the camera obscura versus the camera, and how in each case that seeing is
seen and understood by the observer, are radically dissimilar.
The photographic camera developed from centuries of research into light but it was
chemistry that provided the means to fix fragile and fleeting images. The origins of photographic
chemistry are notoriously complex and seem almost a conspiracy on the part of history to
confound any historian who seeks and elegant and simple narrative. The diorama painter LouisJacques Mandé Daguerre (1787-1851) is popularly regarded as the “father of photography.”
Daguerre’s name quite literally entered photography history when in 1839 the French Academy
of Arts and Sciences awarded him a patent for a photographic process – daguerreotypy – that
employed photo-sensitized copper plates. While Daguerre has become a virtual metonym for the
origin of photography, there were many others who played significant roles in photography’s
development, including Daguerre’s research partner Nicéphore Niépce (1765-1833). Indeed
Niépce’s View from a Window at Le Gras of 1826 is the earliest known photographic image. One
must also mention the work of William Henry Fox Talbot (1800-1877)—Daguerre’s chief
rival—for his work on the calotype or talbotype process. Talbot’s 1844 book, The Pencil of
Nature, which outlined both the aesthetic and scientific potential of photography, marked a

6
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highly significant discursive event in the history of early photography. Further still one would
have to include the name of John Herschel (1792-1871) who made remarkable botanical studies
by laying plant specimens on photo-sensitized papers and exposing them directly to the sun
thereby circumventing the need for the camera entirely. Finally one would also have to make
mention of Thomas Wedgwood who in the late eighteenth century pioneered chemical processes
for the fixing of silhouettes. Suffice to say, the history of photographic technology did not follow
a singular trajectory. Already by 1839, as Geoffrey Batchen has clearly shown, there were
multiple and very different processes competing for the title of “photography.”7 But certainly the
official recognition of photography by the French Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1839 was a
watershed moment in the constitution of photography as a historico-discursive object. The
publication in 1839 of the “Report” on photography by François Jean Dominique Arago (17861853) did much to establish and bolster the nineteenth-century image of photography as at once a
scientific and aesthetic phenomenon.8 Walter Benjamin was to later remark in his seminal essay
“Little History of Photography” that the “beautiful thing” about Arago’s “Report” is “the
connection it makes with all aspects of human activity....In a great arc, Arago’s speech spans the
field of new technologies, from astrophysics to philology: alongside the prospects of
photographing the stars and planets we find the idea of establishing a photographic record of the
Egyptian hieroglyphs.”9
The chemistry of photography provided the technological capability to fix what seemed
to be an indubitably empirical picture of the world. Yet the very fact that this world was a world
7
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of pictures meant also that photography opened a new aesthetic field rife with argument and
contest. Hence nineteenth-century photographic discourse was obsessed with the question of
whether photography was a science or an art. Very different material practices emerged from this
divided constitution. Pictorialism, for example, the first art movement of photography (discussed
in chapter three) codified an aesthetic program for photography in order to raise it to the cultural
respectability of the fine arts. But simultaneously photography was pressed into the service of the
sciences, particularly sociology and criminology, with the aim of making them more “objective.”
Nineteenth-century photography’s divided constitution – divided between art and science –
struggled over what the veridical status of photography was. Was photography objective or not?
Could it express or only record? The photographer of the nineteenth century, like the field of
photography itself, was also divided by philosophical, aesthetic, and scientific contestations. This
fractured figure of the photographer is imaged in the writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and
Cameron in the form of explicit arguments and, just as frequently, through implicit rhetorical
tensions, lapses, contradictions, and paralogisms. At the level of argument and rhetoric there is a
marked symptomatic ambivalence and uncertainty in these texts concerning what photography
was and what as a consequence it meant or could mean to be a photographer. Each text also has a
marked psychological dimension insofar as each poses the question: Who (or what) am I as a
photographer?
1.2 A Photographer
To access this psychological dimension, it is necessary to press beyond the theoretical
confines of subject position theory. Whereas Foucault, or at least the early Foucault, was content
to theorize the subject solely in terms of its position in a field of historical discourse and
knowledge practices, it is the claim of this study that it is necessary to also take note of how that

8

position was experienced, lived, and narrated by those who occupied it. The strong form of
subject position theory, which deemphasizes the subject’s lived life, fails to account for the fact
that the way historical subjects understand their experience recursively affects how they are
socially positioned at any given time. Hence subject position theory is here supplemented with a
view that theorizes the relation between the discursive positioning of the photographer and how
a photographer understands and experiences that positioning as a dialogical and dynamical
system. This dissertation seeks a third way between the structural view of the subject as a
position in a knowledge-power grid and a psycho-biographical view that sees a knowledge
subject as an embodied and psychical being. Methodologically, this study aims to maintain a
double vision: one eye is focused on the photographer as a subject position and the other is on a
photographer, in their respective cases, Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. This study thus
takes a “parallax view” in Slavoj Žižek’s sense in its attempt to methodologically oscillate
between the perspective of the photographer and the perspective of a photographer.10 In order to
properly situate the arguments of this study, it will be helpful at this point to sketch the
genealogy of photography studies. What this sketch reveals is a theoretical convergence of two
lines of inquiry—photography theory and biographical criticism— that stretches from at least the
1960s to the present. It is at the juncture of this theoretical convergence that this study is situated.
1.3 Photography, Theory, and Biographical Criticism
Despite the abundance of studies on the lives and works of individual photographers as
well as the expanding corpus of theoretical writings on photography, there has yet to be any
sustained investigation of the photographer’s emergence as a historical subject. Monographs on
photographers typically follow either implicitly or explicitly the methodological cues of art

10
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history. The force of art history’s impress on photography studies is due to the simple fact that
art history was the first discipline to take photography seriously as a subject of academic inquiry.
The art-historical institutionalization of photography by the mid-twentieth century led by major
institutions such as The Museum of Modern Art in New York catalyzed a vast academic
territorialization of photography. Edward Steichen (who was also a photographer), Helmut
Gernsheim, John Szarkowski, and many other art historians developed historical models as well
as formal criteria with which to aesthetically assess photographs and the achievement of
individual photographers. Szarkowski’s work in particular offers a precedent for this study.
Szarkowski curated an exhibition titled The Photographer’s Eye for the Museum of
Modern Art in 1966. The exhibition’s catalogue essay lays out five elements that Szarkowski
claims characterize the essential features of the photographer’s way of seeing: the thing-in-itself,
time, frame, detail, and vantage point.11 The photographer, Szarkowski argues, sees the world as
a series of spatio-temporal cuts – “slice[s] of time as well as space” in Susan Sontag’s words.12
The photographer’s eye prizes the spatio-temporal fragment: the photographic analog to the
thing-in-itself of philosophy. The photographer according to Szarkowski is principally a way of
seeing or observing (a thesis that presages Crary’s to some extent). Szarkowski’s reading of the
photographer ingeniously presses beyond the coordinates of art history. Szarkowski is less
interested in arguing that the photographer is an artist than in showing that the photographer is a
way of being conditioned by the particular and peculiar exigencies of seeing the world through
the camera. Despite its promises, however, Szarkowski’s project passed into history
underdeveloped in part because the intellectual climate of the mid-1960s was soon to change in
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ways that would prove hostile to Szarkowski’s seemingly subject-centric account of
photography.
The humanities underwent a profound shift in the late 1960s. Politics, history, the subject,
the unconscious, and much else were radically re-theorized in an effort to forge a path beyond
the enclosure of rationalism. One text in particular defined the emerging theoretical climate of
the 1960s: “The Death of the Author” by Roland Barthes, who as will be shown, all but reversed
his position in his last book on photography. In “The Death of the Author,” Barthes memorably
argues that the Author (always capitalized) is a metaphysical idea: the literary equivalent to the
god of theology and the “subject” of Cartesianism. Against the theological imposture of the
Author, Barthes asserts the reader’s interpretive rights. The essay’s last lines are among its most
memorable and polemical:
The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed
without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin [the Author] but in its
destination [the reader]. Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is
without history, biography, and psychology…We are now beginning to let ourselves be
fooled no longer…we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the
myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.13
These impassioned lines sum up Barthes’ thinking at this time. His critical work of this period
advocates an anti-humanist and anti-psychological mode of criticism in favor of one based on the
findings of linguistics. A literary text in Barthes’ view is to be studied not as the psychobiographical expression of an Author but rather as a constellation of linguistic structures, rules,
and conventions that condition and regulate a text’s meaning. Barthes’ strident call to liberate
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literary studies from the theological thrall of the Author and subject resonated with similar calls
to “deconstruct the subject” and to dispense with humanism issued by Michel Foucault, Jacques
Derrida, Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan, and many others. However, Barthes’ critical stance
steadily transformed throughout the 1970s. By the time of his last publication in 1980, it had
changed radically. Barthes’ last text—Camera Lucida—is about photography.
Camera Lucida is intensely personal and intensely speculative. Barthes’ text traces out a
theoretical trajectory from the search for the essence of photography to the search to find in
photographs the essence of the author’s mother who had recently died. That this seeming
reversal of Barthes’ critical stance—from a largely anti-humanist, anti-authorial, and antibiographically oriented criticism to an autobiographical, pathos-laden, and deeply subjective
mode—was effected through a critical engagement with photography should not go unnoticed.
The critical strategies Barthes had employed in his studies of literature and culture seemed to
break down in the case of photography.
Barthes sees photographs as affective instruments. Hence the psychological state and
status of the viewer or the spectator is taken by Barthes to be a necessary component of the
critical project he undertakes in his “reflections on photography.”14 This concern for the
spectator echoes Barthes’ privileging of the reader in “The Death of the Author.” But the
spectator of Camera Lucida is not synonymous with the reader of “The Death of the Author.”
The spectator, Barthes’ “I,” is a melancholic subject and not that purely positional void or open
“space” that he had earlier identified as the reader. Barthes’ takes his “I” with all its emotional
baggage as both the final arbiter and subject of his analysis of the affective power of

14
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photography. Barthes writes: “I decided to take myself as mediator for all Photography.”15
Barthes dispenses with the voice of the dispassionate critic and gives free reign to his taste and
his emotional state. He writes: “I decided to take as a guide for my new analysis the attraction I
felt for certain photographs.”16 Barthes then proceeds to systematize this attraction by dividing
his responses into two sets to which he gives the Latin names: studium and punctum.
Studium names that part of a photograph that the viewer instantly recognizes because the
viewer belongs to the world of signs of which it is a part. It is the part of the photograph that is
subordinated or subject to one’s cultural knowledge. Barthes writes that the studium is that
which “I invest...with my sovereign consciousness.”17 The punctum by contrast, Barthes notes, is
that part of a photograph that surprises and can at times even overwhelm the viewer with
affective force. It leaps out, writes Barthes, “like an arrow and pierces me” and with it the
surrounding banality of the studium.18 While many scholars have made much use of the
studium/punctum contrast for the analysis of photographs, the significance of Barthes’ insight
lies elsewhere.19
Studium and punctum are less elementary building blocks for a theory of photography
writ large than elementary motifs of Barthes’ singularly therapeutic attempt to come to grips with
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a confounding chiasmus of desire and grief: the desire he feels for certain photographs and the
grief that attends his desire to find his mother in them:
at the moment of reaching the essence of photography in general, I branched off; instead
of following the path of a formal ontology (of a Logic), I stopped, keeping with me, like a
treasure, my desire or my grief; the anticipated essence of the Photograph could not, in
my mind, be separated from the ‘pathos’ of which, from the first glance, it consists. I was
like that friend who had turned to Photography only because it allowed him to
photograph his son.20
Barthes rather abruptly shifts his focus away from speculating on the ontology of photography.
He opts instead to do what he calls a “casual phenomenology” of his personal reactions to a
select set of photographs.21 This highly personal mode of criticism marks a complete break with
his earlier critical commitments. Camera Lucida marks Barthes’ turn from a theory based on the
sign to one based on psychical and embodied experience. The radically subjective approach
Barthes’ forges in Camera Lucida cancels out the possibility of deriving anything like a general
theory of photography or photographic spectatorship. What is nominated as studium and
punctum in every instance reflects the particular and peculiar view of Barthes – a psychically
situated and culturally specific spectator.
Shawn Michelle Smith has pointed out that the problematic subjectivism of Barthes
analytic schema – studium/punctum – is most strikingly revealed in the racist and paternalist tone
he strikes in his reading in Camera Lucida of James Van Der Zee’s family portrait of 1926.22
Barthes sees the photograph as evidence of the photographed family’s “touching” attempt “to
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assume the White Man’s attributes.”23 Barthes goes on to assert that one of the two women
pictured in the photograph is wearing a necklace, a “slender ribbon of braided gold.”24 This
necklace reminds Barthes of one worn by his aunt. He then recalls that his aunt had died an “old
maid” and that he is “saddened” whenever he thinks of “her dreary life.”25 Smith points out,
however, that both women in the Van Der Zee photograph are wearing necklaces and neither of
them is made of gold. Both are in fact necklaces of pearl. Smith writes: “Barthes’ failure to
remember the precise attributes of a piece of jewelry is only a slight offense…What is disturbing
is not the erasure of a pearl necklace for a gold but the effacement of an African American
woman under the sign of Barthes’ aunt.”26
Barthes’ reading of the Van der Zee photograph reveals less about the photograph and
more about Barthes’ cultural and historical location, perspective, and habit of mind. What is
specifically “white” about dressing up for a family portrait, and why does Barthes so uncritically
assume that his aunt led a “dreary life” simply because she did not marry? Barthes presents his
point of view as if it is a matter of fact, but in fact it is an ideological expression of racism and
paternalism: the studium here is composed of the cultural codes of race and sex. Barthes’ reading
of the Van der Zee family portrait, as Smith shows, provides a cautionary tale in the use of the
studium/punctum dyad. Every invocation of studium and punctum is bound to reveal something
about the spectator, but may reveal little to nothing about the photographic image in view. The
strident subjectivism of Camera Lucida undermines its theoretical and critical value. Indeed,
scholars such as James Elkins have gone so far as to argue that ultimately Camera Lucida is a
failed project. Elkins notes:
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It is strange that after all the critical writing of the last twenty-five years on Barthes’s
‘little book’—so he called it, reminding us how much is really in it—it remains a central
text, cited almost by default as a source of insights about photography’s ‘essential
features’… despite the fact that readings by Derrida and others have shown how the text
fails to provide the theory it initially promises.27
Elkins’ point about Barthes’ failure is important but arguably more so for reasons he overlooks.
Barthes’ initial project to uncover the ontological essence of photography is importantly seen to
fail in the text as it runs aground on the grief stricken shoals of Barthes’ stubbornly personal and
problematic reflections. The text in this sense dramatizes the experience of loss in two ways. It
dramatizes the loss of Barthes’ mother and dramatizes a theoretical loss of finding the
ontological essence of photography. Camera Lucida, however, does accomplish a critical feat.
By foregrounding the importance of the psychical and embodied spectator, Camera Lucida
extends the reach of photography studies beyond the interpretive confines of the photographic
image. Camera Lucida exposes the social, psychical, sensuous, personal, and biographical
complexity of the photographic spectator. But while the spectator figures prominently in Camera
Lucida, the photographer is all but left out of the picture.
Barthes makes only a passing comment on the photographer, whom he terms the
“Operator.” He writes, “of that emotion (or that essence), I could not speak, never having
experienced it; I could not join the troupe of those (the majority) who deal with Photographyaccording-to-the Photographer. I possessed only two experiences: that of the observed subject
and the subject observing…”28 Barthes’ terms—“subject observing,” and “observed subject”—
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bears a family likeness to Foucault’s conception of subject positions in The Archaeology of
Knowledge cited earlier. Barthes, like Foucault, defines a subject as a position within a relational
field. Barthes’ quasi-subject position, however, is not a mere node or point locked in a grid of
knowledge/power relations. Barthes’ spectator is a body with emotion, feelings, histories, and
biographies: a subject of pathos, desire, and grief – or one might say simply – a spectator with
interiority. 29 Sitting for a photograph, Barthes notes, exposes to view “utter interiority without
yielding intimacy.”30 A photograph of a person, Barthes suggests, enables one to see a being that
has an interior or even secret life that lies beyond the pale of what can be seen. The photograph
of a stranger, for example, does not afford the spectator an intimate glimpse into the depths of
the being in the image, but the very opacity of the photographed subject’s interiority is itself an
intimate reminder that what is visible in the photograph is also a negative index of what is
invisible – a psychical and embodied depth that necessarily escapes the photograph’s depthless
surface.
It is the argument of this dissertation that what is true of the photographed subject is also
true of the one who identifies as a photographer. The appellation “photographer” like the
photograph both accommodates and limits the one who is framed by the term. This study seeks
to flesh out the operator or the photographer as position and passion. This requires constellating
elements of biographical criticism with that of its seeming opposite – subject position theory.
This move is not without precedent. Barthes’ critical enthusiasm for autobiographical thinking
late in his career set precedent for certain postmodernists eager to find a way to revive the study
of biography and autobiography without reanimating a Cartesian metaphysics of the subject. The
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renewal of scholarly interest in biographical criticism took a decisive turn in 1991 with the
publication of a volume of essays titled Contesting the Subject: Essays in the Postmodern Theory
and Practice of Biography and Biographical Criticism.
Contesting the Subject forges a third way between the critical binary of life and text.
Contributors to the volume identify as “postmodern” insofar as they challenge modern
conceptions of the author and its philosophical correlate, the unified self. But they part ways with
many postmodernists in that they see much of postmodern criticism as offering a simplistic
critique of the author and subject. The volume deepens the study and critique of the author and
the subject through a sustained engagement of the canonical texts of the post-authorial critical
tradition.
Stanley Fish strikes a strident tone in his contribution to Contesting the Subject. Fish
argues that to interpret something is to ascribe an intentional agency responsible for the thing’s
existence. To interpret something according to Fish is to see it as the product of “intentional
behavior.” According to Fish, one simply cannot interpret rivers, snowflakes, beaches, icicles,
and so on. But one can interpret utterances, buildings, paintings, bird calls, photographs, cars and
the like. Fish writes that “the act of construing meaning is ipso facto the act of assigning
intention…you just cannot do one without the other.”31 The only logically legitimate subject of
interpretation, argues Fish, is intentional behavior; this is the only subject to which one can
ascribe meaning. Snowflakes are, for example, meaningless in and of themselves. If snowflakes
are said to be meaningful by some person, then it is to that person that one must turn for further
clarification. The same is true of statements. Fish agrees that it does seem right to think that a
critic can choose to interpret a statement as either the product of an intentional subject or solely
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as a linguistic specimen. But this apparent choice, Fish argues, is an illusion since “the one thing
you cannot do is read or hear [a] sentence without already having received it as the expression of
an intentional being, with a particular, as opposed to a universal, history.”32 Fish argues thus that
it logically follows that one cannot read any statement “independently of biography, of some
specification of what kind of person – and with what abilities, concerns, goals, purposes, and so
on – is the source of the words you are reading.”33 To interpret the meaning of any statement,
according to Fish, necessitates inquiring as to who or what is speaking. And to understand a
speaker means understanding something of the life of the speaker.
While Fish’s view of interpretation seems clearly opposed to postmodern conceptions of
the subject promulgated by Barthes and Foucault among others, Fish rightly points out that
Foucault acknowledges that to an extent the question of the Author cannot be resolved by simply
turning the page as it were. In “What is an Author” of 1969, Foucault writes: “It is obviously
insufficient to repeat empty slogans: the author has disappeared; God and man died a common
death.”34 Foucault argues that facile attempts to dispense with the author by relegating the
invention of texts to social, historical, political, or linguistic codes and conventions are as
unsatisfactory as ascribing metaphysical powers to authorial figures. Foucault notes that in
reading a work by “delimiting psychological and biographical references, suspicions arise
concerning the absolute nature and creative role of the subject.”35 But he avers that the subject
should not be entirely “abandoned” but rather “should be reconsidered.”36 Having glanced at this
possibility, however, Foucault quickly turns his back on it. Foucault reaffirms that questions of
32
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the author are best confined to asking “under what conditions and through what forms can an
entity like the subject appear in the order of discourse; what position does it occupy; what
functions does it exhibit; and what rules does it follow in each type of discourse?”37 Foucault
readily admits, however, that this critical strategy effects an ultimately unsatisfactory
transposition of “the empirical characteristics of an author into a transcendental anonymity.”38
Fish concurs and responds by extending and radicalizing Foucault’s concern. Fish maintains that
even “if the originating author is dissolved into a series of functions…, then we have not done
away with intention and biography, but merely relocated them… [T]o read something as the
product of any one of these ‘transcendental anonymities’ is to endow that anonymity with an
intention and a biography.”39
Fish’s argument can be transposed into photographic terms. A photograph can be
interpreted solely in terms of its formal properties. But even a formal interpretation, Fish argues,
implicitly ascribes an agency and a biography to it. To say that a photograph is composed is to
state that it is marked by a structure of formal significance. The only reason this structure is
significant is because it is meaningful and it is only meaningful, Fish argues, because it is the
product of intentional behavior.
Fish’s argument is fascinating. It points up the weaknesses of taking either a hardline
intentionality or anti-intentionality stance. Fish argues that agency and intentionality are
categorically inescapable in that they are constitutive presuppositions of criticism itself. His
argument retains the concept of authorial intent as a matter of logic. In this respect, Fish’s
position reverses Barthes’s. Whereas Barthes positions himself against authorial intent by

37

Foucault, “What is an Author?,” 137-138.
Foucault, “What is an Author?,” 120.
39
Fish, “Intention and Biography,” 13.
38

20

drawing on linguistic-logical arguments, Fish uses the same form of reasoning to buttress an
opposing claim. Barthes uses logic and language to pronounce the concept of the Author dead;
Fish uses the same reasoning to grant the Author critical immunity. Neither Barthes nor Fish,
however, press beyond the realm of language and logic to interrogate authorship as an
experience. For Barthes and for Fish, the Author is a linguistic concept and not a mode of being.
Cheryl Walker, by contrast, seeks to understand authorship as an embodied and lived
experience. Walker’s contribution to Contesting the Subject, “Persona Criticism and the Death of
the Author,” argues contra Fish that authorial claims do not institute a biography per se, but
rather construct a “persona” or “personae.”40 For Walker, Barthes’ contention that the Author is
simply a metaphysical, even theological, fiction that must be put to death grossly inflates an
author precisely into the Author. Walker views this inflation of the author as unnecessary and
misguided. The author for Walker is a persona that emerges halfway between the text and the life
of the writer. The claim of authorship does not itself make any particular claim on intentionality
in anything more than a provisional sense. In the course of writing, Walker argues, it is in fact
difficult to discern “who” is writing or whose intentions are at play for, to an extent, the author’s
biography changes each time he or she writes since the biography comes to include whatever text
the writer is writing at the moment. Thus rather than seek to reify a model of the author as an
intentional subject, a god to be killed, or an inescapable law of language, Walker advocates the
view that the author is as variable and various as the texts the writer writes. Each text gives rise
to its own subject, its own personification, or persona that retrospectively comes to represent the
author. On Walker’s view there is, for example, a persona germane to Capital by Marx and
another persona germane to The German Ideology. This is the logic behind the oft-heard
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construction “the Marx of The German Ideology is ultimately still Hegelian” or the “Marx of
Capital is the mature Marx,” and the like. These “Marxs” are personae born of text, time, and
interpretation. Personae exist in the interstices between texts and contexts. Hence Walker writes
that “the persona critic” should “reflect on the way the forms of authorial representation
available in the text open it to other texts.”41 This critical strategy draws attention to the
“diversity of investments” open to the writer, which “allows one to speak of authorship as
multiple involving culture, psyche, intertextuality, as well as biographical data about the
writer.”42 Walker’s persona criticism plays a significant role in this study because it offers an
invaluable means to conceptualize how an individual consciously and unconsciously shapes the
image of themselves through creative action, which is always embedded in social and historical
contexts.
By the late 1990s scholars of visual culture also began to rethink biographical criticism.
Linda Haverty-Rugg’s Picturing Ourselves of 1997, for example, studies the relation between
autobiography and photography. Haverty-Rugg’s interest is primarily in photography’s capacity
to create a fiction of the self. She approaches the theme of the fabrication (and fictionalization)
of the self by taking a case study approach to four writers: Mark Twain, August Strindberg,
Christa Wolf, and Walter Benjamin. Her inquiry into each case study is framed by contemporary
concerns over linguistic and historical reference. Haverty-Rugg writes: “Over the past two
decades, an essential question has been debated by scholars of autobiography: can we ‘touch the
world’ in writing? Can an autobiographical text refer to a subject outside the text? Does a self
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create its autobiography, or does autobiography create its self.”43 Haverty-Rugg argues that
photography intervenes on this question in a unique and powerful way. Noting the complexity of
the life/text relation in biographical theory and practice, Haverty-Rugg writes that closely
paralleled with this is the question of “the relationship of photography to the world.”44
Photography and biography both reveal the tangled complexities of representation and reference.
Haverty-Rugg’s aim is to understand how the concept of referent in both biography and
photography is shaped by one’s relationship to each as a reader or spectator. Haverty-Rugg is
interested in how biographical and photographic referents are inferred through the embodied
experience of reading and seeing. She thus resists the textualist temptation to reduce biography
to a system of rhetoric or a photograph to a combination of light and shadow. Haverty-Rugg’s
work is invaluable. But her focus on individuals leaves the larger social sphere of photography
largely untouched.
Ariella Azoulay, by contrast, has forged a unique analysis of the social dimensions of
photographic production and circulation. In The Civil Contract of Photography, Azoulay draws
on eighteenth-century models of social contract theory in order to conceptualize how social
formations arise though photography and what politically follows from them. Azoulay
conceptualizes photography as a field of action in which the taking of a photograph constitutes a
social “event.”45 The actors involved in this event—the photographer, the photographed, and the
photograph’s spectators—constitute what she calls a “photographic situation.”46 The
“photographic situation” theoretically spans the present location of the photographic event and
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its future viewers situated in other times and locales. The “photographic situation” thus
constellates together diverse social actors in different times and places that are brought actually
and virtually together through photography. Photography as imaged by Azoulay is a contracting
medium that binds people and places together.
Azoulay’s key argument is that no single photographic actor can reasonably claim
sovereign ownership over the photographic situation since the event of photography establishes a
sociality that is shared. In an essay simply titled “Photography,” Azoulay writes: “Human
subjects, occupying different roles in the event of photography, do play one or another part in it,
but the encounter is never entirely in the sole control of any of them; no one is the sole signatory
to the event of photography.”47 The form of seeing made possible by photography, argues
Azoulay, is technologically, and therefore socially and historically, mediated. Each participant in
the photographic situation effectively signs away the “right to preserve his or her own
autonomous visual field.”48 Photography consigns them to a form of social belonging “not
synchronized or controlled by a sovereign power,” but one that is instead constituted at once in
“different places and by different people who are bound together in civil association on account
of photography.”49
Azoulay opens to view aspects of the social and political dimensions of photographic
action, but her model neither accounts for the psychical specificity of the roles played by
spectators, photographers, and photographed subjects nor the historical process by which they
emerged. Media theorist, Celia Lury, attempts to cross this chasm by conceptualizing
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photography as a prosthetic engagement that binds individuals, technologies, and social bodies,
and produces novel modes of individuation and socialization.50
In Prosthetic Culture, Lury poses the question of how subjects come to see themselves
and others though the prosthetic perspective of photography. Lury terms this practice of seeing
simply “seeing photographically.”51 The camera, for Lury, is a prosthetic that simultaneously
constructs and enables subjectivities to move into and inhabit what Azoulay calls “the arena of
photography.”52 Because photography alters one’s perception of the world, it necessarily impacts
the perception of oneself and others, whether consciously or not. Lury is ultimately interested in
the psychical and cultural histories of how people come to see themselves though prostheses of
their own making. The history of photography is Lury’s prime example. Photography gives its
user a prosthetic eye and memory with which to capture and hold an image of others. This very
capacity, however, changes the camera operator by reorienting her position and perspective with
respect to the photographed subject and vice versa. Lury’s project admirably recounts the
emergence of prosthetic culture by tracing the dissemination of photographic technologies and
practices, and their impact on knowledge fields, but it does not specifically address the psychical
and social novelty of the subject position of the nineteenth-century photographer since her focus
is primarily on the development of twentieth-century prosthetic culture.
As previously noted, a groundbreaking account of the role of photography in subject
formation is given by Jonathan Crary in Techniques of the Observer. Crary breaks with arthistorical (and art-history inspired) accounts of nineteenth-century visual culture. Crary’s
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innovative work jettisons the narrative convention according to which changes in visual
representation (and perception) in the nineteenth century are seen as the outcome of a dialectical
antagonism between avant-gardism and academicism. As Crary puts it: “What this book takes as
its object is not the empirical data of artworks or the ultimately idealist notion of an isolable
‘perception,’ but instead the no less problematic phenomenon of the observer.”53 Crary locates
the emergence of the nineteenth-century “observer” at the nexus of a set of optical technologies –
photography primarily – and related practices of seeing.
Crary’s Foucauldianism is clearly visible throughout Techniques of the Observer. While
Crary’s focus on the “observer” might suggest a traditional subject-centered account, Crary is
quick to clarify his theoretical intent. He writes: “If it can be said that there is an observer
specific to the nineteenth century, or to any period, it is only as an effect of an irreducibly
heterogeneous system of discursive, social, technological, and institutional relations.”54 The
italicization of the term “effect” in the above passage signals Crary’s methodological
identification with Foucault’s argument that a subject is produced by, and is an effect of,
discourses and knowledge/power practices. Crary writes: “I want to delineate an observing
subject who was both a product of and at the same time constitutive of modernity in the
nineteenth century.”55 Crary argues that this novel observer of the nineteenth century, constituted
by “a process of modernization,” became the prototypical modern subject – a subject “adequate
to a constellation of new events, forces, and institutions that together are loosely and perhaps
tautologically definable as ‘modernity.’”56
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Despite some similarities to Crary’s project, this study is in detail radically different.
Firstly, this study argues that technical and technological processes, while important, are not as
singularly determinant as Crary’s study suggests. The relation between techniques and
technologies and subject positions is understood here not as unidirectional causal processes
whereby a technologically specific technique (say of observation) effects the production of a
specific subject position. This study instead advocates a dynamical, bidirectional model as will
be explained in chapter two. Secondly, this study is concerned with the emergence of a much
more specific subject position – the photographer – which is both an observing and producing
subject. Thirdly, this study argues that it is necessary for historical and theoretical reasons to
stress the role played by autobiographical narration in the production of the nineteenth-century
photographer. Fourthly, the argument of this study is built on individual case studies. This
difference is not only a matter of methodological preference, but of argumentative necessity.
Whereas Crary seeks to de-personalize his account of the observer, I argue it is necessary to
account for how practitioners understood themselves as photographers since that very selfunderstanding is part and parcel of the historical record.
1.4 Scope
The scope of this study is at once restrictive and expansive. It is restrictive in that it
restricts itself to a detailed reading of three texts by three of the most important photographers of
the nineteenth century: Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. But it is expansive in that my aim is
to sketch the broad historical and theoretical contours of the nineteenth-century photographer. It
is my argument that the photographer qua historical subject position cannot be adequately
described or theorized without reference to a photographer. But a photographer only makes
sense when understood in the broader context of the emergence of the photographer as a novel
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subject position. The photographer and a photographer are inextricably entwined: discussing one
invariably circles round into discussing the other. But the relation between the two is not simply
circular. The photographer, I argue, came into being through the interrelation of photographic
technologies, discourses, and practices on the one hand and modes of self-understanding,
including autobiographical narration, on the other.
1.5 Outline of Chapters
Chapter two lays out a theoretical framework for reading the case studies. I combine
elements of Foucault’s concept of the subject position with the work of Peter Sloterdijk, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, and Walter Benjamin. Foucault, particularly the early Foucault of The
Archaeology of Knowledge, provides a way of interpreting the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and
Cameron as what I call “points” that pinpoint specific discursive sites within the historical epoch
of nineteenth-century photography. Robinson marks a site at which a discourse of the
photographer as at once artist and bourgeois subject comes into focus; Rejlander indexes the
fractious rhetoric of the art versus photography debate that divided the subject position of the
nineteenth-century photographer; and Cameron illuminates the constraining norms of nineteenthcentury photographic practice, particularly the norm of “still” photography, as well as the
constraining norms of Victorian domesticity and femininity. I supplement this “point” reading of
Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron with the “spherological” perspective provided by Sloterdijk’s
Bubbles, the first installment of his philosophical trilogy titled Spheres.
Bubbles offers a compelling retelling of the history of the Western conception of the
modern subject, subjectivity, and selfhood as imaged by the sphere. With reference to a dizzying
array of examples drawn from philosophy, literature, religion, medicine, cosmology, and more,
Sloterdijk convincingly shows how the sphere has been central to the subject of the Western
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imaginary. Sloterdijk’s main argument is that modernity – beginning sometime in the early
fifteenth century – underwent a succession of traumatic events from Copernicus to Freud. The
protective shells or spheres that had metaphysically protected the human subject were
successively shattered. With each de-shelling of the subject, modernity responded with various
social, political, psychical, and spiritual therapies that sought – but always failed – to reestablish
the protective metaphysical enclosure of the pre-modern world. Sloterdijk’s perspective
resonates, as I show, with Merleau-Ponty’s recasting of the subject as a subject of embodiment
and Walter Benjamin’s vision of the modern subject as traumatized by the onslaught of the
modern world. Together Foucault, Sloterdijk, Merleau-Ponty, and Benjamin enable me to read
the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron with an eye to their significance both as historical
documents that speak to the emergence of the nineteenth-century photographer in and through a
set of discursive contexts, and as autobiographical attempts to hollow out a space – a bubble – to
house and develop Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s emergent sense of themselves as
photographers.
Chapter three examines the case of Henry Peach Robinson. I focus largely on a close
reading of Robinson’s 1891 text – The Studio and What to Do in It. I argue that the text presents
a vivid picture of the ontological crisis that attended pictorialist photography, art-photography’s
first major aesthetic movement, of which Robinson was a pioneer and chief theoretician. I argue
that despite repeated and failed attempts to ground photography, and the photographer, on the
seemingly contradictory bases of art and middle class values, Robinson’s text ultimately fails to
provide a coherent ontological definition of photography. What precisely one is to do in the
photography studio ironically is unanswered by Robinson’s text despite its confident,
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pedagogical tone. Hence the text negatively points to the problematic nature of the cultural
identity of the nineteenth-century photographer.
Chapter four examines the case of Oscar G. Rejlander. My reading focuses largely on
Rejlander’s 1863 text, “An Apology for Art-Photography.” The text’s title suggests that it
provides a defense or an apology for art-photography. It does not. The text is actually a strange,
often baffling, autobiographical fragment in which Rejlander attempts to retrace his entrance into
photographic practice. Multiple personae and sudden shifts in scene and setting undermine the
text’s coherence. But this incoherence, I argue, reveals Rejlander’s struggle to narrate and come
to grips with what he had become in becoming a photographer. The “Apology” provides the
reader with a personal and paradigmatic portrait of the advent of a photographer, and thus also
the photographer.
Chapter five examines the case of Julia Margaret Cameron. The chapter focuses on a
reading of Cameron’s autobiographical text – Annals of My Glass House – published in 1874.
Like Rejlander’s “Apology,” Cameron’s Annals presents the story of Cameron’s entrance into
photographic practice. But unlike Rejlander’s writing, and for that matter Robinson’s, Cameron’s
text is apparently free of ontological anxieties concerning the nature of photography. Her text
rebounds with the joys of becoming in ways otherwise than those prescribed by nineteenthcentury norms of photographic practice – her use of soft-focus being the most obvious example
of this – as well as the joys (and trials) of becoming otherwise than the norms of Victorian
domesticity and femininity demanded. Cameron’s writing opens to view the emergence of the
photographer who saw the identity crisis of early photography as an incentive and an opportunity
to transcend its conventions and prescriptions, and in so doing change not only how photography
could be made but also what one could become in and through that making.
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Chapter six offers a conclusion in which I return to where I began – to the contemporary
photographer. Using my mother as an example of the contemporary photographer’s position, I
ask: what is different and the same about the contemporary photographer as compared to its
nineteenth-century predecessor? I argue that the question of the identity of photography and the
photographer has lost the existential gravitas it held in the nineteenth century. But nonetheless
this very shift is in part a historical consequence of the advent and development of the
nineteenth-century photographer.
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Chapter 2
Framing the Cases
The photographer qua subject position and a photographer are historically intertwined.
The social and historical forces that converged to produce photography opened operational
positions that new subjects called “photographers” came to occupy. Photographers have
historically inflected the social and historical condition of photography and in turn opened other
ways to be a photographer by incorporating photography into the sphere of self-understanding.
The self-conscious photographer is at once a position in the historical and social field and a set of
lived practices. To do justice to the words, works, and lives of Robinson, Rejlander, and
Cameron and to the history of the photographer’s emergence, it is crucial to resist reductionism
in either direction. Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron are neither solely a set of points that mark
the historical emergence of the nineteenth-century photographer nor are they names for three
irreducible biographical singularities. These names mark points in the emergence of the
nineteenth-century photographer and they signify a set of lived practices.
The processes by which each photographer came to an awareness of himself or herself as
a photographer is a case study in the formation of identity through photography, a technology
which in the nineteenth century was still in its infancy. At that time photography’s position in the
social and historical field was constitutively unsettled and fraught with contest and controversy
by the ontological dispute that split photography between art and science. Thus the writings of
Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron are cases studies in the formation of autobiographical
personae within the contested space of early photographic discourse and practice.
This chapter theorizes the photographer as iterated in texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and
Cameron by combining aspects of Foucault’s conceptualization of the subject as a position in the
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social and historical field with Peter Sloterdijk’s re-thinking of human interiority in Bubbles,
Merleau-Ponty’s prizing of embodiment, and Benjamin’s concept of modernity as traumatic
condition. I begin with a brief introduction to the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron.
Section two draws on Foucault’s early work, particularly The Archaeology of Knowledge, in
order to situate the subject position announced in these texts as well as to point out the
methodological limits of this approach. Section three supplements Foucault’s privileging of
positionality with Sloterdijk’s re-conceptualization of interiority through what he calls a theory
of “microspherology.”57 Whereas Foucault sees the subject as historically produced by external
(social and political) forces or more broadly “power,” and is generally dismissive of psychology,
Sloterdijk is interested in the history of how subjects have developed interiorizing perspectives.
Neither embracing nor rejecting the metaphysics of various forms of Cartesianism, Sloterdijk
instead seeks to describe the historically human impulse to picture oneself as a container of
emotions, thoughts, dreams, fantasies, fears, and hopes. I go on in turn to supplement Sloterdijk’s
model of the subject with the concept of embodied discourse provided by Merleau-Ponty, and
finally end with Benjamin’s thinking of the modern subject as a subject of trauma, which
resonates with Sloterdijk’s picture of the fragile, always-about-to-be-de-shelled subject. In sum,
the chapter seeks to forge a third way between Foucault’s subject position and Sloterdijk’s
sphere in an effort to establish a perspective from which it is possible to see the photographer as
at once a subject position and a photographer as a set of lived practices.
2.1 The Cases
Nineteenth-century photography was a diverse amalgam of discourses, practices, and
technologies that constructed new ways of seeing and knowing that in turn engendered
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competing theories on the nature of photographic vision. Confusion and controversy centered on
the question of whether photographic practice was a means to reveal objective optical truth or
whether it was a medium for subjective expression. Cutting through this complex discursive
manifold were social, cultural, and political concerns with what it meant to be a photographer,
who had the right to call oneself a photographer, and what openings and obstacles confronted the
effort to envision oneself as a photographer. The contestations that constituted nineteenthcentury photography positioned the photographer in multiple and differing ways. Each case
study offers a unique perspective on the incredibly diversified field that was early photography.
It will be useful at this stage, then, to briefly introduce my three case studies.
Henry Peach Robinson was born in Ludlow, England and died in 1901. He was the eldest
of four children born to John Robinson, a teacher, and his wife Eliza. The young Henry took
drawing lessons for a brief spell before taking up an apprenticeship in the bookselling trade. He
stayed in the book trade through the early part of his adult life. He first started taking
photographs in 1855. In the same year he opened a portrait studio in the town of Leamington. 58
Portraiture provided a stable source of income for Robinson, but he was avidly seeking to do
something more aesthetically adventuresome. At that time a trend was beginning to take shape
amongst aesthetically ambitious photographers in England. These photographers, later known as
“pictorialists,” took their cues from the so-called Pre-Raphaelites of England. The PreRaphaelites and the pictorialist movement are discussed at greater length in chapter three, but it
is important to point out for the moment that the Pre-Raphaelites were a group of painters, poets,
and critics who opposed the doxa of nineteenth-century realism. They rejected both the idealized
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realism of the Renaissance and that of their contemporaries such as Manet. They instead sought
to reinvigorate a pre-modern, pre-Renaissance, or pre-Raphaelite aesthetic committed to
allegorical and spiritual illumination. The Pre-Raphaelites were anti-modernists. Collectively
they sought to re-enchant realism for the purposes of moral edification. In time Robinson would
become one of pictorialism’s most steadfast champions and its chief theoretician.
Robinson’s pictorialist work met with high praise and his studio practice flourished. But
at the age of thirty-four he was forced to retire from photography due to ill-health brought on by
prolonged exposure to hazardous photographic chemicals. His retirement from studio work
provided him with the opportunity to reflect and, eventually, to write extensively on the practice
of photography and to engage in the ensuing debate on the aesthetic and artistic merit of the new
medium. Beginning in 1869 and continuing on for roughly thirty years, Robinson wrote
instruction manuals for students of photography. Robinson’s The Studio and What to Do in It,
published in 1891, which is discussed at length in chapter three, exemplifies Robinson’s strategy
for securing the cultural legitimacy of pictorialist photography. Rather than enter into the
academic debate on the question of the artistic merit of photography, Robinson sought to secure
photography’s cultural legitimacy by codifying and disseminating in teachable form pictorialist
techniques. Rather than win the case for the legitimacy of art-photography through academic
discussion, Robinson sought to win it practically by training a generation of photographers in
pictorialist principles. The strategy of converting abstract aesthetic concerns into practical,
teachable principles centered on an effort to codify a set of techniques for the formation of a
particular kind of photographer, a particular subject position, namely, that of the pictorialist
photographer.
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What Robinson was unable to do, however, as will be shown in chapter three, was to
identify what photography specifically was beyond vague and unconvincing comparisons to the
arts of painting and poetry. Likewise too, Robinson gives no account of what it might mean to be
a photographer in ways not prescribed by pictorialist principles. Robinson’s fidelity to
pictorialism betrayed a profound anxiety concerning what photography and the photographer
was or could be.
Oscar Gustave Rejlander was born in 1813 in Sweden and relocated in England as a
young man.59 He studied art in Rome in the early 1850s. He married a woman named Mary
Constable and settled in the industrial town of Wolverhampton. He pursued a career as a painter
but with limited critical or financial success. In 1852, Rejlander travelled again to Rome where
he first encountered photographs that struck his interest – reproductions of artworks. Rejlander
sensed what a benefit these could be to painters who wished to study the Masters but who did not
have ready access to museums. On his return to England he and his wife moved to London where
Rejlander began to actively pursue a career as a photographer, first by making photographic
studies for use by painters. It was through this practice, which proved to be financially
rewarding, that Rejlander began to experiment with photography in a more profound way.
Rejlander pioneered the technique of combination printing in which multiple negatives are
printed together to form the illusion of a single photographic image. It was his mastery of this
technique that enabled Rejlander to make his most famous photograph, titled The Two Ways of
Life of 1857. With its forthright depiction of naked women, Two Ways of Life, upset many
photography critics, including Thomas Sutton who all but dismissed the work as obscene. The
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ensuing controversy prompted Rejlander to write a short paper that year, titled “An Apology for
Art-Photography.” He read the paper first at the London Photographic Society, to which he had
been elected president. It was soon after printed and circulated widely through the photographic
press.
Despite its academic sounding title, the “Apology” is really a brief autobiography in
which Rejlander retraces the steps that led him to take up the study and practice of photography.
The writing follows an aleatory, meandering path. Unlike Robinson’s writings, this text neither
presents a case for art-photography in any detail nor does it address the question of how it should
be made. Rejlander speaks from a place of ambivalence and uncertainty as to what he himself is
doing in doing photography. The life-story told in the “Apology” is a stitched together collection
of multiple and conflicting accounts of Rejlander’s origins as a photographer. These accounts are
told through a series of narrative personae that consistently undermine the essay’s
autobiographical coherence. The essay demonstrates a self-conscious admission of the crisis of
identity that haunted early photography and those that practiced it. The “Apology” represents a
nascent attempt to come to grips with photography on its own terms, which meant embracing the
crisis of identity that marked its early discursive formation.
Julia Margaret Cameron was born Julia Margaret Pattle on June 11, 1815 in Calcutta,
India.60 She was the third daughter of James and Adeline Pattle. James Pattle was an official
with the East India Trading Company. The family was comparatively well off and young
Margaret was educated in France. Julia Margaret met Charles Hay Cameron, a rising legal
scholar and practicing lawyer who was twenty-six years her senior and also in the employ of the
East India Trading Company. Charles Cameron’s intellectual interests were not confined to law.
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He was also avidly interested in aesthetics. In the early 1840s, Charles published his Essay on the
Sublime and the Beautiful. Charles’s interest in aesthetics was one reason he was supportive of
Cameron’s decision to pursue photography. The couple married in February of 1838 in Calcutta
and moved to London in 1848.
In England, Cameron began to cultivate an impressive social network that would
eventually include the poet Alfred Lord Tennyson, the philosopher Thomas Carlyle, and the
biologist Charles Darwin, among many others. Cameron was an expert socialite and her
connections proved invaluable for her studio practice. Around 1850, Cameron began to spend
more and more time at the family’s retreat in the village of Freshwater on the Isle of Wight. Her
life there was enlivened by frequent visits from Tennyson and other notables from her elite social
circle. But she was also often lonely as her letters from this time clearly indicate. As her children
grew, married, or left for school, and with Charles frequently away on business trips abroad,
Julia Margaret found herself increasingly bereft of the daily domestic routine she was
accustomed to.
By the late 1850s, Cameron began making photography albums as a hobby. These
lovingly and carefully decorated albums were often made as gifts to her family and friends. It
was Cameron’s interest in making photographic albums that likely motivated her daughter Juley
and her husband Norman to give Cameron a camera for a Christmas gift in 1864. Cameron began
to study photography in earnest at this time. At Freshwater she converted the family chicken
coop into a studio, which she called (as was common at the time) her “glass house” owing to the
many skylights she had installed as was needed in the days before electric lighting. Her social
network provided her with models of means, which enabled her to establish her reputation as a
portraitist in influential social circles. But her ambitions did not stop there.
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By the late 1860s, Cameron followed the pictorialist turn and began making artphotographs based on Classical and Christian themes. She forged a unique aesthetic marked most
significantly by her use of “soft-focus.” In 1874, Cameron’s work was publicly recognized
through a travelling retrospective that toured England, America, and the Continent. Cameron
wrote a short autobiographical memoir titled Annals of My Glass House to accompany the
exhibition. The text traces Cameron’s entrance into photographic practice and charts her early
successes and failures. Her writing, like her work, as chapter five demonstrates, offers a
profound rethinking of the act of photography by foregrounding the body in motion as opposed
to the poised or forcibly restrained body of “still” photography. The Annals recasts photography
as a fluid medium in contrast to the rigid codification of techniques espoused by dogmatic
pictorialists. The Annals marks out a position in the field of nineteenth-century photography
beyond the stylistic enclosure of pictorialism and its unspoken identity crisis. The very ambiguity
of photography offered Cameron degrees of freedom for the practice of photography, which in
turn opened up novel social and psychical spaces within the otherwise restrictive field of
Victorian gender and class relations.
Schematically, the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron illumine three distinct
subject positions within the variegated and contradictory field of nineteenth-century
photography. Robinson marks the position of the photographer as middle class professional and
aesthetic challenger to the fine arts. Rejlander marks the confrontation with photography’s
ontological identity crisis giving rise to a split subject position of the photographer. Cameron
marks the gendered space of photographic production and the challenge to that space and to the
rigid, inflexible aesthetic norms of popular and pictorialist practice.
2.2 Points
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The texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron mark social and psychical stress points in
the constitution of the nineteenth-century photographer. These points or positions lie at the
interstices between art and science, between nature and machine, between subjective expression
and objective truth, and masculine and feminine. From a subject position perspective, Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron are names for differing sets of statements and the correlative conditions
of possibility for making them. It is the Foucault of The Archaeology of Knowledge who
radically sets the terms of this form of historical reading when he notes:
the subject of the statement should not be regarded as identical with the author of the
formulation – either in substance, or in function. He [or she] is not in fact the cause,
origin, or the starting-point of the phenomenon of the written or spoken articulation of a
sentence; nor is it that meaningful intention which, silently anticipating words, orders
them like the visible body of its intuition; it is not the constant, motionless, unchanging
focus of a series of operations that are manifested, in turn, on the surface of discourse
through the statements. It is a particular, vacant place that may in fact be filled by
different individuals.61
Foucault jettisons the idea that a statement is the product of an intentional subject. Rather for
Foucault it is the speaking or stating subject which is produced through discourse. At any given
historical moment there exist, Foucault argues, implicit and explicit social rules that regulate
what can be said. But these rules are flexible.
In an earlier text, The Order of Things, Foucault stressed that discourse in any historical
period is governed by a fixed set of rules that he calls an “episteme.” But in Archaeology he
abandons the use of that term and calls the system of rules the “archive.” The archive, for
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Foucault, is not simply a collection of historical facts or documents. Foucault writes: “The
archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements
as unique events.”62 Archival analysis, in Foucault’s sense, aims to understand how new or
“unique” statements appear as such within the regulative structure of a given historical epoch.
The Foucauldian archival researcher thus seeks out not only what constrains statements at a
certain historical moment, but also what makes it possible for novel ones to appear. The archive
(unlike the episteme) is conceptually characterized by flexibility, by the recognition of the
possibility that the rules of statement making are subject to change. As Lois McNay notes in her
study of Foucault, “the archive is...not a limiting or constraining formation but an enabling
system of rules which is never entirely complete and which is, therefore, always open to
change.”63 Researching the archive, in Foucault’s sense, means researching not merely what it
was possible to say or do during a certain historical period, but also what rules enabled the
transformability of statements and acts during that particular time.
While the Foucault of Archaeology aims to discover the rules for the production of novel
historical statements, he is for the most part silent on how “individuals” arrive on the scene of
discourse and embody positions within it. As McNay notes, “the social processes that determine
how individuals come to occupy the ‘vacant place’ [of discourse]...is not considered” by
Foucault.64 McNay continues:
Discursive subject positions become a priori categories which individuals seem to
occupy in an unproblematic fashion. Indeed ‘different individuals’ [Foucault’s phrase]
creates difficulties because it implies that individuals have a unified, prediscursive

62

Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 145.
McNay, Foucault, 66.
64
McNay, Foucault, 77.
63

41

existence which enables them to step freely in and out of the different available subject
positions.65
Foucault’s later work, however, does seek a more nuanced account of subject formation.
From the third volume of his History of Sexuality, titled The Care of the Self, clear through the
Collège de France lectures, Foucault’s thinking focuses squarely on the question of how
subjectivity and specifically selfhood are constituted through what he calls “techniques of the
self.”66 Foucault traces the emergence and transformation of the care of the self from Ancient
Greece and Rome through the Christian era. Foucault’s aim in this later work is to show how the
care of the self transformed from an ascetic practice in the Ancient world to a moral hindrance in
the Christian era. Foucault’s late work shifts to a micrological focus on how power and
knowledge are exercised in intimate relations, including the introspective relation between one’s
thought and one’s sense of self. Foucault asserts in an interview in 1984 that his later work seeks
to grasp the historical evolution and function of the “exercise of self upon self by which one tries
to work out, to transform one’s self and attain a certain mode of being.”67 The interviewer finds
this surprising. He confesses that he assumed that he, Foucault, had always steadfastly “refused
to speak about the subject in general.”68 Foucault responds:
No I had not ‘refused.’ I perhaps had some formulations which were inadequate. What I
refused was precisely that you first of all set up a theory of the subject –as could be done
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in phenomenology and existentialism –and that, beginning from a theory of the subject,
you come to pose the question of knowing, for example, how such and such a form of
knowledge was possible.69
Foucault is keen to point out that, in his view, his work does not seek to displace the subject per
se, but rather to displace the philosophic practice of inquiring into the conditions of knowledge
according to a trans-historical, a-priori model of the subject. Foucault insists on a methodological
reversal of the ratio-centric knowledge schema. Foucault theorizes the subject as an “effect” of
certain knowledge practices or what he later calls “games of truth.”70 Foucault’s historicoontological method does not jettison the subject; it jettisons the idea that there is one, unique, and
true subject that is the ground of all knowledge. Foucault here, as in his essay “What is an
Author?,” is keen to distance his position from an uncritical rejection of the subject tout court.
Foucault instead sees the subject as a historical variable. For the philosopher there has been a
host of subjects produced though historically specific processes of discourse formation and
diffusion. Where there is a discourse, there forms a subject is the constant refrain of Foucault’s
work. His late work supplements a macroscopic view of the subject as a product of sociohistorical discourse with a microscopic focus on processes of self-constitution – the discourse of
the self to the self. Foucault comments:
You do not have towards yourself the same kind of relationships when you constitute
yourself as a political subject who goes and votes or speaks up at a meeting, and when
you try to fulfill yourself in a sexual relationship. There are no doubt some relationships
and some interferences between these different kinds of subject but we are not in the
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presence of the same kind of subject. In each case, we play, we establish with one’s self
some different form of relationship.71
Foucault here presents a model of the subject as changeable from moment to moment as it is
(re)produced though relations of knowledge and power. Foucault concludes that “it is precisely
the historical constitution of these different forms of subject relating to games of truth that
interest me.”72 This concluding remark exposes the central problem of Foucault’s late work,
namely, how to align his macroscopic view of the subject as an effect of historical discourse with
his microscopic view of the subject as an effect of a continually shifting set of power/knowledge
relations. Added to this, Foucault’s late work also seeks to account for the role of the self in its
very constitution without falling into psychologism. The task was and remains immense.
Foucault’s late work clearly tries to move beyond his earlier formulation of the subject as
a one-dimensional, historically specific and discursively situated position or point in a
constellated field of historical discourse. Although it is manifestly evident in his late work, traces
of his dissatisfaction with this point schema also show up in his early work. Consider his
enigmatic aside in Archaeology, that discourse should not be imagined as having the “appearance
of a monotonous, endless plain that I attributed to it…when I spoke of ‘the surface of
discourse.’”73 Foucault goes on to note that if discourse could be morphologically figured it
would be comprised of a plurality of “heterogeneous regions,” each with a “complex volume.”74
Foucault’s effort to see discourse as a shape may have sprung from a desire to better picture how
discourse not only positions but psychically inhabits its subjects. While Foucault voices passing
interest (in the same interview) in Freudian inspired psychological and psychoanalytical
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concepts, including “repression and interiorization,” he is suspicious that this way of thinking
inexorably reinforces individualistic conceptions of the subject that serve to obscure the shaping
power of history and society. Foucault’s nascent attempt to re-picture the relation between
discourse and subject or even outside (social and historical forces) and inside or interior life
(dreams, memories, fantasies, etc.) has found its metaphysical pioneer, I argue, in the person (or
persona) of Peter Sloterdijk, to whose work I now turn. Sloterdijk’s work provides a salient
supplement to Foucault’s concept of subject position. Taken together these two perspectives
allow for a richer description of the historical and psychical processes through which Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron constituted themselves as photographers.
2.3 Bubbles
Sloterdijk advances his theory of the subject in Bubbles, the first installment of his
philosophico-historical trilogy titled Spheres. Bubbles aims at nothing less than a wholesale retheorization of the relation between subject, object, and world in the Modern Age as told and
imaged through the form of the sphere. This at first might sound whimsical if not preposterous.
However, with reference to a dizzying array of examples from art, cosmology, psychology,
mysticism, medicine, literature, philosophy, and much else, Sloterdijk shows how the sphere has
been central to the imaginary of the Modern Age.
Sloterdijk begins with an oft-repeated truism. The Copernican Revolution destroyed the
comforting illusion that humans dwell under the protective spheres of the heavens watched over
by their creator. The ascent of humanism in the Renaissance, the scientific and political
revolutions of the Enlightenment, the Industrial Age, Darwin, Nietzsche, Freud, Einstein, Bohr,
Heisenberg, in short the Modern Age, repeatedly exposed humanity to the cold indifference of an
accidental world. In response, the Modern Age furnished itself with new structures designed to
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protect it from the effects of its own progress. Sloterdijk writes: “To oppose the cosmic frost
infiltrating the human sphere through the open windows of the Enlightenment, modern
humanity...attempts to balance out its shellessness in space, following the shattering of its
celestial domes.”75
For Sloterdijk, modernity is not simply The Age of Reason. It is also a deeply
metaphysical even mystical period. It seeks through a host of means to recapture the protective
guarantees of the pre-modern world. Sloterdijk’s analysis has a certain affinity with the view
advanced by Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment, namely that modern Reason
never broke with its supposed enemy – mysticism.76 As Adorno and Horkheimer argue, Reason
underwent a mystical enchantment as it promised nothing short of redemption for a blind and
ignorant humanity. Sloterdijk, however, takes an imaginative leap that would have made Adorno
and Horkheimer deeply uncomfortable. Sloterdijk proposes a psychical and social metaphysics:
human subjectivity is described as a fragile bubble—a self-enclosed sphere—floating
haphazardly amidst the sharp edges of the modern world. The danger of the modern world has
given rise, Sloterdijk argues, to a whole host of social, political, and psychological therapies
designed ultimately to shield fragile subjectivities from the brute materiality of an unkind world.
Sloterdijk writes:
What makes the Modern Age special is that after the turn to the Copernican world, the
sky as an immune system was suddenly useless. Modernity is characterized by the
technical production of its immunities and the increasing removal of its safety structures
from the traditional theological and cosmological narratives. Industrial-scale civilization,
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the welfare state, the world market and the media sphere: all these large-scale projects
aim, in a shelless time, for an imitation of the now impossible, imaginary spheric
security.77
Modern subjects are “disappointed, cold and abandoned;” hence, Sloterdijk argues, they “wrap
themselves in surrogates of older conceptions of the world, as long as these still seem to hold a
trace of the warmth of old human illusions of encompassedness.”78
Sloterdijk pictures the history of the Modern Age as a morphological venture on the part
of humanity to create in-dwelling spaces – bubbles – to shield itself from the world it made.
These bubble worlds seek to form inter-globular links through intimate encounter, love,
domination, exchange, and so forth. Bubbles presents a history of the Western subject as a
subject in search of a lost metaphysical shelter to protect its transparently fragile self.
Sloterdijk’s model, contra much contemporary theory of the last forty-plus years, privileges the
concept of interiority (indeed the title of chapter two of Bubbles is “Thinking the Interior”).
Sloterdijk favors an epistemological prioritization of the psychical over the social – the inside
over the outside – but with the caveat that the two in the end must be thought together. He writes:
“though sphere theory by its nature begins as a psychology of inner spatial formation...it
inevitably develops further into a general theory of autogenous vessels. This theory provides the
abstract form for all immunologies.”79
Sloterdijk refuses to refuse the concept of interiority as many of his contemporaries do.
Rejecting what he calls “interior deniers,” Sloterdijk’s aim, however, is not to credit a notion of
interiority as a pre-given innate kernel of identity exemplified by Descartes’ “I.” Sloterdijk
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instead is interested in charting the various ways in which the modern human subject has thought
of itself as an interiorized and interiorizing being. Sloterdijk seeks to supplement the Foucauldian
focus on the shaping power of external social and political forces with a psychological emphasis
in order to render a fuller picture of the history of the Western subject. Sloterdijk conceptualizes
interiority as at once inside and outside the subject. Taking a cue from psychoanalysis, Sloterdijk
sees the inside of the subject as composed of experiences had in the world “out there.” But this
inside is seared by the residuum of memory, which through individuated action in turn affects the
outside world. Willem Schinkel and Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens note that the Sloterdijkian
bubble resembles “elements of a Foucauldian dispositif in its mesh of discourse, practice and
objects and in its potential to ‘shape’ subjects.”80 Foucault’s term “dispositif,” which can be
translated as “apparatus,” refers to the assemblage of discourses, practices, bodies, and
institutions through which subject formation occurs.81 Schinkel and Noordegraaf-Eelens go on to
note that Sloterdijk “directs his attention to what Foucault call[s] ‘practices of self.’ Indeed,
Sloterdijk’s work appears to move through similar phases from macro-spheres to micro-spheres
and practices of the self.”82 But the Foucauldian dispositif and the Sloterdijkian bubble are
different in that the dispositif is not a theory of subjects but of the process of subject formation,
whereas the bubble is a theory about subjects that stipulates that a subject – at least a Western
modern subject – is a being that seeks with typological regularity to ground and enclose itself.
Schinkel and Noordegraaf-Eelens note: “With Sloterdijk, ontology becomes ontotopology.”83
They conclude: “What Sloterdijk gains with his description of ‘spheres’ is, ontologically, a way
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to conceptualize social life as consisting of the precarious building and break-down of spatial
collectivities.”84
Sloterdijk thus proposes a psycho-sociological history of the subject. He credits the
modern study of the psyche (psychology and psychoanalysis principally) for “explaining that all
humans live constructivistically, and that every one of them practices the profession of a wild
interior designer.”85 Sloterdijk sees modern psychology as archaeological evidence that the
Western human subject sought to fashion its identity in the form of a psychical container filled
with memories, regrets, dreams, ambitions, and so forth. Foucault would surely bristle at
Sloterdijk’s praise for modern psychology’s poetics of interiority. Foucault’s work insists over
and over that it is necessary to look outside the subject to understand subjectivity at all. But
Sloterdijk’s bubble project in no way disputes this. To illustrate this, consider for a moment a
soap bubble.
A bubble begins its existence as a flat shimmering liquid surface suspended precariously
in the bubble blower’s loop. When blown upon, this thin fragile sheet expands and folds upon
itself and forms a bubble. Now imagine that the bubble loop represents a certain point in
historical time and space, and the soap represents a certain admixture of discourse. Foucault sees
the subject as framed by the apparatus or dispositif of its production. He sees the subject as the
soap suspended in the loop – a concentration of discourse at a particular historico-temporal
juncture. Sloterdijk sees the subject as the formed bubble floating in historical and social space.
What this illustration is designed to show is that Sloterdijk’s perspective does not replicate
Cartesianism. The interior of the bubble is made of the same stuff as the exterior – air and soap.
But the spaces are distinct. Likewise the interior of the Sloterdijkian bubble is composed of the
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world “out there” –society, history, and experience. But the inside space is different from the
outside, and this difference matters. The process of bubble formation is a process by which the
outside becomes the inside – a process of interiorizing – which produces and is driven by the
subject simultaneously.
Despite its somewhat esoteric nature, Sloterdijk’s project has affinities with some recent
work in the sociology of knowledge. Neil Gross, a pioneer in this field, offers a methodological
point of departure in his recent socio-biography of the American neo-pragmatist philosopher
Richard Rorty (1931-2007). Gross’ work may seem far from the concerns of this study. But what
is salient for the present discussion is Gross’ re-theorization of the relation between discourse
and the formation of selfhood. The first section of Gross’ study presents a straightforward
biographical account of the life and work of Rorty. But in the second section of the book, Gross
offers an account of how it was historically and socially possible for a figure like Rorty to
emerge within the academic sphere of mid-twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. Gross
asks: what made it possible for Rorty to reject the analytic tradition in the name of a revival of
nineteenth-century American pragmatism and nonetheless continue to achieve academic
success? How was it possible for Rorty to pull off this institutional shake-up and continue to
thrive within the American philosophical establishment?
The finer points of Gross’ argument are obviously not relevant to this study. What is
significant is that Gross argues that it is illegitimate to focus exclusively on social, historical, and
institutional factors, and to ignore how a given historical actor understands oneself since the very
process of self-understanding is part and parcel of the social mechanism. Gross describes the
relation between discourse and selfhood not in terms of a unidirectional flow as Foucault seems
to. Gross sees the relation between the external world of discourse and the interior psychical
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sense of self as an autopoietic system. Gross writes that “much research by social psychologists
and others suggests that social action is typically mediated by actors’ own selfunderstandings.”86 Self-understanding, the processes by which it occurs, the categories it
comprises, the means of narration it offers, are all, Gross argues, socially and historically
conditioned, but the mediating action of self-understanding recursively generates different modes
of social action that inflect the social environment and in turn transform the discursive spaces in
which selfhood is fashioned. The external world of discourse is interiorized, as it were, in the
fashioning of self-understanding which then loops back out into social space in the form of
different social actions that are inflected by “actors’ conceptualizations of themselves and their
lives.”87 Practices of self-understanding such as autobiography in Gross’ view function within a
dynamical socio-psychical process that produces the subject of the statement at the same time
that the statement itself reconstitutes the social field, if only very slightly, and thus the individual
in turn. Gross, like Sloterdijk, thus argues that subjectivity is best described as a constant
dynamical relay between outside and inside – between the building of interiorized selfhood as
response to and product of external social and historical conditions.
2.4 Language and Embodiment
To posit the spherical model (Sloterdijk) over the point model (Foucault) would simply
replace one abstract model for another. What goes missing in Foucault and Sloterdijk’s
contrasting views on interiority is an account of lived experience. Despite their divergent
perspectives, Foucault and Sloterdijk share the same underlying methodological bias, which is
that it is proper to treat interiority as a matter of archaeological research. Both steer clear of
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opening the question from the perspective of its lived conditions. Both share – for different
reasons – a resistance to phenomenology. But, as this study will show (particularly in chapter
five), phenomenology offers an immensely powerful philosophical means for negotiating the
complex relations between photographic practice, life-writing, the constitution of identity, and
the performance of selfhood iterated in the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron.
For the archaeologist, phenomenology names a stratum of historical discourse
(philosophic discourse in this case). The archaeologist can speak about phenomenology but not
through it. To the archaeologist or the genealogist phenomenology is a subject to be investigated
solely in terms of its historical conditions of possibility. But phenomenology, whose primary
investigative subjects are sense, embodiment, and perception, lived experience is accessible to
philosophical reflection. Phenomenology is not for this reason superior to archaeology. Nor
should a facile distinction be drawn between the two perspectives. Archaeology investigates the
historical conditions of possibility for phenomena. Phenomenology investigates the experience
of phenomena. But arguably they both utilize a methodological procedure derived from the
founder of phenomenology – Edmund Husserl.
Husserl’s method for investigating experience required what he called “bracketing” the
truth/appearance distinction. The phenomenologist, for Husserl, is not to ask: is what I
experience merely an appearance or the truth? Rather one is to bracket that question and
concentrate one’s philosophic energies on describing the experience as a phenomenon in its own
right. On this view, for example, a dream, though imaginary, is experienced as real. The fact that
the dreamer wakes up and realizes she was dreaming, for the phenomenologist, is immaterial
with respect to the reality of the dream as experienced. The procedure of bracketing also obtains
– in a different form – for archaeological research. The archaeologist, as evidenced by Foucault’s

52

early studies, brackets the epistemological truth-value of the discourse under examination. This
question is bracketed or suspended in favour of inquiring into the conditions of possibility for the
discourse itself. Foucault, however, remained deeply suspicious of the concept of the
phenomenological “given” of experience. In Foucault’s view, the power of discourse is primary
in that it is discourse that shapes and to a large extent makes experience intelligible. Discourse
for Foucault both describes and constitutes phenomena. Still, Foucault’s archaeological method
employs a quasi-phenomenological bracketing procedure as Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus
have shown in order to epistemologically open discursive practices to view.88
Phenomenology and archaeology/genealogy both “bracket” the question of truth in an
absolute sense in order to inquire into the specific conditions of phenomena. One could plot this
intersectional relation between phenomenology and archaeology as a chiasm. The
phenomenologist studies the experience of phenomena. The archaeologist studies the history of
phenomena. But at the centre of each project – and thus at the centre of this chiasm – is the
bracketing procedure. In both instances, the elucidation of phenomena depends on a procedural
decision to bracket the question of what is true in an absolute sense in favour of asking what is
the experience of the phenomena (phenomenology) and what are its conditions of possibility
(archaeology). To use a term favoured by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, there is an “intertwinement”
of archaeology and phenomenology at the level of their fundamental methodological
procedure.89 The passage from archaeology to phenomenology follows a folded path like passing
from one side of the Mobius strip to the other. Thus to pass now from the historical question of
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interiority raised by Foucault and Sloterdijk to the question of autobiographical experience via
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is to pass along a methodological continuum.
To write the story of one’s life – to write autobiography – is a fraught task. But one need
not rehearse the tired epitaphs that there is no “I” qua self for “I” is always a grammatical subject
and not a person. Foucault, Barthes, Derrida, and many others have insisted on eschewing
metaphysical conceptualizations of the self as a discrete entity, complete unto itself and existing
prior to acts of speech or writing. For poststructuralists, the self comes into being retrospectively
through discursive acts either initiated by the subject or projected onto him or her by exogenous
forces, and frequently both. The self that becomes accessible by writing is a paradoxical
phantasm: it at once provides the language of personhood, identity, and individuality, and yet
these very categories are linguistic and hence generalizable as an abstract code of signification.
Language is understood to be not expressive, but rather productive of, the subject. This view,
now well-entrenched, admirably broke free of metaphysically inflated conceptions of selfhood; it
also obscured to some degree the complexity of self-creation. For it is one thing to insist that
writing produces the self – in the form of the author, for example, retroactively – but it is another
thing to assert in a general manner that all claims to selfhood necessarily lose their respectability
on these grounds. Rather, one might say that it is precisely that a model of a non-stable, shifting,
and linguistically iterable self opens with the structural/poststructural insight.
It is this conception of the self that proves methodologically useful for interpreting the
texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. Their texts are case studies in the emergence of
selfhood in and through photographic and textual production. Their work bears testament to a
desire to know who they were becoming through photography and writing. To read Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron thus means reading not only the words signed by their texts, but the
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desire to be readable for themselves and for others. Autobiography is not only a genre: it is also a
desire.
To claim that autobiography is both a genre and a desire is to theorize language as an
intersectional medium that spans body and system. To speak and to write is a gesture. It is a
bodily event. But meaningful articulation is possible only by virtue of the existence of a
linguistic system. A linguistic system is also a system of rules (grammar), and these rules are
abstract, arbitrary—a matter of convention as Ferdinand de Saussure argued.90 The subject as a
thinking being, the poststructuralist declares, is impossible to conceive outside the conditions of
language, since it is through language that thought is made. Even the claim to be a thinking being
is, of course, itself a linguistic claim. If it is through language that any account of the “I” is
possible, then it would appear that all that can be said about oneself must be said through a
linguistic system that is in essence an impersonal, abstract, and arbitrary set of rules – a code –
that makes communication possible: “I” is a pronoun and never a person. Much important work
has been accomplished through this perspective, and deconstruction is one name for that
accomplishment, but other conclusions can be reached. One is offered by Maurice MerleauPonty in Phenomenology of Perception.
Merleau-Ponty takes aim at two views of language. One view of language he calls the
“intellectualist” and the other the “empiricist.” The intellectualist sees language as a container
and vehicle—a medium—for thought. On this view, language has no meaning in itself. Meaning
is a matter of thought not of words. The intellectualist will ask for the “thought behind the
words” and seek meaning there. Merleau-Ponty rejects this view on the same grounds as many a
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poststructuralist would later. (But these reasons can also be found in many other philosophers,
including Wittgenstein.) The position that there are thoughts behind words falls into a logical
trap. The question – what thought lies behind words? – is answered always in words. The
argument that “thought” determines the meaning of words can neither be confirmed nor falsified
since “thought” in itself (if such a thing exists) is effaced at the instant it is cited or described.
The “empiricist” view, on the other hand, sees linguistic meaning as entirely determined by the
mechanical rules of a linguistic system: meaning just is linguistic in essence. The meaning of
words, in this view, is determined by the system of which they are a part. The empiricist view
holds that no thoughts – and thus no subject – can properly be said to “lie behind” words. The
intellectualist view is an argument for the existence of a rational agent – a subject. The empiricist
view is an argument for a subjectless system. Merleau-Ponty argues that this apparent antimony
– subject or system – should be reformulated as subject and system.
Spoken and written meaning is, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, both a bodily gesture and an
operational effect conditioned by a linguistic system. Meaning is made at the intersection of the
two. Neither pole is solely determinate. Meaning in this model is neither prior to the utterance or
inscription (the intellectualist’s view) nor is it determined ipso facto by the rules of a language
system (the empiricist’s view). Meaning is a making, a process, which occurs through the
intertwinement of body and system.
Taking bodily movement as his starting point, Merleau-Ponty writes: “I do not need to
visualize external space and my body in order to move one within the other. It is enough that
they exist for me, and that they form a certain field of action spread around me.”91 Conceiving
language as a space too – a space through which the gesture of articulation moves – Merleau-
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Ponty continues: “In the same way, I do not need to visualize the word in order to know and
pronounce it. It is enough that I possess its articulatory and acoustic style as one of the
modulations, one of the possible uses of my body.”92 To make meaning in language is to involve
one’s embodied self in the logic of a linguistic system: neither system nor subject remains the
same in this encounter. Articulation “brings to life...an organism of words, establishing it in the
writer or reader as a new sense organ, opening a new field or new dimension of our
experience.”93 An instance of language is an instance of a subject: the two are created in the
ephemeral simultaneity of articulation. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, “thought is no ‘internal’ thing,
and does not exist independently of the world and words.”94 Thought imagined as “prior to
expression is thought already constituted and expressed...through which we acquire the illusion
of an inner life.”95
On this last point – “the illusion of an inner life” – one could argue that Merleau-Ponty is
rejecting interiority. Not so. He is rather re-thinking the experience of inner life as a process
cultivated intersubjectively. Inner life – selfhood – is philosophically retained as a phenomenal
experience, but it is understood as an effect produced by moving through the shared articulatory
space of language. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, “word and speech...cease to be a way of
designating things or thoughts, and become the presence of that thought in the phenomenal
world.”96 This “presence” is not a mere wrapping for thought. Nor is it an idea, a thought,
statically present. It is the trace of movement in the space of language. It is the phenomenal
registration of the act of meaning making that in one instant opens both a system and a body to
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view. One becomes an “I” though the gesture of articulation. The “I” is a thin index of the
coming into presence of a subject. The subject here is a subject of language, but not subject to it.
Collapsing the two into one another effaces the difference between body and system: a difference
registered in the torsion of language itself.
Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s texts can be understood in Merleau-Ponty’s sense as
figurations of a subject in the process of becoming. This subject is “the photographer.” The
photographer emerges in and though their autobiographical articulations. To read the texts of
Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron as evocations of the photographer as a subject of becoming
provides a methodological pivot point to move back and forth between the discursive viewpoint
offered by Foucault’s concept of subject-position (the point model) and Sloterdijk’s interiorized
perspective (the sphere model). Phenomenology offers a go-between – a passage – between the
archaeological conception of the subject, which privileges exteriority, and the spherological
conception, which privileges interiority.
2.5 Interiors
In the case studies to follow, archaeology (research into historical discourse) and
phenomenology (especially in chapter five) are intertwined in an effort to keep in view the
biography of the photographer in question, and the autobiographical becoming of the subject of
the photographer at the moment of its historical advent. Between historical system and lived life,
between body and a language system, the following case studies are themselves studies in a
method that refuses to relegate autobiography to linguistics or to the mere “illusion of inner-life.”
To jettison what Sloterdijk calls “thinking the interior” is to abandon historical processes of self-
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understanding to the realm of ideological mystification.97 To be clear discipline in its
epistemological and punitive forms does shape one’s sense of self as Foucault rightly argues. It is
also clear that the autobiographical “I” is not the expression of an indivisible, motionless,
intentional being enclosed within a structure of self-identity. This is metaphysics and it is reified
in the cultural sphere in the myth of the Author as both Foucault and Barthes demonstrate in
different ways.98 But if taken as far as Foucault seems to in Archaeology, this framework leads to
a drastic and hasty conclusion: the “I” is simply an ideological illusion that compels humans to
ignore how social and historical factors shape them and therefore leads to political and social
apathy.
With Sloterdijk and Merleau-Ponty, however, it is possible to draw a distinction between
interiorizing processes and interiority as such. Firstly, one can justifiably abandon the concept of
the self as an indivisible kernel of interiority on the grounds that this is confuted by everyday
experience. Martin Heidegger gave this practical experience a philosophic term: “beings-in-theworld,”99 and as Luce Irigaray notes, one of the effects of being in the world is that “cultivating
interiority” becomes a necessity.100 To live in the difficult modern world requires fragile human
subjects to establish conscious and unconscious strategies to withstand its onslaught.
Photography was surely part of, and a response to, that onslaught.
Photography hurled modern subjects headlong into a regime of invasive visibility.
Personal character and outward appearance already linked in the nineteenth century by
physiognomy and phrenology became matters of seemingly “scientific objectivity” with the
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advent of photography. Writing on the invention of the “mug-shot” in nineteenth-century
photography, Alan Sekula notes: “A physiognomic code of visual interpretation of the body’s
signs – specifically the signs of the head – and a technique of mechanized visual representation
[i.e. photography] intersected in the 1840s”101 The body was thus transformed into a site for the
mapping of the self’s inner character. Physiognomy, as Shawn Michelle Smith argues in
American Archives, underwrote the persistent belief that a photograph of someone can reveal
something about that person. Smith argues that nineteenth-century photography “produced a
model of subjectivity in which exterior appearance was imagined to reflect interior essence.”102
Smith subtly and powerfully extends the work of Alan Sekula and John Tagg among others by
focusing on how nineteenth-century photography, bolstered by the “scientific” blessing of
physiognomy and eugenics, constructed the idea that the external body visibly bore evidentiary
traces of a person’s mental and moral profile. Photography appeared to promise the nineteenthcentury observer not only an empirical record of the body, but also a readable text of interior
essences. The utopia of at last securing a science of the visible via photography was extended to
the fantasy of seeing the unseen inner essences of one’s character. Hence, Smith draws the
profound insight that nineteenth-century photography “highlighted the very constructed and
contingent nature of interiorities.”103 Smith continues that if
interiority was the essence imagined to be stable as external signs fluctuated, it was
stabilized only through the proliferation of surface signs, of representations of the body,
called upon to make such essences readable, apparent, knowable. The photographic sign
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invited one to participate in a leap of faith whereby the body might serve as an index to
an imagined essence.104
Smith illuminates the problematic emergence of the photographic-based discourse she calls
“superficial depths.” Of course, “superficial” signifies in two ways for Smith. On the one hand it
refers to the depthless surface of the photographic image and on the other to the constrained and
limiting character of the discourse of interior essences. But it must be asked: are “interior
essence” and interiority absolutely synonymous?
Interiority need not be construed as solely the metaphysical assertion of the existence of
interior essences and as such diametrically opposed to a social constructivist viewpoint. Indeed,
the force of social construction may be said to produce the very division between one’s position
within a social matrix and the unseen character of the experience of occupying that very position.
Hence photography may be said to both reify the physiognomic gaze while simultaneously
creating a discursive gap between what the photograph purports to show and what it does not or
cannot. On this score, it is worth noting that the writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron
speak most to what is not clear, articulable, visible, and knowable about being a photographer,
and thus give voice to experiences of inarticulacy, conceptual invisibility, and sometimes
downright stupefaction as to what photography might be and what it might mean to identify as a
photographer. In their very struggle to articulate what it might mean to be a photographer,
Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron indexed the emergence of a new form of subjectivity created
in the interstices of photographic practice, photographic imagery, and modern technologies of
reproduction as Walter Benjamin so aptly demonstrates in his reading of August Sander’s famed
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photo-essay Face of Our Time. 105 A brief digression through Benjamin’s text will help to clarify
this point.
Face of Our Time is a suite of portraits of people. Almost all the people in Sander’s
photographs are left unidentified save for a single line denoting their profession. The book
showcases the diversity of Weimar culture at a moment when, with the advent of National
Socialism, such diversity was becoming the object of paranoia and oppression. For Benjamin, the
book allegorizes the modern physiognomic imperative to be seen and judged by one’s outward
appearance alone. It illuminates this gaze – as ramified by photography – the photographic gaze.
Benjamin grasps this gaze’s corrosive effect on the conception of the self as a private,
autonomous agent. It’s this imperious photographic subjection that the photographer sets in
motion with the clicking of the camera. This gaze, Benjamin argues, however, also establishes a
new sociality bound by the demands of a new technology, a new form of seeing, and a new mode
of subject production – photography. Benjamin expands on this point in his essay on Baudelaire.
Following to an extent the model of cultural historiography inaugurated by Baudelaire in
“The Painter of Modern Life” of 1848, Benjamin seeks out the trace of his own time in the new
gestures of the body or what Baudelaire calls “the sketch of manners.”106 Benjamin writes:
In the mid-nineteenth century, the invention of the match brought forth a number of other
inventions which have one thing in common: a single abrupt movement of the hand
triggers a process of many steps…With regard to countless movements of switching,
inserting, pressing, and the like, the “snapping” of the photographer had the greatest
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consequences. Henceforth a touch of the finger sufficed to fix an event for an unlimited
period of time….Haptic experiences of this kind were joined by optic ones, such as are
supplied by the advertising pages of a newspaper or the traffic in a big city. Moving
through this traffic involves the individual in a series of shocks and collisions. At
dangerous intersections, nervous impulses flow through in rapid succession, like the
energy from a battery.107
The hand of the photographer functions here as what Benjamin calls a “thought
figure.”108 Its sudden movement captures the speed of modernity: in a flash the body is made into
an image; in a flash the haptic collides with the optic. The shock, the trauma, of modernity on
individual and social bodies manifests itself, Benjamin argues, in a symptomatology of abrupt
movements from the convulsions of the hysteric to the snap of the photographer. The body of
modernity is convulsive. It is spurred on by schizophrenic commands to accelerate: work faster,
drive faster, spend faster, produce, and reproduce. Thus the body of modernity is subjected to a
new and brutal training commanded by the abstract logic of automation, which speeds and slows
the body’s progression through the “dangerous intersections” of the modern maelstrom. The
modern body is a battery for Benjamin: both battered and energized by a constant stream of
shocks, collisions, and “nervous impulses.” The photographer, for Benjamin, thus figures the
collision of industrial technologies and human bodies. Like the lighting of a match or the sudden
lurch of the automobile as it shifts into drive at the instant the traffic signal goes green, the
photographer’s “snap” is a symptom of life lived at modern speed.
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Benjamin sees modernity as a time of trauma. His experience of the trauma of modernity
was part of his living memory. Consider these lines by Benjamin that recount the introduction of
the telephone into his childhood home.
Not many of those who use the apparatus [the telephone] know what devastation it once
wreaked in family circles. The sound with which it rang between two and four in the
afternoon, when a schoolfriend wished to speak to me, was an alarm signal that menaced
not only my parents’ midday nap but the historical era that underwrote and enveloped this
siesta. Disagreements with switchboard operators were the rule, to say nothing of the
threats and curses uttered by my father when he had the complaints department on the
line. But his real orgies were reserved for cranking the handle, to which he gave himself
up for minutes at a time, nearly forgetting himself in the process. His hand, on these
occasions was a dervish overcome by frenzy.109
Benjamin portrays the introduction of the telephone into the home from a personal and
paradigmatic perspective. The ring of the telephone was an alarm in the Benjamin household: it
awoke his parents not only from their daily nap, but from the historical epoch in which it had
been possible to sleep undisturbed by its ring. Suddenly awakened by the ring of the telephone,
the tempo of the Benjamin household was reset by the rhythms of modernity. Cranking the
phone, snapping the camera, striking the match are indices of an emergent grammar of modern
gestures; they are Benjamin’s freeze-frame studies of the traumatized modern body in
movement. The Benjamin household was both the object of technological modernity’s intrusive
reach and the subject from which protests and “curses were uttered.” The caller, as figured by
Benjamin, like the photographer, is a combination portrait – a figure made of multiple images – a
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figure of trauma, adaptation, and resistance. The snap of the photographer, like the cranking of
the caller, were new gestures, new actions, by which the pelting abuse of technological
modernity was both further energized and interrupted. The photographer, like the caller, for
Benjamin brings the over-accelerated speed of modernity at least to the image of a halt and offers
the chance to pierce its illusion of instantaneity and transparency.
Sloterdijk like Benjamin sees the modern subject as having to work tirelessly to insulate
itself from the technological environment it creates supposedly to make its life easier. The
photographer seen in the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron (on this SloterdijkianBenjaminian view) is likewise a figure who carved out a space for itself from which it was
possible to momentarily arrest and redirect the flow of visual modernity. The autobiographical
work of thinking one’s self as photographer can be understood then as a means of surviving the
process of modern subject formation by cultivating a measure of interiority – at once an inside
and an outside – which established a place or space for the photographer within the harsh light of
modern visibility. The “I” of the photographer that Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron enunciate
in different ways is not some prediscursive, motionless, subject sealed within the solid carapace
of interiority. It is rather an “I” formed through a machinic and social relay between the operator
and camera, a prosthetic assemblage, a complex discursive amalgam, which produces an
interiorizing experience. Robinson sought to carve out a place, a studio, in the sphere of
professionalized bourgeois labor. The “Apology” expresses Rejlander’s autobiographical desire
to hollow out a place for his emergent sense of his self as photographer. And in writing the
Annals, Cameron opened new dimensions, even a new “society” as she calls it, within the
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strictures and structures of Victorian domesticity and femininity.110 These texts show how each
photographer, in different ways, was engaged in processes of self-formation. The quest to
understand what it meant to be a photographer was the lens through which Robinson, Rejlander,
and Cameron surveyed the relation between human and machine in the age of industrial-scale
modernity. By posing the question of what it meant to be a photographer, Robinson, Rejlander,
and Cameron were in their own way seeking to find or construct a place, a shelter, a protective
sphere or bubble to withstand the onslaught of the Modern Age.
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Chapter 3
Photography and Pedagogy:
The Case of Henry Peach Robinson
Chapter two theorized the historical emergence of the nineteenth-century photographer
by combining Foucault’s concept of subject position and Sloterdijk’s bubble model. This chapter
examines the case of British photographer Henry Peach Robinson (1830-1901) from these two
perspectives. Robinson is widely recognized by photography scholars as one of the most
influential of nineteenth-century photographers.111 He was a founding member of the
Brotherhood of the Linked Ring in 1892, a group of photographers committed to establishing
photography as an art. This group proved instrumental in developing a style of art-photography
that came to be known as “pictorialism.” Robinson did more than any other photographer of his
time to codify the principles of pictorialism (these will be explained in time) through the
publication of instructional manuals. One of these manuals – The Studio and What to Do in It
(1891) – is key to understanding the tremendous difficulty that early photographers had in not
only conceptualizing what photography was or could be, but also what it meant or could mean to
be a photographer. Robinson’s Studio seeks to establish not only a cultural place for photography
on par with the fine arts, but also an opening, a space, for the photographer as an autonomous
cultural figure. In a Sloterdijkian sense, Robinson’s Studio attempts to open a space for the
photographer simultaneously within the sphere of fine arts and within that of the bourgeois order.
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The Studio looks to the arts of writing and painting as aesthetic models for an art of
photography. But by the end of the text, the argument encounters a problem. After having made
the case that art has rules that can be learned and mastered, Robinson argues that art is ultimately
un-teachable because the artist, he claims, is reliant on a form of knowledge that is unconscious.
This problem positions the photographer in the text between art and photography in a conceptual
space bereft of the cultural legitimacy of the former and the latter’s particularity. The text
wanders over aesthetic, moral, and class themes in search of a framework to critically establish
the cultural autonomy of the photographer. The Studio attempts, but ultimately fails, to ground
the identity of photography and the photographer.
3.1 Pedagogy of Pictorialism
Robinson was a practitioner and an avid promoter of photography’s first artistic
movement – pictorialism. He was also the movement’s chief theoretician. Beginning in the late
1860s, Robinson began publishing texts on photography. Almost all of his best-known texts,
such as Pictorial Effect in Photography, Picture Making by Photography, Elements of a Pictorial
Photograph, and The Studio and What to Do in It are a combination of instruction manual and
aesthetic treatise. Robinson’s project in these texts aims to lay out the aesthetic program of
pictorialist photography in teachable formulas that could in principle be learned by anyone. The
aim of Robinson’s pedagogical project is to grant pictorialist photography the legitimacy of a
bona fide art-historical style by making explicit its formal rules.
Pictorialism derived its aesthetic codes largely from the so-called Pre-Raphaelites of
England, who flourished between the 1820s and the 1860s. Led by poet and painter Dante
Gabriel Rossetti (1828 –1892), the Pre-Raphaelites included notable artists such as William
Hunt, Ford Maddox Brown, as well as the critic John Ruskin. The Pre-Raphaelites sought to
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displace the prevailing norms of realism. They reacted against the legacies of Renaissance
idealization and the brute realism of mid-nineteenth-century modernism. They took their cues
from medieval art (pre-Renaissance or pre-Raphael). Beyond these vague aesthetic alliances and
inclinations, however, it is difficult to define pre-Raphaelitism precisely. As art historian Robert
de la Sizeranne notes in The Pre-Raphaelites, the movement was beset by internal
contradictions. Pre-Raphaelitism “was composed of the most diverse and contradictory
elements.”112 Sizeranne continues:
There was a preference for imitating the thin, hard style of the Primitives [the nineteenth
century’s term for pre-historic art and much of the art of Africa and Asia], whereas a
single glance at the ample bosoms, round shoulders, and sensual

mouths of Rossetti’s

women evokes all the opulence and splendor of the Renaissance. There was realism,
“uncompromising truth,” forbidding the addition of any imaginary element, but it is
precisely the imaginary that is striking.113
Pre-Raphaelitism is perhaps better defined as an outlook rather than a coherent stylistic
framework. It favored realism but an enchanted one. It took inspiration from simple scenes
imbued with pastoral, allegorical, magical, or spiritual meaning. It was this preference for
enchanted over realist realism that marked pictorialism.
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Plate 1. Henry Peach Robinson, Fading Away, 1858. Courtesy of the George Eastman House, International Museum
of Photography and Film.

Robinson’s Fading Away of 1858 exemplifies the pictorialist style. Fading Away depicts
a young girl lying on her deathbed. Mother and sister look on while father gazes out the window.
The scene, like much of Robinson’s work, is highly staged with actors serving as sitters. The
truth that the photograph aims to show is not that of so-called photographic “objectivity” but
rather the truth of human emotion, in this case, grief over the loss of a child. Pictorialist
aesthetics center on the depiction of “scenes” in both the pictorial and dramaturgical sense.
Indeed, theatrical considerations including props, accessories, and backdrops figure prominently
in Robinson’s texts.
In the Studio, for example, Robinson devotes one chapter each to backgrounds and
accessories. Writing on the latter, Robinson advises the aspiring photographer to keep in store a
wide variety of props and furnishings for every conceivable setting. He writes: “There is a great
virtue in variety…. The monotony of making all men and women lean on the same chair, in the
same position, and photographing them one after another, from week’s end to week’s end, must
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be dreadful. The continual use of even a good thing is objectionable.”114 After carefully weighing
the pros and cons of certain styles of gates, fences, chairs, screens, and so forth, Robinson goes
on to carefully consider the use of somewhat more esoteric studio props. He writes: “The same
remarks apply to the ship’s mast and the swing, both good of their kind, when used occasionally
and in season, but not when they are pressed into service for all purposes against nature and
art.”115 As for seaside scenes, Robinson recommends that the photographer obtain a full-sized
row boat if possible “or half of one if you must economize space.… I have seen the bows of a
real old boat used with great effect, and it was found to be very suggestive of poses. A bit of old
rope, some netting, crab baskets, and other objects of the seaside, also aided in the realistic
effect.”116 Robinson’s ideal studio thus resembles a theatre barn with a whole range of props,
accessories, and backdrops for every conceivable scene.
The theatricality of pictorialism stems from its emphasis on narrative. Robinson argues in
Elements of a Pictorial Photograph that photography should aspire to more than mere imitation.
He writes: “In aiming at the truth we must not forget the spirit.”117 Robinson seeks to liberate
photography from the pursuit of visual objectivity. He writes: “It is not the copying of nature that
gives artistic delight, so much as the intellectual pleasure to be derived from getting the best
effect out of any given materials, or adding a beauty to that which is already beautiful.”118
Pictorialist practice systematically refuses the imperatives of visual fact. It prioritizes the
beautiful over the true. Robinson writes: “In photography fortunately, we are gradually

114

Henry Peach Robinson, The Studio and What to Do in It (London: Piper and Carter, 1891), 33.
Robinson, The Studio and What to Do in It, 33.
116
Robinson, The Studio and What to Do in It, 33.
117
Robinson, Elements of a Pictorial Photograph (Bradford: Percy, Lund and Co, 1896), 39.
118
Robinson, Elements of a Pictorial Photograph, 39.
115

71

Plate 2. Henry Peach Robinson, A Merry Tale, 1882. © British Library Board, 1757.b.14 (6)

emancipating ourselves from the trammels of rigid fact, and are rising into the finer regions of
artistic truth.”119
The apparent incongruity of anti-modernist Pre-Raphaelitism and photography (paragon
of modern image making) is symptomatic of pictorialism’s rejection of photographic realism,
which differs in kind from the realism of nineteenth-century painting. Realism, even gritty
realism such as Courbet’s, could still be counted as art in the nineteenth century simply because
it was made with paint and canvas. But photographic realism came to be associated with an
emerging regime of empirical visual objectivity. It is this objectivity that pictorialism rejects and
which it seeks to aesthetically transform and transvalue. And it is narrative above all else that
pictorialism deploys in order to raise photography out of empirical servitude into the “finer
regions of artistic truth.”
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Robinson defines the pictorialist picture this way: “our sort of picture—is a flat surface
calculated to give pleasure to the beholder by the skillful way in which the intention of the
producer is expressed by pictorial means, consisting of lines, lights, and shades.…This is the
material part of the picture and is held by some, a dwindling minority, to be all sufficient.
Beyond, and as I think necessary to the complete picture, is poetry, sentiment, story, the literary
part of the picture.”120 This emphasis on literary content or narrative is manifest in Robinson’s A
Merry Tale of 1882. The scene depicts a group of women gathered on a country path sharing an
intimate and evidently merry tale. The image speaks to the literary “beyond” at which pictorialist
photography aims in its artistic effort to transcend base photographic empiricism.
While Robinson’s photography certainly aided in the dissemination of pictorialism, his
writings did as much, if not more, to establish pictorialism’s cultural profile. Of all of Robinson’s
texts, it was his Pictorial Effect in Photography of 1881 that was to have the most lasting and
widespread impact on the development and dissemination of pictorialism. As photography
historian Robert Hirsch notes, Pictorial Effect in Photography “was the most widely read
textbook on photography in the nineteenth century.”121 In Pictorial Effect, Robinson elaborates
on the concept of the picturesque, the cornerstone of pictorialist aesthetics. Robinson writes,
“every scene worth painting must have something of the sublime, the beautiful, or the
picturesque….The most obvious way of meeting with picturesque and beautiful subjects would
be the possession of a knowledge of what is picturesque and beautiful.”122 The “picturesque,” for
Robinson, is a specific combinatory of formal effects: light, shade, line, and overall composition.
A photographer who learns this formal language, Robinson writes, “will be better qualified to
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discover the picturesque in the visible world.”123 Pictorial literacy enables the photographer to
look at the world “with the eye of an artist.”124 This seeing is also a form of knowing insofar as it
is an informed seeing that can distinguish what is beautiful from what is not according to
pictorialist principles. With this knowledge the photographer can learn to see not only “what is
beautiful but why it is beautiful.”125 Thus a “new world is open to him who has learned to
distinguish and feel the effect of the beautiful and subtle harmonies that Nature presents in all her
varied aspects.”126
Robinson skips over the problematic meaning of the sublime, which in principle cannot
be anticipated or governed by rules, in order to proceed on to a discourse about how the sublime,
as a pictorial effect, can be produced. The text passes from a philosophical moment to a practical
and pedagogic moment. A discourse on beauty shifts into a pedagogy of how to make a beautiful
picture. This elision is symptomatic of Robinson’s two-fold aim: to produce a manual on how to
make artistic photography while defending the cultural legitimacy of that aim.
Robinson was writing at a time when the question of the aesthetic potential and artistic
legitimacy of photography was a matter of open and hotly contested debate. This debate was
largely determined by two competing visions of photography. Conservative critics saw the
camera as a mere machine for objectively recording visual phenomena and thus as fundamentally
incapable of subjective expression. Those who promoted the merit of art photography stressed
the technical skills necessary to compose a photograph. Robinson’s writing exemplifies the latter
view. His pedagogical project is premised on the idea that a single formal language is common to
painting and photography. Robinson’s answer to the question of whether photography is an art is
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that art is not determined by the medium, but by the knowledge possessed by the one who wields
it.
Robinson’s pedagogic strategy is to redirect abstract considerations on aesthetics towards
matters of technique: he continually shifts from discussing photography writ large to prescribing
techniques for the photographer to follow. The subject of Robinson’s pedagogy is always in the
last instance the photographer. As he writes, “however prolific a man may be in his [creative]
ideas, he cannot express these ideas intelligibly until he has learned a language and its grammar,
or laws of construction.”127 Robinson notes:
[I]t has happened too often that the art-teaching which has been supplied to
photographers has dealt rather with the thoughts to be expressed rather than on the modes
of expressing them; it is of little use endeavoring to teach a man to write poetry until he
has learned to spell.128
Robinson’s stresses the necessity of learning visual grammar. The visual sign of pictorial
grammar in a photograph, for Robinson, is the signature of the non-machinic presence of a
thinking being – the photographer. Robinson writes that just as the writer “must write
grammatically or he will offend his readers. So with the photographer; if he does not show that
there is a man behind the machine with rules…his result will be a machine-made article, and not
an individual impression as every work of art should be.”129 Robinson directs his pedagogical
energies towards developing his ideal photographer by laying out the grammar or rules the
practitioner is to follow.
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Robinson’s pedagogical effort is given its most cogent and clear formulation in The
Studio and What to Do in It, one of his final texts, published in 1891 at a time when Robinson
himself had ceased his photographic practice due to ill-health. The Studio details everything a
photography studio requires from foundation to skylights, from sitting room to dark room, as
well as an entire set of instructions for what to do in the studio. The text hails, solicits, or
positions the reader as a student-photographer and Robinson as a correspondence teacher
conveying studio instruction across the distance between text and reader. The Studio sets up an
educative environ in the manner of what Jacques Rancière in The Ignorant Schoolmaster calls
the “explicative order.”130 For Rancière, pedagogy is a social practice that constitutes and relies
upon a set of power relations. It is also an aesthetic formation. Educational instruction, writes
Rancière, is a “singular art…the art of distance.”131 Pedagogy involves an entire repertoire of
implicit and explicit signs and codes through which a pedagogic performance is enacted, the
roles of student and teacher are assigned, and the social distance between the two positions
maintained.
The explicative order positions the pedagogue as an agent of power, which Rancière calls
an “explicator.”132 The distance of the explicator to the student confers an aura, in Walter
Benjamin’s sense, of power upon the explicator. For, as Rancière surely knows, it is Benjamin
who defines auratic power as “the unique appearance of a distance no matter how close.”133
Indeed, Rancière strikes a Benjaminian chord when he notes:
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The master’s [or explicator’s] secret is to know how to recognize the distance between
the taught material and the person being instructed, the distance also between learning
and understanding. The explicator sets up and abolishes this distance—deploys it and
reabsorbs it in the fullness of his speech.134
Through his texts, Robinson surely sought to define himself as the chief explicator of
pictorialism. But he neither had the benefit of full speech nor a robust educational apparatus,
such as the academy, at his disposal. However, he was working in a genre that did have a certain
social status—the training manual. The genre of the training manual was a common form for the
dissemination of photographic instruction in the nineteenth century. It helped establish the
popular practice of photography on a mass scale. This genre rests on the implicit assumption that
if one is in a position to author a training manual, then one must be an authority on the subject.
The training manual projects its writer into the pedagogic power structure of the studentteacher relation. But the training manual as such demands from the reader a measure of
autodidactism. The training manual institutes a form of pedagogy parallel to the form of the
correspondence course. While the training manual sets its author up as a master of sorts, this
master is also divested of the voice – the teaching tool par excellence of the explicator. Without
the fullness of explicative speech and without a fully bureaucratized educational order, Robinson
had no direct knowledge of how his teaching was received by his readers. This pedagogic
anxiety is echoed in the manifest anxiety registered in the Studio concerning what photography is
and what it means to be a photographer. These two questions or lacunae mark the text. They are
signified by rhetorical tensions, contradictions, and above all absences and invisibilities. The
Studio registers the ontological anxiety of nineteenth-century photography. This anxiety attains a
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paradoxical visibility by the very invisibility of the subject “behind the camera,” in Robinson’s
words – the photographer.
3.2 The Vacant Studio
The opening pages of the Studio contain blueprints complete with elevation diagrams for
building a photography studio. Building a proper studio was a primary concern for the
nineteenth-century photographer. Natural lighting was an imperative as the light bulb had yet to
enter into photographic practice. Photography studios thus had to be designed so as to maximize
and control sunlight. Ever the pragmatist, Robinson writes: “The arrangements for managing the
light should be simple, so that they may be under the immediate and instant control of the
operator; all complicated systems of blinds should be avoided.”135 Robinson’s preferred
architectural model resembles a small lean-to cottage, facing northeast to catch diffuse rather
than direct sunlight. It has a rectangular floor-plan topped by a partly slopped and flat roof. The
slopped section is outfitted with skylights and the flat section houses the darkroom and is
necessarily windowless. Ideally the size of the studio is supposed to “be large enough to admit of
every necessary operation without inconvenience, but should not be so large as to…be difficult
to manage.”136 Robinson quips that a large studio, “like a great book, is a great evil.”137
Robinson also offers instruction in how to decorate the interior of the studio. He advises
that the interior should be sober and above all practical. “I prefer that the studio have the effect
of a moderately furnished living room, such as sitters may be expected to occupy in their own
homes; avoiding shabbiness on the one hand, and ostentatious show on the other. Don’t let there
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be a great display of anything, not even your own good taste.”138 A middle class sentiment
informs Robinson’s taste for interior design. The interior design that Robinson prefers is squarely
opposed to the interiors a client of means would expect to find in the studios of the best portrait
painters of the day, such as John Singer Sargent’s (1856-1925) studio, for example, which was
richly decorated with antiques, tapestries, and Japanese screens. Robinson by contrast opposes
extravagance or clutter of any kind in the studio. But he is not opposed to the prominent display
of the photographer’s tools. On the contrary, he notes: “You will not be able to hide the
implements of your art, nor is it desirable that you should do so.”139 Indeed the camera is to take
centre stage in the studio: “I like to keep the centre of my studio absolutely free, except for the
camera.”140 Robinson also offers careful and thrifty advice for setting up a darkroom.
No room is more neglected than this one. Any closet is thought good enough for a dark
room; but no part of the establishment [the studio] should call for more thought and
attention…There should be sufficient space to conduct all the operations in comfort.
Table space should be ample, and there should be sufficient shelves to hold everything
but dust [ruinous to film plates]. The sinks used to be made of wood…lined with pitch
[but these]…were always causing trouble; white porcelain sinks were expensive…For
several years I have used Doulton’s sinks; they are made of glazed stoneware, are very
cheap, can be got of any size, and are useful for other purposes.141
The attention to the minutest details notwithstanding, Robinson’s descriptions of the
interior of the studio underscores a strange invisibility. One asks: where is the photographer? The
figure of the photographer is signed only in the traces of the tools of the trade and the places of
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work: camera (photographing room) and sinks (darkroom). The text describes the studio down to
the smallest details complete with many diagrams and visual aids that establish a visual matrix
that supports the pedagogy. But no explicit figuration of the photographer animates this
pedagogy. The Studio is a vacant studio. What goes unseen and unspoken is the photographer.
And yet the vacant place of the photographer is precisely the space – the “absolutely free center,”
in Robinson’s words – which the reader is silently solicited to occupy. The rhetorical absence of
the photographer – marked by the vacant studio with its empty rooms – circumscribes the open
space that the reader comes to inhabit. The Studio textually constructs an open space. It allows
for what Heidegger calls “making room” or “giving space” for the photographer. 142 The Studio
opens this “giving space.” It gives space and “makes room” for the being and becoming of the
reader-as-photographer. This open, “absolutely free” and “giving space,” demarcates the subject
position that a photographer can come to occupy. This open space is at once an open space for
the reader-photographer to inhabit and a trace of the textual invisibility of the photographer.
This invisible dimension of the photographer of the Studio can be understood, in a
slightly revised sense, as what Walter Benjamin calls an “optical unconscious.” Benjamin writes
in “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility” of 1936 that it is “through
the camera that we...discover the optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual
unconscious through psychoanalysis.”143 Benjamin’s point is that prior to photography, the eye
held sovereignty over knowledge in the oft-repeated formula: to see is to know. But photography
exposed to view the fact that entire visual worlds – the very fast particularly – escape the grasp
of the eye and human consciousness. The camera’s ability to see beyond range perceived by the
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eye throws into question the entire tropological entanglement that links vision, self, and
knowledge. Photography, and thus the photographer, renders visible and knowable phenomena
that might otherwise go unseen and unknown. But this vision and knowledge is not one that the
photographer possesses. The photographer simply marks the point at which this vision and
knowledge is captured: the photographer is the figure that captures, while not possessing, the
optical unconscious. Robinson’s Studio exposes to view a textually figured optical unconscious.
What goes unseen in the text is the photographer or rather what is seen is the open space itself
yet to be occupied by a photographer. In this sense, the space left vacant can be understood as the
open subject position of the photographer that a photographer comes to inhabit. These spaces of
openness and non-presence or invisibility frequently open at the site of comparisons to the art of
painting. Consider the following passage:
The first aim of the student in lighting a head [a portrait] – leaving out the question of
what may be called “fancy” lighting such as Rembrandts [sic] – should be to get
roundness and relief, to obtain gradation, and to avoid patches of black and white; to so
light the head that beauties are made prominent and defects hidden. Or as [the
photographer] Mr. [John] Mayall once summed up the object of lighting: “To render age
less garrulous; make beauty more lovely; to impart an expression of intelligence where
nature has not been over bountiful; to light up the intellect, and to impart the quality of
power in those heads on which she has lavished her most precious gifts; in short, to
present human nature in its best form, by aid of a camera and a properly-lighted room.”144
Rembrandt here figures the technique of “fancy” lighting or chiaroscuro. Against “fancy”
lighting, Robinson invokes the popular photographer John Mayall (1813-1901) who advises the

144

Robinson, The Studio and What to Do in It, 37.
81

photographer to light the face in a way so as to soften nature in the manner of a pre-Raphaelite
painter. A strange encounter and aesthetic debate is thus figured. The anti-modernist realism of
pictorialism and pre-Raphaelitism is set against “fancy” realism as figured by Rembrandt. This
opposition to what is presumed to be “fancy” is more than an aesthetic choice: it is a class
choice. Rembrandt stands for a set of aesthetic values against which Robinson valorizes the
middle class popularity of John Mayall. Here class and aesthetics cross the pedagogic matrix of
Robinson’s pictorialism. The affirmation of Mayall over Rembrandt speaks to the emergent
middle class sympathy for a photographic aesthetics of practicality: the simple over the “fancy,”
the “properly lighted” over the dappled “patches” of chiaroscuro.
Pictorialism’s codification of a pragmatic poetics has had historical effects that have far
outlived the movement, as the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu found in his 1965 study of
photography.145 In Photography: A Middlebrow Art, Bourdieu presents his findings after having
surveyed amateur photographers from across the socio-economic spectrum. His research leads
him to conclude that there exists a “canon” of “ordinary” or “popular” photographic practice.
This practice, he argues, is primarily symbolic. Its function is to “solemnize” the individual,
event, or place photographed.146
Opposed to popular practice are those who seek, as the pictorialists did, to establish
artistic legitimacy for photography. In words that seem to capture the pictorialist attitude,
Bourdieu writes that devoted practitioners seek “to ennoble themselves by attempting to ennoble
photography” by constructing a “body of technical and aesthetic rules” to distinguish their
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practice from the norms “that govern popular practice.”147 This was certainly true of the
pictorialists who likewise sought to “ennoble” photography and photographers by emulating the
fine arts, particularly painting. As Robert Castel and Dominique Schnapper note in their
contribution to Bourdieu’s study: “Painting is a noble art [hence it]…provides the clearest
guarantee of aestheticism for an activity [photographing] in search of security.”148 The encounter
Robinson stages between Mayall and Rembrandt dramatizes the central agon of nineteenthcentury photographic culture—which continued in some form through the twentieth century:
photography was seen as both handmaiden to, and middle class usurper of, high art. The gaze of
pictorialist photography impressed itself most radically and explicitly upon such scenes of
antagonism: painting versus photography; highbrow versus middlebrow tastes; Rembrandt
versus Mayall.
3.3 Moral Education
The antagonism between painting and photography comes most forcibly to the fore in the
second to the last chapter of Robinson’s text—“The Itinerant Painter.” The chapter outlines what
a good portrait painter must do in order to be a success. While certainly not the mainstay of
pictorialism, portraiture was the way most pictorialists, including Robinson, achieved a level of
financial independence which was often necessary to pursue their artistic ventures. The “Itinerant
Painter” figures the photographer as a responsible middle class entrepreneur in contrast to the
rootless, irresponsible, and indeed immoral, “itinerant painter.” Robinson writes:
When a well-established photographer takes a portrait he looks for his profit, not only to
the sum he receives for the first order of copies, but to the contingent potentialities which
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may arise from the possession of the negatives, and to that end he goes to a great deal of
trouble and expense cataloging and storing them. Of course the great portion of these
negatives are never wanted again, and are an encumbrance; but all professional
photographers know that there is so good a demand for copies from old negatives, that
they find it to their interest to keep all they take, and to print prominently on the back of
their cards, “All negatives are preserved. Copies or enlargements of this portrait can
always be had.”149
Copies can always be had – for a price, that is. “Copies” in nineteenth-century photographic
practice signified quite differently than they do today. The norms of photographic production and
circulation today (especially in the case of digital and online photography) have decreased (at
least philosophically) the value of the copy, and indeed rendered the distinction between original
and copy less meaningful. But in the nineteenth century, the copy was fixed, or at least Robinson
wanted to fix it, within a fully rationalized system of exchange.
Robinson’s photographer is circumscribed by the norms of capitalist exchange. He is one
“who looks for his profit.” Robinson’s Studio establishes a place for photography and hence for
the photographer within the settled life of the small business owner. Robinson’s photographer is
not only a master of certain photographic techniques, but a competent and prudent member of the
professional class. This point is underscored when Robinson goes on to tell his reader a story
from his own studio practice. He writes:
One day some years ago, a shabby old gentleman came into the reception room, and said
he wanted his portrait taken. He was shown specimens [i.e. examples], but he said they
were all too dear; he could only afford half a guinea….I liked the appearance of the old
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man, who looked poor but respectable, so as a kind of charity I took a negative of him. I
was so pleased with him that I offered to send him a dozen copies without charge, but he
would not accept this offer…and paid his half-guinea. I found afterwards I had
entertained an angel—a business angel—unawares, for I have done nearly £300 from that
negative since. The fine old gentlemen died soon afterwards, and then I found out he was
a famous manufacturer.150
The “shabby” patron turns out to be a “business angel” and by the end of the story becomes a
“fine” gentleman. The transparency of Robinson’s class values rivals a nineteenth-century
parody of the middle class man on the make. Money, production, manufacturing are the means
by which a “shabby” man becomes “fine” and “respectable.” The story rhetorically stages a
photographic-like sequence in which the “shabby” patron becomes – by being photographed – a
rare, even angelic creature. But this moment of aesthetic (even quasi-spiritual) transcendence is
almost instantly commodified: the angelic photograph becomes a “business angel.” The aesthetic
image is transfigured into a commodity.
Robinson’s middle class aesthetic emerges even more forcefully, however, in the
chapter’s eponymous story: “The Itinerant Painter.” It is a complex tale and as such necessitates
a long quotation.
There is a class of painter who misuse the great name of artist...who go round the
country, and, by means of introduction or impudence, obtain orders for portraits, usually
enlargements painted from photographs. As they never take an original [photographic]
portrait themselves, they require the negative, and use every means, fair or foul, to obtain
it, and are usually successful. The method of proceeding is something like this. A father
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of a wealthy family has been dead a short time; the itinerant painter hears of this, and
before she [the widow] has time to apply to a photographer, [the itinerant painter] gets an
introduction to the widow. A great deal of his success in his business depends on fluent
and persuasive speaking, and the lady [the widow] is soon induced to order a portrait of
her late husband.... [T]he “tramps” are so pressing and plausible that they [even]...get the
widow to write for the loan of the negative…. [T]he photographer consents, seeing no
way out of it; or properly and wisely refuses to lend the negative. In this case the itinerant
brings more pressure to bear, showing his patron how selfish and inconsiderate the
photographer is in preventing her from having a splendid portrait of her husband…. [T]he
unfortunate photographer is placed on the horns of a dilemma; if he consents to lend the
negative, he loses the benefits for which he has speculatively kept it for years, and if he
refuses, he runs the risk of losing [a]…customer.151
The itinerant painter, like the professional photographer, is a man in search of profit. But
the itinerant painter establishes no fixed address. He has no established studio, no place of
business, and hence no place in the order of town or city life. The itinerant is a figure of wanton,
ungrounded, non-localizable, or nomadic circulation. Unlike the professional photographer, the
itinerant painter has no genuine fidelity to his clients. He is solely an opportunist who preys on
innocents as figured by the widow. He is a mere “tramp,” a con-man, whose success relies on
fast talking. He also preys on the photographer who in the account is forced into a moral
“dilemma.” Should he keep the negative – the wiser choice in Robinson’s view – or give it away
and keep his client happy? Unlike the itinerant painter whose only fidelity is to profit, the
photographer is figured as a moral subject who must choose between profits and persons. While
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Robinson counsels that the wiser choice is for the photographer to protect his property, he
sympathizes with the photographer who, in having to make this decision, is caught on the “horns
of a dilemma.”
The story of the itinerant painter exemplifies the tense relation between pictorialism and
painting. Painting is pictorialism’s model, and even muse. “Painting” is a code word for a visual
grammar that the pictorialist photographer is expected to master. But the photographer is to
establish his studio, his practice, within the “respectable” order of the professional sphere. The
itinerant painter may be a “brother artist” to the photographer, but this brother belongs to an
itinerant, and ultimately, lower class. While both the itinerant painter and Robinson’s
photographers are capitalist subjects seeking to maximize their profits, the photographer is the
more moral of the two. The photographer “looks for his profit” but does not stoop to the conning
strategies of the itinerant painter. Hence while painting is the well-spring of pictorialist wisdom,
the photographer is portrayed as morally superior to its master (painting).
3.4 The Subject Supposed to Know
The final chapter of the Studio, titled “The Education of a Photographer,” attempts to
resolve pictorialism’s moral and social antagonism with painting. Robinson returns to the theme
of the sublime. He moves from pedagogy (formal and moral) back to aesthetic philosophy.
Robinson re-affirms the central tenant of the text – photography can be learned. But then
Robinson argues that beyond technical facility lies the un-teachable realm of art. Here things
become pedagogically contradictory. Robinson writes:
The study of art in its most comprehensive sense is, doubtless, the work of a lifetime; but
there are one or two initial truths that should be clearly understood, and thoroughly
impressed on the mind of the student. First, that very little art can be taught. Second, that
87

the chief portions of art which can be taught consist in tolerably definite and simple rules
and principles easily understood and remembered, and not difficult to apply. These rules
are to art what grammar is to literature. They will no more enable the painter to paint a
Transfiguration than grammar taught Shakespeare how to write Hamlet; but neither the
great picture nor the great poem could have been produced without, on the one hand, a
knowledge of composition, and on the other an acquaintance with the construction of the
English language. And third, that after the mastering of certain rules, art studies chiefly
consist in constant observation and appreciation of the beauties of nature and art, and in
attempts to realize in practice these beauties, aided by the principles and rules before
acquired.152
There is a tension at play between what can be taught, under the sign of “principles,”
“rules,” and “grammar,” and a comprehensive talent to make art. For Robinson, art in the last
instance cannot be taught. Rules of composition – grammar – can be taught. But the study of art
comes under the tutelage of nature. Rules are useful for the conversion of observations gleaned
from the “beauties of nature” into representations. But knowledge of rules alone, cautions
Robinson, is not enough to make art. There is an obvious contradiction: the student must first set
about “mastering” rules and principles of composition in order to see the beauties of nature
compositionally. The demarcation that Robinson makes between observation and practice is in
this way a false one: to observe the beauties of nature as Robinson expects necessitates mastering
the aesthetics or grammar of art. Robinson seeks a resolution to the contradiction via an
elaboration of the aesthetic philosophy of William Thompson (1819-1890).

152

Robinson, The Studio and What to Do in It, 139.
88

In An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought of 1879, Thompson discusses the rules
of logic as a means to examine the nature of human reasoning. Robinson quotes the following:
“The whole of every science may be made the subject of teaching. Not so with art; much of it is
not teachable.”153 Robinson in fact misquotes Thompson or more exactly puts words in his
mouth. Thompson does say: “The whole of science may be made the subject of teaching.” But he
does not follow by concluding: “Not so with art; much of it is not teachable.”154 Those words are
Robinson’s. What Thompson does say is that logic is like art, but logic differs in one key respect.
Whereas logic is a conscious operation, art is bound up with “the notion of unconsciousness.”155
Thompson continues: “The man of science possesses principles, but the artist, not the less nobly
gifted on that account, is possessed and carried away by them.”156 Further clarifying his point, he
writes: “Shakespeare is admitted to be a consummate artist, but no one means by this that his
plays were composed only to develop a certain express theory of Dramatic Poetry.” 157 Thompson
then goes on to quote philosopher William Whewell (1719-1866), who notes: “The truths on
which the success of Art depends, lurk in the artist’s mind in an underdeveloped state – guiding
his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of
enunciated propositions.”158
Thompson serves as a philosophical buttress for Robinson’s claim that art is on the whole
un-teachable. Since the special knowledge that the artist possesses is unconscious, it cannot be
consciously transmitted in the form of clear pedagogical principles and rules of mastery. So even
though Robinson misquotes Thompson, who bases his argument on Whewell, he appears to hold
153
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to the spirit of Thompson and Whewell’s point: the knowledge of art is instinctual or
unconscious and hence cannot be taught. In a conventional sense, education demands that things
be clearly teachable and as such that pedagogy – its contents and its transmission – be fully
amenable to conscious learning. But if art is a matter of the unconscious, then it cannot be taught
consciously and conscientiously.
Art, as a teachable subject, might then be said to constitute the center and the aporia of
Robinson’s pedagogic project. It is at once the heart of Robinson’s pedagogy of pictorialism and
its recalcitrant and resistant kernel. This tension between the unconscious and education is
explored in depth by Shoshana Felman. In “Psychoanalysis and Education,” Felman notes that
the unconscious names the “discovery that human discourse can by definition never be entirely
in agreement with itself, entirely identical to its knowledge of itself, since as the vehicle of
unconscious knowledge, it is constitutively the material locus of a signifying difference from
itself.”159 For Felman, psychoanalysis remains at bottom “a critique of pedagogy.”160 The
resistance of the unconscious marks every pedagogical endeavor. Read in terms of Robinson’s
pedagogic project, “art” is the term that auto-critiques or deconstructs the possibility of a
pedagogy of pictorialism. This deconstructive fissure marks finally the “I” that carries
Robinson’s authorial authority – the sign of Robinson qua explicator. This “I” fits the profile of
what Jacques Lacan terms “the subject supposed to know.”161
Lacan develops the idea of “the subject supposed to know” through a discussion of
Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave. Lacan transposes Hegel’s terms: the psychoanalyst is
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positioned as a master in that the analyst is “supposed to know,” but, Lacan argues, it is the
analysand, the object of the master’s gaze, who makes this supposition unconsciously. In seeking
out a psychoanalyst, the analysand has already answered to an interpellative solicitation which
auto-positions the psychoanalyst as the master, or the subject who is “supposed to know,” what
is wrong with the analysand. Even before the analysand sits down with the psychoanalyst, the
scene of interpellation has already occurred and the position of mastery has been assigned to the
psychoanalyst. Mastery in Lacan’s sense is not an attribute the psychoanalyst has innately; it is a
position (of power and knowledge) that the psychoanalyst occupies as a function of an
institutional discourse (the psychoanalytic discourse) and the interpellation that this discourse
accomplishes.
It is insignificant whether or not the one who assumes the master’s position is actually a
master. The master does not need to have knowledge to be a master. The master merely occupies
the position of the master. Lacan puts the matter humorously by noting that student teachers
know first-hand that one can play the role of a master while knowing very little about a given
subject. Lacan writes: “It was students at the Ecole normale [supérieure]…these little princes of
the university who know quite well that you don’t have to know something in order to teach
it.”162 As Lacan scholar Bruce Fink notes, “the master is unconcerned with knowledge: as long
as his or her power is maintained or grows, all is well.”163 Lacan uses the example of citation to
help illustrate the paradoxical nature of the master’s discourse.
When one cites Marx or Freud – I haven’t chosen these names by chance – one does so as
a function of the part the supposed reader takes in a discourse. The citation is in its own
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way also a half-said. It is a statement about which someone is indicating to you that it is
admissible only insofar as you already participate in a certain structured discourse.164
Here Lacan is doing a bit of autobiography. When Lacan cites Marx or Freud he invokes their
authority on the presumption that his readers (and auditors) are already participating in the
discourse of his version of psychoanalysis in which these names have already assumed the status
of masters.165
Citation in Robinson’s text functions similarly. In quoting Thompson, Robinson’s text
invests his name and discourse with mastery, which recursively lends authority to Robinson’s
“I.” The citation of Thompson is a philosophical alibi that supports the supposition of mastery
that the reader invests in the Studio, which itself is a function of the reader having already
presumed that Robinson’s name signifies a master who is supposed to know what photography is
and how one is to become a photographer. Robinson’s text sets his “I” up as a master, but
Robinson the person in fact has no mastery over this position. The position of mastery is
discursively produced by virtue of the fact that the Studio is a bona fide instructional manual.
The genre of the text qua instructional manual positions Robinson’s “I” as an instructor supposed
to know—a master of pictorialist photography. This position is ascribed by an automatic
discursive function. In this sense, Robinson, like every supposed master, is in effect mastered by
the discourse of mastery itself.
3.5 The Itinerant Photographer
Robinson situates his ideal practitioner at a nexus between aesthetics and commerce
within the order of middle class professionalism. But aside from this, the Studio is silent on
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salient points. Why should one be a photographer? What is photography apart from its relation to
the other arts such as painting? How can art-photography be taught if art is finally un-teachable?
What is it that the Studio teaches one to do? These questions can be collectively restated as: what
does it mean to be a photographer? The Studio gives no direct answer. Yet the question “what is
a photographer?” is made strangely visible by its manifest textual obscurity.
Unable to establish an autonomous definition of photography, pictorialism as a program
loses its pedagogical coherence. It is dispersed over a set of antagonistic scenes of class and
aesthetic conflict. The pedagogy of pictorialism iterated in the Studio positions the photographer
on “the horns of a dilemma” in Robinson’s words. Neither able to sufficiently close the gap
between art and photography nor to set photography on its own path, Robinson’s pictorialist
program for establishing cultural legitimacy for photography paradoxically produces the figure
of an ungrounded, aleatory photographer or what might be ironically called the “itinerant
photographer.” Unconscious or “blind” to its own ontological doubts concerning photography
and the cultural status of the photographer, the figure of the photographer in the Studio hovers in
the contested space between art and photography, paintings and photographs, the moral and the
immoral, the itinerant and the settled middle class entrepreneur, Rembrandt and Mayall. The
photographer exists only as an open space, an outline, thinly delimiting a middle class subject
position, a hollow figure, haunting the pages of the Studio.
What the Studio accomplishes, however, is the opening of this very space into which the
reader-photographer may enter. That is, the Studio, like an actual studio, contains an open space
that the reader-student can inhabit. The open space of the pictorialist photographer provides a
place for the reader-student to become a photographer. The Studio provides an imaginative place
for the germination of the pictorialist photographer. The text creates a space apart, at a distance,
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from the rhetoric of photographic objectivity. It is in this sense that the Studio functions as a
Sloterdijkian bubble that encloses around the would-be photographer-reader. This space, to quote
Sloterdijk, exists “initially only in constructs…of language” but from this develops, like a
photographic negative, a photographer through the act of reading into the open space of the
text.166 Hence, Robinson’s demonstrative failure to provide a clear definition of photography and
the photographer, paradoxically, and perhaps unconsciously, nevertheless opens an in-dwelling
space through which the reader-student projects a sense of self as photographer. The Studio
provides a place for a photographer to develop.
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Chapter 4
Ways of Life:
The Case of Oscar Gustave Rejlander
Henry Peach Robinson’s The Studio and What to Do in It positions the photographer in a
classed space caught between an uneasy attachment to the fine arts and a nascent desire for
autonomy. A very different conception of the photographer appears in the writing and work of
Oscar Gustave Rejlander (1813-1875). This chapter examines Rejlander’s most important essay,
“An Apology for Art-Photography,” published in 1863.167 The text traces in microcosm art’s
paradigmatic shift into the age of its technological reproducibility and the emergence of
photographic seeing – all from the perspective of Rejlander’s personal recollections.168 The
narrative of the “Apology” is told through a motley collection of figures and settings: a market in
Rome, a London gallery, a “young Miss” playing piano, a “ready-made photographer,” an
anonymous gentleman, and a neighborly artist. Each of these figures is examined in the course of
this chapter with an eye to how they illuminate the emergence of photographic seeing and the
discursive context of the photographer as demonstrated by Rejlander’s struggle to see himself as
a photographer.
4.1 Painter and Photographer
As noted in chapter two, Rejlander left his native Sweden for England as a young man
and married an English woman, Mary Constable. The couple settled in the town of
Wolverhampton in 1846. It was not a bucolic location for a struggling painter. Art historian and
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Rejlander specialist, Stephanie Spencer, notes that the “Wolverhampton region was commonly
called the Black Country owing to the intensity of its ugliness.”169 An actor famous at the time
once memorably remarked that the “route from Wolverhampton to Birmingham by night is the
best guide to Dante that I know. The huge heaps of slag, the blast of the roaring furnaces, the
sulphurous stench of the hell pits, the horde of half savage colliers...the gangs of half-naked
women...amazed and horrified me.”170 Rejlander’s struggle to establish himself as a painter in
Wolverhampton met with little success. No record of his participation in any major exhibitions
survive from this time, save notice of a single painting – provocatively titled Oh yes, Oh yes! –
which appears on the exhibition register of the Royal Academy’s annual Salon of 1848.
Rejlander underwent a conversion (or diversion) that propelled him from his outcast
invisibility as a painter in Wolverhampton to the centre of nineteenth-century photography. This
transformation began in 1852 when he traveled to Rome. While browsing in a market, he came
across a number of photographic reproductions of artworks. He recognized what a benefit these
images could be to a painter. When he returned to England he took lessons with Nicholass
Henneman, who had been an assistant to William Henry Fox Talbot (1800-1877), one of the
chief inventors of photography. Over the next decade Rejlander honed his craft. He began by
making art studies of figures, draperies and the like, which he sold to fellow painters. In time his
practice expanded and deepened. By the 1850s he had begun experimenting with the production
of art-photographs, and shortly after he began to exhibit them widely. In 1855 he won his first
medal at the Universal Exhibition in Paris.
His success as a photographer, however, did not inspire him to stop painting. He
continued to paint right up until his death. The British Journal of Photography noted this in their
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obituary for Rejlander: “Until within a very short period of his demise he [Rejlander] was
occupied in the duties of his beloved profession, resting at short intervals, moving from his
couch to the camera or the easel feebly and slowly.”171 The obituary fittingly captures the sense
of Rejlander’s creative life as caught within, and moving between, the poles of painting and
photography. It was in this movement between these two worlds that Rejlander negotiated his
self-understanding and autobiographical figuration as a photographer. It is within this drift back
and forth that he established a sense of continuity with, and autonomy from, the nineteenthcentury discourse of art and the figure of the artist.
The “Apology” marked the highpoint of Rejlander’s writing. He first read the essay
before the prestigious London Photographic Society, to which he had been elected president in
1856. As president, Rejlander often gave addresses at the Society’s meetings. But as Spencer
notes, “he often arrived unprepared” and would default into giving a casual talk on purely
“technical” matters instead.172 This was not altogether surprising since throughout the midnineteenth century photographers were consumed with technical questions. Indeed the journal
Athenaeum noted in 1850: “Perhaps, like young painters, the photographists are too intent at
present on the mechanisms of their art to attend to its highest capabilities.”173
By the 1860s, however, considerable technical advances had been achieved. As a result
photographers increasingly turned their intellectual energies to addressing and debating
philosophical and aesthetical matters. By 1863, the world of photography was ready for a paper
like the “Apology.” Its influence was highly significant. The paper soon went into print and was
disseminated widely though the expanding network of photography associations and societies in
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England and abroad. The paper struck a chord with photographers (and critics) because it zeroed
in on the central debate in photography at that time: the question of whether or not photography
was a form of art. Rejlander’s paper was one of many such essays of the time that tried in one
way or another to resolve the question of photography’s artistic legitimacy. What makes the
“Apology” unique, however, is that it addresses this question in the form of an autobiographical
narrative. In the “Apology,” Rejlander’s narrative “I” re-traces how he “drifted into making
photographic pictures.”174 Rejlander’s use of the word “drifted” is quite fitting. The “Apology”
does not tell a linear story. It drifts from one origin story to another and deploys a host of figural
personae along the way. The “Apology” is at once the story of a developing photographer and a
study in the struggle to narrate this development.
4.2 When in Rome
Rejlander begins his story in Rome. “In 1852 I was in Rome, and saw photographs of the
Apollo Belvedere, the Laocoon, the Torso, Gibson’s Venus, &c., &c., which I bought and
studied.”175 Rejlander’s list of photographed artworks spans centuries. The Apollo, the Torso and
the Laocoon of Ancient Greece appear alongside John Gibson’s neo-classical rendition of Venus,
completed shortly before Rejlander’s arrival in Rome. The market scene presents in miniature
the anarchic disordering of art-historical time wrought by the advent of photographic
reproduction. By 1863, art of all periods was steadily being archived within the virtual enclosure
of photography – a “museum without walls” – as André Malraux would later famously term it.176
The repeated etcetera of the passage signifies in brief what Rejlander could only intimate at the
time: the archival potential of photography to reproduce any artwork. The repeated etcetera
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functions as a minimalist maxim that fittingly allegorizes the historical logic of technological
reproducibility. Like the ellipses of a mathematical set, the doubled etcetera signifies that the
logic of photographic reproduction is virtually unbounded. Every artwork can be
photographically miniaturized and virtualized. The cultural treasures of Rome (or anywhere) can
now be shipped in a tourist’s suitcase. The opening passage of the “Apology” thus contains in
condensed form a first-person account of the paradigmatic shift that Walter Benjamin would
later theorize as the historically irreparable loss of “aura” that attended the passage of art into the
age of its technological reproducibility.177
4.3 Ackermann’s (Seeing Photographically)
Rejlander’s recollection of buying art-reproductions in Rome drifts into a narration of a
prior scene in London: “I merely recollected having seen some reddish landscapes at
Ackermann’s [gallery] in Regent Street [London, England].”178 Around the same time Rejlander
also saw a show of daguerreotypes, but of these he noted that they “made no impression on me.
What I saw...proved as evanescent as looking at myself in a glass.”179 The reader has been
catapulted from Rome, city of the former Renaissance where the treasures of art are being
cheaply sold as photographic reproductions to London, the present capital of the industrial
revolution where photographs are being sold as art. Rejlander bears witness to the emergence of
a new aura – the art-photograph – that in due course will become an insurgent medium in the art
world of the industrial era.
The account also includes something else: Rejlander’s reflection in the glass. To be sure,
Rejlander’s reflective recollection may have stemmed from Rejlander having actually seen his
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reflection on the glassy surface of the daguerreotypes he saw. But even if this is so, it does not
exhaust the statement’s autobiographical significance.
The scene as seen can be productively understood in terms of what Freud terms
“condensation.” In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud identifies condensation as one of the
means by which “dream work” is done. Condensation is the unconscious act by which multiple
dream images are composited to form a single image. Freud references the combination
photographs of Francis Galton (1822-1911) to analogically illustrate his point. Galton was a
pioneer in the now defunct and dubious “science” of eugenics. In an effort to discern racial
essences, he made studies of the human face by overlaying multiple negatives of different faces
to make a single photographic portrait. Freud sees in Galton’s portraits a fitting visualization of
the dream-work of condensation. He explores this aspect of dreams through an analysis of one of
his own dreams—the so-called “R. is my Uncle” dream.
Freud writes of having a dream in which a strange face appeared before him. Freud’s
analysis reveals that the face he saw was in fact a composite or “condensation” of his Uncle
Josef’s face with that of R., a friend and fellow colleague (Freud keeps the name confidential).
For present purposes, the analysis of the dream is less important than the conclusion about
psychical life that results from it. For Freud, the unconscious can see photographically. For as
Freud notes: “What I did was to adopt the procedure by which Galton produced...portraits:
namely by projecting two images on a single plate.”180 Freud’s analysis of the “R. is my Uncle”
dream would not have been possible without the advent of photography generally and the
technique of composite printing specifically. The conclusion Freud reaches – that he adopted the
“procedure by which Galton produced…portraits” – opens a speculative wager that exceeds the
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interpretive locus of Freudian dream interpretation. It opens a way towards thinking how
consciousness, and the thinking about consciousness, are impacted, shaped, and transformed by
the optics of photography. Freud’s analysis of his “R. is my Uncle” dream exemplifies how
photography can impact the image of the psyche and hence the image of the self in a radical way.
Freud’s interpretation of his own dream shows both how one’s psychical sense of self, and the
reinterpretation of that sense of self, can be reconstituted photographically. It shows that
photography can serve as a prosthetic device in service of a technique – in this case a
psychoanalytical technique – of self-understanding and self-constitution. It is precisely this that
Rejlander’s “reflection” also shows.
The evanescent reflection of Rejlander’s narrative “I” in the “Apology” is indicative of a
psychically internalized photographic optics. Photography is textually entwined in that instant
with Rejlander’s self-constitution as the subject of his autobiographical narrative. At that
moment, Rejlander sees himself retrospectively as the photographer he would become, and he
sees that image in the text through the literal frame of photography. He sees himself as the future
photographer in a photographic frame: he sees himself photographically. Rejlander’s emergent
“I” “adopts” (pace Freud) the landscapes at Ackermann’s for the purposes of constituting the
image of itself as photographer.
Rejlander’s recollection, like Freud’s dream interpretation, exemplifies what Celia Lury
describes as the peculiar and particular “subject-effects of seeing photographically,” a theoretical
notion that Lury develops on the “assumption...that the photograph, more than merely
representing, has taught us a way of seeing and that this way of seeing has transformed...selfunderstanding.”181 Rejlander’s use of the optics of photography in order to frame and focus his
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autobiographical image is a study in the use of a prosthetic technology, photography in this case,
to frame a novel self-understanding or what Lury calls a “prosthetic autobiography.”182
Prosthetic autobiography as Lury powerfully elaborates renders transparent an implicit
structure of dependency external to the subject in order for the autobiographical subject to be
constituted in the first place. This prosthetic autobiography via photography, Lury argues,
catalyzes novel modes of individuation. Lury writes:
experimentation as a technique of the self makes possible a relation to the individual so
produced (including previously defining characteristics of consciousness, memory, and
embodiment) in which aspects that have previously seemed (naturally or socially) fixed,
immutable or beyond will or self-control are increasingly made sites of strategic decisionmaking, matters of technique or experimentation.183
Such experimentation can take a host of forms, but Lury argues that it is photography that has
most profoundly and paradigmatically catalyzed the development of modern prosthetic culture in
which “visibility is an imperative.”184 Historically, photography initiated “novel configurations
of personhood, self-knowledge and truth.”185
To tell the story of one’s life as a photographer is to enunciate a relation to an outside
view – a view through the lens of photography. The life of the photographer denotes in
autobiographical terms specifically the life lived in relation to photography. While this life is
bounded by its prosthetic engagement with the camera, it is also freed from the totality of the life
proper to the normative subject of autobiography. The photographer as subject of a “prosthetic
autobiography” can be “dissociated from his or her biography, consciousness and memories but
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may then...acquire a prosthetic auto/biography or biographies.”186 Lury re-signifies the
autobiographical subject as a human maker. With a nod to philosopher Rosi Braidotti, Lury
argues that prosthetic autobiography reimagines the human as “a crafty homo faber” who uses
tools like photography for the purposes of “copying and multiplying the potencies of the human
body.”187
A photographer fittingly illustrates Lury’s point. A photographer comes into being
through a prosthetic engagement with the camera. This prosthetic engagement also involves
writing. It is in and through this prosthetic assemblage that Rejlander’s narrative “I” qua
photographer emerges. It is through this assemblage of technological and psychological seeing –
photographic seeing – that Rejlander’s autobiographical self-image as photographer develops.
This assemblage constitutes an apparatus in Foucault’s sense. It is at once what Foucault
would call a “technology of the self,” which constructs a “relationship to the self,” as well as a
medium through which to perform and produce “the work of the self on the self.” 188 Together
this apparatus and the psychical form of seeing photographically conditioned by it make possible
what Foucault calls the “discovery of the self by the self.”189 By the “discovery of the self,”
Foucault means a historically and culturally specific conception of the self. It is to this concept of
the self – not the self itself – to which Foucault refers. For Foucault, the modern self as the
inborn reference of one’s identity, is a Christian variant on the Ancient Greek “culture of the
self.”190
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In Foucault’s view, Rejlander’s autobiographical project – a search for the discovery of
the origins of his self as photographer – is the sign and symptom of a particularly modern
conception of self as something that lies within – a veritable kernel or soul. This modern
conception of self, Foucault argues, is the historical effect of the workings of a discursive
dispositif or an apparatus that emerged in the early modern period. It effected the production of
the image and idea of the self as an interior essence that can be discovered by introspective
reflection. That is, the modern discourse of the self produced the very idea that the self is
discoverable through self-searching acts like confession and autobiography. The apparatus of the
modern discourse of the self is what, in his translation of dispositif, Paul Veyne terms a “set-up”
that frames a certain way of speaking about and acting in relation to the subject of the self.191
This “set-up” is constructed around the idea that the self is waiting to be discovered by
introspection. For Foucault, it is precisely this mode of self-surveillance that produces the object
of its gaze – the modern self. It is in this sense that autobiographical narratives can properly be
described as a kind of set-up or dispositif that catalyzes a “process of subjectification,” which is
to say that autobiographical narratives “produce their subject[s].”192
On Lury’s account, which is heavily influenced by Foucault, the subject of a prosthetic
autobiography is effectively the subject of a photographic and discursive apparatus or a set-up
that conditions and produces the idea that the self is discoverable through technological and
linguistic prostheses. Lury’s point, following Foucault, is that the self that is discovered through
the prosthesis of photography is in fact produced by this prosthesis. For Lury the subject of a
photo-prosthetic autobiography makes, extends, copies, multiplies, and re-signifies itself through
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photographic action. Through this prosthetic engagement, the photographic operator multiplies
the possibilities of becoming and self-constitution. Seeing photographically, as Lury defines it, is
one of the most visible aspects of this mode of becoming open to the photographic operator; it
transforms not only the optical but also, as Rejlander’s case will show, the psychical aspects of
seeing.
4.4 Coat Sleeve
The scene that Rejlander describes at Ackermann’s gallery soon fades and a new origin
story takes its place. He recalls an event from his portrait painting days that unexpectedly
impressed upon him the power of photographic vision. As Rejlander describes, it was a
photograph of an anonymous gentleman with a curious fold in his coat sleeve that spurred him to
devote himself seriously to the study of photography. He writes:
It is curious to notice how frequently trifles decide some men’s actions. What really
hurried me forward [towards photography] was having seen the photograph of a
gentleman, and the fold in his coat sleeve was just the thing I required for a portrait I was
then painting at home, and could not please myself in this particular point. My sitter had
no time or inclination to sit for it...but this [photograph] was just “life-like!” “Now,” said
I, “I shall get all I want.” I could not exercise proper patience. I therefore took all the
[photography] lessons at once, to turn out a ready-made photographer the next day.193
A mere trifle, a fold in a coat sleeve seen in a photograph, was “just the thing,” Rejlander
recalls, which finally propelled him to consciously and conscientiously take up photography.
That this tiny detail so captivated Rejlander points to the cultivation of a sensitivity to minute
visual detail, which as Szarkowski argues in The Photographer’s Eye, is indicative of
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photographic vision.194 The camera attunes the eye to see details that can otherwise go unseen.
There is a parallel here with the thought of Walter Benjamin on two points: the detail of the coat
sleeve and the force of the optical unconscious. In his essay “Little History of Photography,”
Benjamin writes the following about a photograph of the philosopher F.W.J. Schelling: “Just
consider Schelling’s coat. It will surely pass into immortality along with him: the contours it has
borrowed from its wearer are not unworthy of the creases in his face.”195 Like Rejlander,
Benjamin’s photographic eye hones in on a mere trifle, a detail: a small fold in a coat sleeve. The
curious fold in Schelling’s coat at the crest of the shoulder becomes a code by which Benjamin
reads the lines of Schelling’s face and forces a dialectical coupling of the materiality of the coat
and the philosophical idealism of its wearer. The fold itself folds a complex quasi-Marxist
material reading of a modern image of one of the nineteenth century’s most important
representatives of German Idealist philosophy.
The same visual detail – a fold in a coat sleeve –“spurs on” Rejlander’s narrative. This
tiny detail functions as the keystone that critically supports the narrative arc that
autobiographically spans the before and after of Rejlander’s passage into photographic practice.
The form of seeing (photographic seeing) that the picture of the gentleman offers Rejlander is
speedily appropriated by an emergent and insurgent “I” determined “now” to “get all I want.”
What does it want? It wants to close the prosthetic distance between optical and photographic
seeing. Rejlander’s “I” establishes a fantasy of self-sufficiency. The ego’s dream of liberation
from dependency on anything outside itself finally expresses itself in the paradoxical
pronouncement that this “I” is a “ready-made photographer.”
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There is an incongruity between the image of a “ready-made photographer” who by
definition is already a photographer and thus was always already a photographer, and the
photographer who took “lessons” in order to develop into one. Rejlander’s emergent ego as
photographer seeks to efface the “other” of photography and supplant it with an image of a selfsufficient “I.” But the “lessons” shine like a penumbra that reveals what is otherwise eclipsed by
this egoical claim: seeing photographically must be learned, whether consciously through
“lessons” or unconsciously by mere exposure to photography. Photographic seeing is a technique
and a technology for the production of the self qua photographer.
4.5 A Young Miss
No sooner has the confident persona of the “ready-made photographer” appeared in the
“Apology” than it is effaced by a more ambivalent figure that speaks of the trials of tutelage,
training, and “lessons” in development. Rejlander writes: “Alas! for a very long period my
attempts at photography resembled those of a young Miss at the piano, looking alternately at the
music and the keys. If I had to speak at the time of operation [photographing], I very easily went
wrong.”196 The time of learning that previously had been signaled by one day of formal training
thickens and expands into a story of apprenticeship that now is said to cover a “very long
period.” The autotelic “I” of the ready-made photographer now gives way to an “I” that “easily
went wrong.” This “I” is figured as a “young Miss at the piano” clumsily playing both a music
and an instrument she has not yet mastered.
This “young Miss” is an example of what Cheryl Walker might call an autobiographical
“persona.”197 Walker argues that because the “I” is never self-sufficient, it emerges in an
autobiography through a collection of more or less visible personae. Personae in Walker’s view
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emerge through a complex interleaving of the “I” or ego, lived life, and the multiplicity of
“literary voices” and intertextual traces that bear on the scene of writing. 198 The “I” of
autobiography “functions like an outline,” writes Walker, “a potentiality, rather than a fullness,
which is always already depleted as it renders itself in discourse. One might even call a persona a
thin description.”199 The persona is a vessel more than a mirror that conveys and transforms the
subject, the self, or the “I” of the autobiographical reference. Coming as it does after the
figuration of the “ready-made photographer,” the “young Miss” at once signifies and splits the
“I” of the “Apology.” It at once makes possible its figuration while rendering that figuration
manifestly multiple. With the appearance of the “young Miss,” Rejlander’s narrative “I” can no
longer be read as a singular, self-sufficient ego. The self-sufficient “ready-made photographer” is
exposed as a fantasy by the secondary iteration of the “young Miss.”
The “young Miss” appears on the scene of recollection playing the piano in media res.
Assuming that the “young Miss” is the persona of Rejlander as novice photographer, and that the
music this figure plays is photography, some striking questions follow. Did she, photography,
begin playing for Rejlander that fateful day in Rome or was it London? When did this music
begin in Rejlander? The “young Miss” autobiographically personifies a place beyond which
questions of Rejlander’s beginnings as a photographer become ever more clouded as if
consumed in what Benjamin calls the “fog that surrounds the beginnings of photography.”200
Rejlander’s narrative “I” cannot ground itself as an origin since photography conditions
the very possibility of his seeing himself as a photographer. And strictly speaking photography
did not have a singular origin. The modern photograph dates to the early nineteenth century. But
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the building blocks of photography – optics, chemistry, and rules of visual composition – vastly
predate the invention of the mechanical camera. The fog that surrounds the origins of
photography is re-imaged in Rejlander’s account by the confused and multiple origin stories of
his beginnings as a photographer, which is itself iterated by the plurality of figures that narrate
those beginnings.
The narrative drift in the “Apology” from the “ready-made photographer” to the “young
Miss” splits the autobiographical trajectory and introduces a swerve, a clinamen, into Rejlander’s
account. Rejlander intimates this when he notes: “I drifted into making photographic pictures.”201
This drift erodes the surety of the account and fractures the normative expectation that the “I” of
autobiography is singular, and unique. It serves as unintentional critique of the illusory idea that
the “I” is complete, coherent, and whole. The multiple personae of the “Apology” render the “I”
as a series of images and fragmentary figures. On this point Szarkowski notes something
especially prescient. Writing on the photographer’s problematic attempt to capture the world in
fragments he notes: “The photographer...[can] not assemble these clues into a coherent
narrative.”202 With the appearance of the “young Miss,” Rejlander’s autobiographical project
loses its unity and coherence. At that moment it drifts into a narrative form that, like
photography, is marked by reproducibility and fragmentation. Thus the “Apology” bears the
impress of seeing photographically insofar as it catalyzes a logic leading ultimately, as Lury
notes, to the “dissolution of the individual, the proliferation of multiple” personae and “the
emergence of an optical unconscious.”203
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4.6 You Photographers
The “young Miss” soon fades and is replaced for yet another figure and yet another origin
story. Rejlander writes:
A very good artist was staying in the neighborhood, engaged in some commission. He
called, saw [one of my] picture[s], was very much delighted with it, and so was I. Before
he left my house he looked at the picture again, and said it was “marvelous;” but added—
“Now, if I had drawn that, I should have introduced another figure between them, or
some light object to keep them together. You see there is where you photographers are at
fault.204
Rejlander’s autobiographical persona is the object of the artist’s rebuke: “that is where you
photographers are at fault.” But this negative identification soon assumes a more affirmative
tone. Rejlander continues:
I snapped my fingers after he [the artist] had left – but not at him – and exclaimed outloud, “I can do it.” Two days after I called at my artist friend’s hotel, as proud as
anybody. He looked at my picture and at me, and took snuff twice. He said—“This is
another picture.” “No,” said I, “it is the same, except with the addition you suggested.”
"Never!" he exclaimed…“how is it possible?” Our interview ended with another
suggestion that if a basket or [something] else had been on the left side in the foreground
it would have given greater depth to the picture...I agreed fully with my friend’s
criticism; and, after a week, I sent to him, in London, the picture amended as a present.205
The passage showcases Rejlander’s skill at combination printing. At the prodding of the painter,
Rejlander added figures and objects to his initial photograph by shooting the new elements
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individually and compositing them into the original negative. But the passage indexes something
else that for present purposes is of more interest. In the course of the passage, the painter drifts
from the pole of a neighbor to that of “friend.” This “friend” is very different from the “brotherartist” figure found in Robinson’s Studio. Robinson’s use of the term “brother-artist” underscores
an evolutionary theme internal to his pedagogic program: common descent. Photography, for
Robinson, descends from painting which descends from a supreme source of Art. According to
Robinson, one becomes a photographer by adapting the techniques and standards of art,
particularly painting, to that of photography.
Rejlander, by contrast, images the photographer as a figure drifting between painting and
photography. Rejlander writes: “The same way a painter goes if he means to paint a
photographer must go if he wishes to make a composition-photograph.”206 But he adds: “The two
go together – part here and meet again.”207 Finally he notes that where art and photography part
“photographic art does not stand still, but proceeds and gathers other merits along another
road.”208 This “parting” of the photographer from the artist signifies a swerve, a clinamen, in the
historical development of the nineteenth-century photographer. The photographer for Rejlander
takes another route, another “road,” that diverges from the path of the artist.
4.7 No Mind
Rejlander specifies further that photography can be distinguished from painting in terms
of the contingencies involved. Whereas the pedagogic ideology of Robinson’s Studio is
committed to the proposition that photography can be learned and practiced as an intentional
activity. The “Apology” by contrast conceptualizes photography as a practice devoid of the
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guarantor of intentionality. Consider the following strangely worded passage: “there is no mind
in a photographic picture, so according to some it cannot contain any new idea, pose, light or
expression.”209 The “some” was directed at critics, most especially Thomas Sutton whom the
essay later mentions by name.
For Sutton, and like-minded critics, photography was not and could not be a form of art.
Critics like Sutton held that photographs had “no mind;” they were thought to be devoid of the
stamp of human consciousness and feeling. Such critics saw the photograph as a mechanically
degraded and impotent copy of the vitality of phenomena comprehended by the human mind. An
artwork by the hand of an “inspired” artist was thought to be indubitably imprinted with the vital
power of the artist’s imagination. Rejlander’s rejoinder to Sutton and like-minded critics turns on
a subtle revision of the concept of intentionality upon which his critics’ view rests.
Rather than presume that art is a matter of planned procedures by which the artist’s ideas
and emotions are transferred to a material and relayed to the viewer, Rejlander instead highlights
the contingencies of photographic production. Rejlander suggests that photography proposes a
new “idea,” a new “expression,” a new “pose” (a new way of appearing); above all, he suggests,
that it throws a new “light” on the conception of creative action. But the practice of photography
also exposes the operator to the contingencies of the technological apparatuses involved, and to
the contingencies of time, place, point of view, and angle of vision any of which can “easily go
wrong.”
Rejlander intimates in brief a major insight that twentieth-century commentators on
photography would develop, namely, that the frame of a photograph is a contingent boundary
framing a contingent moment. As Barthes beautifully observes, a photograph “is wholly
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ballasted by the contingency of which it is the weightless, transparent envelope.” 210 In the
“world” of photography (Rejlander’s word), things can “go wrong” because, as he notes,
photographic practice is marked by a contingent “drift.”211 This movement of drift, drifting, or
deviations amidst the contingencies or those “trifles that decide some men’s actions” is the
aleatory axiom upon which Rejlander establishes his life-story and his conception of
photography. The drift of photography, Rejlander suggests, leads the photographer inexorably
beyond the boundary of intentional certitudes. “I very easily went wrong” is yet another
minimalist maxim that economically signals the “new” potential, the “new light,” but also the
new darkness, the new opacities, revealed by photography. The photographic capture of the
world, Rejlander suggests, involves the photographer in the contingencies that mark the
precarious space of the present. To capture, to frame, to freeze, to fix the world in photographs is
to become involved in what Barthes calls the “vast disorder of objects” – the vast disorder of
things and times that is the world seen through the viewing pane of the camera. 212 To photograph
is to drift amidst the contingencies of the present in its fragile moment to moment temporality –
brief moments in which so much “can easily go wrong” – times in which a flicker, a passing
shadow, a twitch, a blink, a “trifle” can decide everything.
4.8 Two Ways of Life
The concluding pages of the “Apology” are devoted to a defense of what was to become
Rejlander’s most famous photograph, Two Ways of Life of 1856. The photograph (of which there
are multiple versions) is composed of thirty-two separately shot negatives that were
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Plate 3. Oscar G. Rejlander, The Two Ways of Life, 1856. Courtesy of the George Eastman House, International
Museum of Photography and Film.

painstakingly combined in the darkroom to form a single photographic image. The photograph
depicts a wide but shallow-stage-like space framed in the center by an arch and columns. At
center, an old man leads two young men into a throng of figures, some clothed and some nude or
semi-nude. On the right is arranged a group of allegorical figures representing the path of virtue.
These include figures of learning, industry, and chastity. On the left are figures of vice depicting
slothfulness, promiscuity, and corruption. The picture presents a moral drama in which youth
must choose which way in life to go. Rejlander elsewhere gave the following explanation of the
work.
In the background is represented a country scene, where, far from the tumult of life, two
youths have been fondly reared [the country side is visible in the photograph’s
background]. The time has arrived when duty calls then to perform their part in the busy
haunts of men. The father, with many misgivings, but with many prayers, conducts them
from the home of their childhood, through an archway, which is symbolic of the
boundary between town and country. Left [as] orphans at an early age, the spirit of the
114

mother is seen still hovering near them [in the foreground], instilling into their minds
good desires.213
Initial public reactions to Two Ways of Life were good. One critic wrote: “This
magnificent picture, decidedly the finest Photograph of its class ever produced, is intended to
show of how much photography is capable.”214 However, over time the tone began to change. A
critic writing for the Art Journal wrote:
Virtue and Vice—Industry and Pleasure—are here displayed with an allegorical felicity,
which is—under all the circumstances of producing such a picture—surprising. The pose
of each figure is good, and the grouping of the whole as nearly perfect as possible. We do
not, however, desire to see many advances in this direction. Works of high Art are not to
be executed by a mechanical contrivance. The hand of man, guided by the heaven-born
mind, can alone achieve greatness in this direction.215
In 1857, the Council of the Society of Photography in Scotland refused to hang the picture at its
annual exhibition on moral grounds.216 The Council reversed its decision the following year but
they hid the vices-half of the photograph behind a curtain.217 Thomas Sutton later wrote:
When the Council of the Society, some years ago, banished from the walls of its
Exhibition a photograph entitled...Two Ways of Life, in which degraded females were
exhibited in a state of nudity, with all the uncompromising truthfulness of photography,
they did quite right, for there was neither art nor decency in such a photograph…There is
no impropriety in exhibiting such works of art as Etty’s Bathers Surprised by a Swan, or
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The Judgment of Paris; but there is impropriety in allowing the public to see photographs
of nude prostitutes, in flesh-and-blood truthfulness and minutest of detail.218
The debate between art and photography here the form of a moral contest. Nudity in art for
Sutton and the like is acceptable, but nudity in photography is an obscenity. Despite the fact that
the photograph was known to be a contrived composite image, the reality principle of
photography foreclosed for critics like Sutton the possibility of seeing nudity in photography as
little more than pornography.
It is in the context of this critical and moral condemnation of Two Ways of Life that one
should also read the “Apology.” The reading of the text before the London Photographic Society
was Rejlander’s chance to defend his work, and as Spencer points out, he was also keen to
defend his female models from the charge of impropriety. Rejlander writes:
Those that objected to...Two Ways of Life being exhibited had a perfect right to their
opinion; but they have no right to ask the names or profession or religion of [the] models,
still less to use vile epithets in speaking of them, as Mr. Sutton has done in his paper read
before the Photographic Society of Scotland.219
Despite Rejlander’s effort to defend his work and his models, he could not stem the rising chorus
of moral outrage. Rejlander never quite recovered. He felt his foray into art-photography had
produced, as he later wrote in a letter to Robinson, “only cavil and misinterpretation.”220
Spencer’s archival research has conclusively shown that of the nearly four hundred photographs
attributed to Rejlander only twelve of them were intended by Rejlander to be seen as artphotographs. By 1860, perhaps due to negative criticism, Rejlander abandoned his practice of
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art-photography. He would continue to make portraits and study aides for painters, but his
aesthetic ambitions by 1858 had all but died out.
The textual re-presentation of Two Ways of Life in the “Apology” might be said to
constitute what W.J.T. Mitchell calls a “metapicture.” Mitchell elaborates on the concept of
metapictures first in Picture Theory of 1995, but it is his formulation in his more recent What Do
Pictures Want of 2005 that proves particularly useful for present purposes. Mitchell is interested
in pictures (and images broadly) that picture their own picturing. Self-referential pictures are
typically associated with postmodern imagery. But they can be found throughout history in
sources like Rembrandt, Vermeer, Velasquez and many others whose pictures prominently
feature painted images of paintings. Such works draw attention to their material status as
pictures. Metapictures can also be found in photography as can be seen in the many pictures of
photographs and cameras. The trope has been exploited to great effect by photographers such as
Duane Michaels, Louise Lawler, Jeff Wall and others. Mitchell argues that metapictures make
visible the fact that “all media are mixed media” and that diverse media are always “nested”
within one another.221 Mitchell takes media in the broadest sense. Media are made up of
mediums. And a medium, Mitchell argues “is not just a set of materials, an apparatus, or a code
that ‘mediates’ between individuals. It is a complex social institution that contains individuals
within it and is constituted by a history of practices, rituals, and habits, skills and techniques, as
well as by a set of material objects and spaces.”222 In Mitchell’s view, a photographer is a
medium as much as photography since each mediates the transposition of the visual into
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photographic form. Through Mitchell’s lens, Two Ways of Life might be conceptualized as what
might be termed a metaphotograph of the photographer as a medium.
This reading intersects critically with Jordan Bear’s profoundly ingenious interpretation
of Two Ways of Life. In “Dangerous Combinations,” Bear reads Two Ways of Life not as a moral
allegory of virtue versus vice but as a political allegory of labour organizing. The invisible
“joins” that make up the photographic image are read by Bear as signifying an “invisible” union
of labour.223 Baer writes: “The idiom in which the critical response to Rejlander’s photograph
was issued was one with striking affinities to a contemporary political condition that likewise
seemed to be comprised of an invisible collusion: the organization of labour.”224 Bear goes on to
point out that the term “combination” resonated in the England of the 1850s with “any
undesirable community of men, who sought, in the words of the Combination Acts meant to
suppress their activities, to ‘raise wages, or to increase or diminish the number of hours of work,
or quantity of work, to be done.’”225 In short, Bear ingeniously suggests that both the means by
which Two Ways of Life was produced and what it depicts – combination on the one hand and
labour on the other –created a rhetorical and pictorial resonance that “would have been
understood almost exclusively in relation to trade unionism” and labour more generally.226
Extending Bear’s insight, one might argue that Two Ways of Life, and the photograph’s
re-figuration in the “Apology,” can be read as an allegory not solely of labour in general but also
as an allegory of the labour specifically of the photographer at the very moment of its coming
into historical existence alongside the art and labour of modernity. The “Apology” and Two
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Ways of Life textually “nested” within it may be said to metapicture the nineteenth-century
photographer as a split, internally divided, and contested cultural figure. The image (like the
“Apology”) depicts the medium of photography, and thus also the photographer “nested” within
it as composed of two figures bound to a world split by competing images of photography. The
two paths confronting the young men may be said to personify two seemingly conflicting choices
that confronted the nineteenth-century photographer. Should the photographer follow the path of
art and sensual beauty or the path of rational and instrumental technology? The photograph as a
metaphotograph figures the split historical figuration of the photographer emerging against the
culturally and aesthetically contested backdrop of nineteenth-century photography.
The drama of the “Apology” passes from Rome to London; from a young girl clumsily
playing piano to two young orphaned boys adrift in a “world” that branches and splits. The
various figures of the photographer emerge in the “Apology” through multiple and multiply
recollected photographic situations, apparatuses of desire, technology, image, and selfimagining, together point beyond the anemic outline of pictorialism and the whole edifice of the
photographer-as-artist paradigm that went along with it. Unlike the ideal pictorialist figured in
Robinson’s texts, the photographer of the “Apology” is a figure of self-division as signified by
the multiple accounts of Rejlander’s entry into photographic practice and the plurality of
personae that dramatize them. Whereas the photographer of The Studio is framed in terms of a
narrowly defined, aesthetic program, the photographer of the “Apology” is a wayward figure
whose meanderings in the world of photography lead the photographer in ways neither
prescribed nor even envisioned by the pictorialist program. The “Apology” marks a moment in
the historical emergence of the photographer when the question of what it might mean to be a
photographer finds no single, direct, answer. But in its very uncertainty it carves out a possibility
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only dreamed of in pictorialism: the possibility that the photographer could yet “gather merits
along another road” parallel to that of the artist. The “Apology” establishes the possibility of
autonomy for the photographer if only through the specific questions and uncertainties thrown up
in the interstitial space between the practice of photography and the sphere of recognizably fine
art. In the pages of the “Apology,” the photographer appears for what it was for a moment in the
nineteenth century: a divided figure marking an uncertain field.
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Chapter 5
A Transport of Delight:
The Case of Julia Margaret Cameron
Chapter four argued that Rejlander’s “Apology” illustrates a then emergent subject
position in the field of nineteenth-century photographic discourse and practice: the photographer
as a divided and fractured subject position split by the competing interests and demands of art
and photography. The identity crisis in which the nineteenth-century photographer was
embroiled was, however, interpreted by some photographers as license to reject the imposition of
norms drawn from outside photography’s borders. This was the case with Julia Margaret
Cameron (1815-1879).
This chapter examines Cameron’s brief autobiographical text, Annals of My Glass House.
The text was published on the occasion of Cameron’s 1874 retrospective titled, Mrs. Cameron’s
Photography, which toured England, Australia, America, and the Continent. “Glass house” was
a common name for a photography studio in the nineteenth century owing to the fact that a
studio in the days before electricity required many windows and skylights to sufficiently light the
space. The central principle of the Annals, and arguably of Cameron’s conception of
photography as a whole, is that of movement. Cameron often allowed her subjects, especially
children, to move during the long exposure time, which created blurs in the final photograph. She
also intentionally employed “soft focus” rather than the sharp and hard focus favored by most
nineteenth-century photographers. Cameron’s stylistic emphasis on movement signified by the
blurriness of many of her most important photographs parallels her philosophic prizing of
mobility and fluidity in the Annals. Cameron’s Annals and her photographic work together
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served to open spaces within what Azoulay calls the “arena” of photography. 227 The arena of
Cameron’s photography was her glass house. Both her physical studio and her textual glass
house – her autobiography – functioned as spaces for experimentation that served to open novel
degrees of freedom within the otherwise restrictive space of Victorian norms.
This chapter begins with a reading of the autobiographical work that the Annals perform.
It then proceeds to investigate how the Annals re-conceptualize photographic action and the
subject position of the photographer from the perspective of movement and fluidity. Lastly it
examines how this conception is given form in one of Cameron’s most complex works, Pray
God Bring Father Safely Home of 1872.
5.1 Safe Cover
Cameron was born Julia Margaret Pattle in Calcutta, India. Her father, James Pattle, was
a British official for the East India Trading Company. Her mother, Adeline de l’Etang, had
ancestral ties to Marie Antoinette. Julia Margaret married Charles Hay Cameron, a jurist and a
member of the Law Commission stationed in Calcutta. By the mid-1850s the couple moved to
the village of Freshwater on the Isle of Wight. Cameron over time cultivated an impressive
network of influential friends, including the philosopher Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), Charles
Darwin (1809-1882), and Alfred, Lord Tennyson (1809-1892). These contacts were to prove
invaluable in the course of Cameron’s eventual rise to prominence as one of the most respected
photographers of her generation.
The Annals opens with the following invocation: “‘Mrs. Cameron’s Photography,’ now
ten years old, has passed the age of lisping and stammering and may speak for itself, having
traveled over Europe, America and Australia, and met with welcome which has given it
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confidence and power.”228 The third-person voice heard here is a function of the title of the
exhibition, Mrs. Cameron’s Photography. Cameron, however, strategically enacts a poetics of
prosopopoeia. The exhibition has passed the stage of stammering and matured into a “world
traveler” endowed with “confidence and power.” This act of prosopopoeia slyly enables
Cameron to claim her success by ascribing a voice to the exhibition.
Although women of the Victorian period did begin to assume roles in public life and the
arts, the prevailing nineteenth-century norms remained largely intact. Women were expected to
remain in the private sphere of family and married life. Men governed social life by (among
other things) regulating and restraining women’s access to the public sphere through legal fetters.
Hence in England, as elsewhere, Victorian women had little to no status as legal subjects. And
what little legal status women did possess was largely taken away by marriage. Mary Poovey
points out in her study Uneven Developments that married women in the eyes of the law were
seen essentially as property of their husbands. This legal principle was known as “coverture.”
Poovey notes: “the principle of coverture...dictated that married women were legally represented
or ‘covered’ by their husband because the interest of husband and wife were assumed to be the
same; as a consequence married women were not ‘bound’ as individual subjects by contracts,
debts, or some criminal laws.”229 Hence “in Britain, when a woman became what she was
destined to be (a wife), she became non-existent in the eyes of the law.”230
The principle of coverture reflected and reinforced the ideology of “separate spheres”:
public for men and private for women.231 Men were to participate in the public realm of work
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and civic duty and women were to remain at home unemployed except in unpaid domestic labor
and child rearing. The ideology of separate spheres was reinforced by the perpetuation of the
view that women were “naturally self-sacrificing,” a view that drew considerable support from
the pseudo-biological principle that women were naturally maternal creatures. 232 The domestic
sphere was socially a “protected territory” in which married women’s “naturally” self-sacrificing
maternal capacities were thought to “achieve their fullest expression and influence” without the
fetters of legal oversight (or protection).233 Hence the paradox of Victorian domesticity was that
married women were “free” to do what their maternal “natures” demanded: they were “free” to
remain under the “cover” of house, home, and husband.
This in brief renders clearer the complex sexual politics that impinged on Cameron’s
public emergence as a photographer and her self-figuration in the Annals. As Cameron’s
biographer, Victoria Olsen notes, Cameron had to “walk a fine line between two poles: selfeffacement would satisfy her public persona of self-sacrifice and devotion to her family but deny
her ambition and personal talent; self-promotion would serve her art and career but potentially
threaten her identity within her family and community.”234 In order to walk this “fine line,” the
Annals deploys inventive strategies of discretion designed at once to satisfy and subvert
Victorian norms of femininity. Letting the exhibition “speak” strategically enables Cameron’s
persona as photographer to speak through it. Playing the self-effacing woman provides safe
cover, the necessary cover, under which the Annals could slip the societal censors that
“protected” the feminine sphere.235 This strategy of discretion via a self-effacing persona follows
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the cultural logic of what Homi Bhabha has called (citing nineteenth-century colonial discourse)
“sly civility.”236
Bhabha argues that in the restricted zone of enforced civility, colonized subjects can and
do find means and modes of address and social performance that simultaneously satisfy and
subvert the demands of the colonizer. In his essay “Sly Civility,” Bhabha cites these lines from a
sermon by Archdeacon Potts in 1818: “If you urge them [the colonized] with their gross and
unworthy misconceptions of the nature and the will of God, or the monstrous follies of their
fabulous theology, they will turn it off with a sly civility.”237 It is the ambivalence of colonial rule
that the colonized reflects back to the colonizer as “sly civility.”238 The self-effacing acceptance
of the colonizer’s social norms produces anxiety within the apparatus of colonial power by
generating a series of unsettling questions. Why would anyone submit? Does anyone wholly
submit? Is the submissiveness of the colonized merely a mask behind which some resistant
kernel silently refuses to yield? Are they conforming or merely being sly? The performance of
sly civility, writes Bhabha, “reveals that the other side of narcissistic authority may be the
paranoia of power; a desire for ‘authorization’ in the face of a process of cultural differentiation
which makes it problematic to fix...objects of colonial power.”239
There are obvious complications with adopting wholesale a postcolonial perspective in
order to chart Cameron’s public presentation of herself in the Annals since the relation between
colonizers and colonized is not symmetrical to that of men and women. But there are resonances
between the two sites of power and resistance. Cameron’s public persona had to slip past the
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societal checkpoints zealously guarded by the masculine order. Cameron’s Annals deploys the
strategy of sly civility by miming the Victorian norm of the mystique of self-effacing femininity.
This mimicry of femininity (to use another of Bhabha’s important concepts) is, however, not
simply a conscious strategy.240 It is also the sign of an ideological (which is to say unconscious)
confirmation of prevailing norms. It was in and through this mixture of conscious and
unconscious miming of Victorian norms of femininity that Cameron’s persona as photographer
emerged. This conscious stratagem and ideological confirmation of Victorian femininity takes
shape early in the Annals. Consider the following:
I think that the Annals of My Glass House will be welcome to the public, and,
endeavoring to clothe my little history with light, as with a garment, I feel confident that
the truthful account of indefatigable work, with the anecdote of human interest attached
to that work, will add in some measure to its value.241
The strategy of sly civility is obliquely visible. The Annals address a public, but the address is
dressed in a “garment” of “light.” The text purports to offer a “truthful account,” but the account
is discreetly covered “as with a garment.” Paradoxically, the text is clothed in the very thing that
illuminates all things – light. This creates for the reader a certain interpretive free play. One can
read this “little history” as a “truthful account” but only on the condition that one bears in mind
that this accounting is also an act of concealing. The Annals at once expose Cameron as
photographer to the public, and at the same time the text covers itself “as with a garment” in the
garb of Victorian femininity. The text exists at the crucial intersection or interstice of two sites:
public exposure and private discretion. In this interstitial space the Annals carves out a thin
persona within “the public” of England in the year 1874. This persona lived its life between the

240
241

See Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man,” in The Location of Culture.
Walker, “Persona Criticism and the Death of the Author.”
126

interiorized space of the Victorian domestic sphere (feminine) and the “outside” world of “the
public” (masculine) to which the exhibition and the Annals were addressed.
Public address in 1874 (as now) was regulated by norms derived from the quasi-juridical
order of acts that include witnessing, confession, testimony, and autobiography. In The Limits of
Autobiography, Leigh Gilmore draws out the juridical dimension of autobiographical address.
She writes, “along with the dutiful and truthful accounting of a life one might find in
autobiography, the self is not only responsible but always potentially culpable, given
autobiography’s rhetorical proximity to testimony and the quasi-legalistic framework for judging
its authenticity.”242 Autobiography puts in question its own truthfulness since it is assumed that
one’s image or story of oneself is never “objective.” But it is not only that the reading of
autobiography is plagued with questions of veracity. The writing of autobiography is as well. To
truthfully tell the story of one’s life to the public – to give a “truthful account” as Cameron says
– is to put one’s life on the stand in the public court of opinion. Gilmore continues:
In the cultivation of an autobiographical conscience, one learns to be, and even strives for
a sense of being, overseen. Thus autobiography can be viewed as a discipline, a selfstudy in surveillance. The prevalence of surveillance not only characterizes a relation
between the self and others but becomes, as it is internalized, a property of the self as
self-reflexivity or conscience.243
Gilmore notes that the “self who reflects on his or her life is not unlike the self bound to confess
or the self in prison, if one imagines self-representation as a kind of self-monitoring.”244
Confessional autobiography proceeds on the implicit assumption that the public gaze is directed
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at the self. In Cameron’s case, the public (male) gaze operationalizes a regulatory and coercive
force, which compels the desire to give a “truthful account.” As an accompanying text to the
exhibition, the Annals, like Cameron’s photographs, were circumscribed by a space of judgment.
It was from within this space of aesthetic and social judgment that Cameron’s self as
photographer emerged in the eyes of a male-dominated public gaze. Cameron had to satisfy the
male-dominated public gaze’s demand for proof that her persona (if not person) was covered or
clothed in the garment and garb of Victorian femininity. She had then to expose in public her
social belonging within the private, feminine sphere. This was the paradoxical position Cameron
was in: how to make the private public without appearing to sully its supposed sanctity?
Cameron was caught in the increasingly confused borders of the private and public, which in no
small way was a direct consequence of the advent of photography. The photographic image
became a virtual vehicle for the transgression and partial breakdown of the public and private
distinction. The family photograph, one of Cameron’s genres, is at once a private document and
yet made for collective and even at times, as in Cameron’s case, public consumption. As Barthes
notes, photography “corresponds precisely to the explosion of the private into the public…the
private is consumed as such publicly.”245 Commenting on this passage, Lury writes that the
photographic “display of the private…the making external of the internal both denies and
depends upon the boundary of the two. It erases only to redefine this boundary, reconstituting the
private within the public.”246
It is from a position within the interstice of the private and the public that the Annals
speak. “Autobiography,” T.L. Broughton notes, “in its modern, introspective form at least,
situates itself at the very juncture of the public world of announcement and the private world of
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self-analysis and meditation.”247 The private world of autobiography can only be “read,” or
otherwise understood, insofar as it conforms to (or contests) public expectations and norms
concerning autobiographical truthfulness. And the semblance of truthfulness has to be effected
according to the gendered genre norms of autobiography. Cameron’s “truthful account” had to be
dressed or clothed in the language of femininity. The Annals thus symptomatically show how the
truthful autobiography addressed to the public requires a dressing of the truth. The truth must be
dressed as a witness is dressed for court – in conformity with the rules, regulations, and
procedures of public truth telling. To tell a private truth to the public, one must tell it in the
language of public address. It is within this ambivalent space of enunciation that Cameron’s
“truthful account” must be understood as an iterative production in the present rather than a
statement corresponding to a set of historical events only. Here one finds that, as Bhabha notes,
“the ‘true’ is always marked and informed by the ambivalence of the process of emergence
itself.”248
The question of autobiography and its relation to the public/private distinction thickens
considerably when the Annals suddenly break off into a quotation from Tennyson’s poem “The
Gardener’s Daughter.” Cameron contextualizes her use of Tennyson’s poem by prefacing it with
these words: “details strictly personal and touching the affections should be avoided, is a truth
one’s own instinct would suggest, and noble are the teachings of one [Tennyson] whose word
has become a text to the nations.”249 Cameron’s appropriation of the poem (which goes
unacknowledged) retools the famed Laureate’s poem as an autobiographical para-text. The first
quotation reads:
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Be wise; not easily forgiven
Are those, who setting wide the doors that bar
The secret bridal chamber of the heart
Let in the day250
Cameron’s prefatory contextualization of Tennyson’s poem appropriates and transforms
it. Firstly it covertly buttresses Cameron’s strategy of discretion: the public will not easily
forgive a woman for exposing the private domestic sphere as signified by the hallowed space of
the “bridal chamber.” The poem thus signals to the public that Cameron acknowledges the
prevailing norms regarding the privacy of the “feminine” domestic sphere. Yet this
acknowledgement also serves as safe cover for the exposure of that sphere though the exhibition
of her photographs, many of which were of Cameron’s family. The appropriation of the poem
acts to solemnize the Victorian sanctity of the domestic enclosure while at the same time it opens
that enclosure to the light of photography and public spectatorship. In light of photography, the
“secret bridal chamber” barred from view is in a sense re-signified as a hidden “camera” in the
original Latin sense – a chamber. The advent of the modern mechanical camera descends from
the camera obscura: a dark chamber through which light is only permitted to enter through a
small aperture. This optical device produces an image of the outside world on the opposite wall
inside the chamber. In a lovely rhetorical inversion, then, the “glass house” as a text becomes a
camera obscura (or dark chamber) that “captures” Tennyson’s poem within its photo-rhetorical
enclosure. This inversion is significantly at odds with pictorialist sentiments.
Cameron is considered a pictorialist. But her writing on photography demonstrates a
conviction to dispense with fine art as a model from which to derive norms of photographic
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practice. She asserts photography’s aesthetic rights in the Annals by re-signifying the relation
between photography and the fine arts. She subordinates Tennyson’s poetry to a photographic
rhetoric and in doing so slyly inverts the nineteenth-century cultural hierarchy of the fine arts
over and above photography.
The heliocentric rhetoric of the Annals also transforms the “The Gardener’s Daughter”
through an intensification of the poem’s photographic resonances. The Annals recontextualization of the poem recodes “light” and “chamber” as elements of an amorous, even
sexual, “bridal” drama replete with penetrative rhetoric: light flooding the chamber. But the
penetration goes unseen. Light does not illuminate the privatized interiority of the bridal chamber
of the heart. It is barred from view by the doors of the locked “chamber of the heart.” The heart
chamber rhetorically houses the presumed subject of the Annals, Cameron’s true self. Cameron’s
heart of hearts, as it were, dwells unseen in the otherwise apparently transparent autobiographical
enclosure of the Glass House. The heart as seat of the soul or self in modern vernacular has a
long history. The heart is the master signifier of Western interiority. As Sloterdijk writes,
“emotional disciplines have spawned a universe of subtle physiologies whose only aim is to
deepen and emphasize the equation of the heart and the center of the self...heartiness is the
epitome of affective core subjectivity.”251 Cameron’s barred chamber of the heart with its
connotations of chastity, of limit, of a barrier, a refusal to fully disclose, fully disrobe, unclothe
or strip bare is the sine qua non of an intimacy, which functions to fabricate the assumption that
some truth lies hidden in the Annals, but in the form of a personal and private intimacy that
remains discreetly unexposed.
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This strategy of photographic re-signification is echoed in a letter Cameron wrote around
1870. Describing her relation to Tennyson, she writes: “Tennyson is the Sun of the Earth and I
am the Priestess of the Sun of the Heavens so that my works must sometimes surpass his.” 252 By
the time she peened those lines, Cameron had completed a suite of photographs illustrating
Tennyson’s epic poem The Idylls of the King. Cameron relished the opportunity to transform
Tennyson’s words into images. It is in the context of that project that her statement should be
read. Naming Tennyson the “Sun of the Earth” certainly valorizes him and by extension the art
of poetry as a whole. Yet at the same time by giving herself the title “Priestess of the Sun,”
Cameron fashions herself as an intercessor with the power to re-render Tennyson’s poetry into
images made of light. Cameron’s photographic images of the Idylls of the King do in a sense
“surpass” the poem as Cameron says. They do so in kind more than quality. The photographic representation of Tennyson’s poem surpasses it by traversing the bounds of verse by transposing it
(with a difference) into the language of photography.
5.2 The Gift

Having established the groundwork for a project of autobiographical discretion, Cameron
proceeds to tell the story of her entrance into photographic practice. She writes: “I...restrain the
overflow of my heart and simply state that my first lens [or camera] was given to me by my
cherished departed daughter and her husband with the words, ‘It may amuse you, Mother, to try
and photograph during your solitude at Freshwater.’”253 What Cameron fails to mention is that
prior to 1863 she had already been exposed to photography, and was by all accounts already
avidly interested in it.
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As early as 1857, Cameron began making photo-albums. Many of these were given as
gifts to her friends and relatives. These albums, often artfully decorated, were filled with
photographs of family, famous persons, and even reproductions of artworks as well as photoreproductions of found photographs. Olsen points out that the gift of the camera from Juley (who
died before Cameron published the Annals) and Charles “almost certainly at Christmas in 1863
was a natural return gift for the photographic album Cameron had given her daughter for her
birthday the year before.”254
The year Cameron obtained her first camera coincided with the arrival of Oscar Rejlander
in the village of Freshwater. Rejlander soon found himself immersed in the Cameron’s lively
social calendar. On occasion Rejlander used the Cameron family, sometimes Julia Margaret
herself, as models for his pictures. Olsen notes that Rejlander’s prints “often ended up in Julia
Margaret’s albums,” which indicates Cameron’s admiration for Rejlander’s work.255 In some
images Rejlander is also seen in the photograph. Such pictures point to “the tantalizing
possibility that at least in some cases Julia Margaret may have been the one behind the
camera.”256 Olsen concludes that “the production of this series of photographs [by Rejlander] at
[Cameron’s] home in the same year she took up photography herself suggests that there was
some form of collaboration or apprenticeship between the two photographers.”257 While the
scholarship on this particular point remains speculative, it is certainly true that Cameron was
exposed to photography well before 1863.
To what extent, then, is the account offered by the Annals simply a fiction designed to
facilitate Cameron’s success? This question is not easy to answer. The Annals tells the truth in
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some respects. Cameron did receive a camera as a gift from her daughter and son-in-law. And
the gift came at a time when the lively house at Freshwater had faded to a quiet routine. Her
children had grown up and left, and her husband was frequently away on business. And while
friends like Tennyson, Rejlander, and other notables were given to dropping by, they were not
family.
Family life for Cameron, as for many Victorian women, was deeply tied to her own
sense of identity. Olsen and other scholars point out that Cameron had a deep and abiding need
to remain connected to her family throughout her life. It is therefore simply not the case that
Cameron used her family as a cover for her own professional ambition. Rather it is more likely
that Cameron understood her budding identity as a photographer through her family. That is,
family was a lens through which Cameron charted and made sense of her emerging identity as a
practicing photographer. Olsen writes, “the autobiography probably reflects an emotional truth:
the acquisition of the camera and the resulting photographs marked a shift in identity.” 258 It was
though narratives of familial belonging that Cameron charted her passage beyond the familial
enclosure through photography and out into the public sphere.
5.3 From the Hen House to “My Glass House”
The founding of Cameron’s studio features prominently in the Annals. Cameron writes:
“I turned my coal-house into my dark room and a glazed fowl house I had given to my children
became my glass house!”259 The words “became” and “my” and the exclamation point frame the
text of the “glass house” in the rhetoric of autonomy (“my”) and transformation (“became”).
However this claim is couched in the language of mothering and feminine domesticity
considered proper to a Victorian woman of Cameron’s class. Note that her autobiographical “I”
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or the persona that operates through that “I” takes possession of the darkroom – formerly a coalhouse – but the glass house or studio is prefaced by a narrative of familial belonging. Only after
this set-up does the narrative “I” take possession of it with the designation “my glass house.”
Despite this the statement is also transformative, even, to an extent, transgressive. The “glazed
foul house” that formerly belonged to the family “became my glass house!” In this transitional
rhetoric of becoming, the autobiographical “I” straddles the borderland between the domestic
interior and the world of the studio – the glass house – from which Cameron accessed the public
sphere. Cameron continues:
The hens were liberated, I hope and believe not eaten. The profit of my boys upon new
laid eggs was stopped and all hands and hearts sympathised in my new labour, since the
society of hens and chickens was soon changed for that of poets, prophets, painters and
lovely maidens, who all in turn have immortalized the humble little farm erection.260
The founding of Cameron’s glass house in the Annals is framed in the language of family
and domesticity but it operates within a transitional framework. The cancelled profits that would
have come from the sale of hens’ eggs function as a preamble to a transition from family to
“society.” The hen house as domestic sphere is “changed” to a space for a “society” of artists and
visionaries. The theme of liberation, even female liberation in the form of the once cooped-up
and now possibly “liberated” hens, is tempered by the stress laid on the support of her family for
Cameron’s “new labour.” So while the scene of the founding of Cameron’s glass house marks a
transition in the Annals from the domestic enclosure to “society,” this transition remains
transitional, occupying a liminal zone somewhere between the actualization of, and merely a
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hope for, liberation. The narrative here (as throughout the text) straddles a precarious line. It at
once affirms and resists Victorian standards of feminine domesticity. As Olsen notes:
Between the lines she [Cameron] seems to be defensively saying: yes, we lose the income
from the eggs, but we will all gain from my art and my family encourages me to do
this!...Professional work was certainly not impossible for Victorian women, especially in
the cultural fields, but it was difficult and strewn with obstacles. For a bourgeois woman
suddenly to take up a paying job might imply that her husband could not support her, that
the family was in dire straits, that the wife was insubordinate...Cameron’s autobiography,
many of her letters, and her portraits of Charles Hay [her husband] and her children
function rather like a signed permission slip that Cameron could present on demand.261
Performing a public persona capable of straddling the line between family and society
demanded a tightrope walker’s dexterity. Negotiating the Victorian line between family and
society meant negotiating the hazards of self-division. As a public persona, Cameron had to be
seen as both mother and photographer. Cameron’s autobiographical “I” had to bear the mark of
the socially sanctioned space of the domestic enclosure. But paradoxically she had to wear this
garment of domesticity in public. Cameron’s confirmation of Victorian values of femininity and
domesticity strategically enabled her to (partially) transgress the social limits imposed by them.
Persona-making, however, is not only a volitional process. Cheryl Walker points out that
persona production is both a conscious and unconscious process. It proceeds both (and often not
equally) by volitional agency and by internalizing the prevailing ideologies of the social order.
The persona is shaped not by the sole sovereignty of the “person,” but emerges in the
confrontation with society. For this reason a persona is not always a medium for liberation or
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self-improvement. Indeed Walker notes that “it is rarely the case” that the persona is solely a
“delightful aspect of human experience.”262 Persona production is often a fraught and fractious
process born of difficult conditions. Cameron saw that the only way it would be possible for her
to occupy the position of a self-proclaimed photographer was for her to be seen to occupy the
position of the dutiful Victorian wife and mother.
To what extent Cameron believed in the Victorian values she professed cannot really be
answered. Were Cameron’s professed convictions heart-felt or was she merely being sly? The
strangeness of the mask of persona is that it can often grow into one’s sense of self often without
one necessarily being aware of it. As Alicia Ostriker notes, the “I’ of self-narration might in
certain cases mark the site at which “the mask has grown into the flesh.”263 For Walker and
Ostriker asking “who” appears behind the mask of figures in an autobiography, however, is the
wrong question. The questions to be asked are rather: who and how many have become through
these masks and by what volitional strategies, social norms, and ideological constraints?
Personae abound not only in the Annals but also in Cameron’s photography. Role-playing
was a key feature of Cameron’s studio work. Photographs of her children dressed as cherubs, her
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Plate 4. Julia Margaret Cameron, I Wait (Laura Gurney), 1872. Digital image courtesy of the Getty’s Open Content
Program.

maid as the Virgin, friends and relatives dressed as characters from literature and mythology
appear frequently in her photographs. So while Olsen is right to point out that Cameron’s
pictures of her family helped bolster her “respectable” public persona, it is also true that many of
her family photographs are not portraits in the strict sense but rather character studies. Moreover,
many of her portraits are distinctly out-of-focus. Cameron’s penchant for costuming and unfocusing together constituted a profoundly powerful material and stylistic arsenal for defamiliarizing her subjects and her relation to herself as mother, socialite, Victorian woman, in
short for estranging herself from the historical norms of her gender and class.
Cameron’s poetics of de-familiarization cut in two ways: she de-familiarized herself and
those she photographed. She was given to subjecting her family models to a tasking process in
which family relations were momentarily severed and re-threaded through Cameron’s
demanding aesthetics. Cameron’s great niece Laura Gurney Troubridge recalls posing with her
sister as angels of the nativity. Laura remembers Cameron’s “ungentle hand” tousled their hair
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“to get rid of its prim, nursery look.”264 Each child was “scantily clad” and had “heavy swan
wings” fastened to “her slim shoulders.” To the young girls, “Aunt Julia appeared as a terrifying,
elderly woman, short and squat...[d]ressed in dark clothes, stained with chemicals from her
photography (and smelling of them too), with a plump, eager face and piercing eyes.”265 “No
wonder,” Laura continues, “those old photographs of us, leaning over imaginary ramparts of
heaven, look anxious and wistful. This is how we felt.”266
Here in a childhood memory, the reader catches a fleeting glimpse of another side of
Cameron’s persona—the working photographer. In the “liberated” space of the ex-chicken coop
turned glass house, Cameron could distance herself from Victorian expectations of femininity
and maternal nurturing and become, through photographing, some other seemingly
unrecognizable figure. Laura and her sister (like many of Cameron’s other intimates) were put
through an estranging process in the course of being photographed in which the familial bonds
were momentarily dissolved into a semi-anonymous encounter between model and photographer.
Costuming intensified this sense of estrangement and de-familiarization by materially reconfiguring identities. For Cameron, the “world of theatre and fantasy allowed room to explore
other selves and identities.”267 Upon entering the “society” of the glass house, Cameron and her
models left behind the domestic sphere of Victorian norms of social comportment.
5.4 I began
In charting her beginnings as a photographer, Cameron writes: “I began with no
knowledge of the art. I did not know where to place my dark box, how to focus my sitter, and my
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first picture I effaced by rubbing my hand over the filmy side of the glass”268 Of this effaced
image little is known. Cameron notes that she paid the model, a farmer living nearby, half a
crown per half hour for sitting and that “after many half-crowns...I effaced it while holding it
triumphantly.”269 That Cameron makes mention of this mistake twice in this short text should not
go unnoticed. Rejlander’s “Apology” for comparison will help to flesh out the significance of
Cameron’s statement.
Rejlander projects his novice years onto the figure of a “young Miss” clumsily playing
piano on one occasion, and on another he attempts to efface it altogether through the figure of the
“ready-made photographer.” Cameron by contrast begins by openly declaring her beginnings as
a photographer as an “I” that “began with no knowledge of the art.” The passage from the sphere
of homemaking to the glass house is marked, then, as the passing into a knowing that one must
say is Socratic, for to know that one does not know is the beginning of knowledge in the Socratic
tradition. Cameron’s “I,” unlike Rejlander’s, does not displace its novice beginnings. No “readymade photographer” arrives to block from view this point of unknowing.
Cameron’s figuration of herself initially as an “I” with “no knowledge” also follows her
pattern of using a self-effacing gesture as a springboard to a more affirmative self-narration.
Cameron writes,
my son, Hardinge, being on his Oxford vacation, helped me in the difficulty of focusing.
I was half-way through a beautiful picture when a splutter of laughter from one of the
children lost me that picture, and less ambitious now, I took one child alone, appealing to
her feelings and telling her of the waste of poor Mrs. Cameron’s chemicals and strength if

268
269

Cameron, “Annals of My Glass House,” 181.
Cameron, “Annals of My Glass House,” 181.
140

she moved. The appeal had its effect, and I now produced a picture which I called ‘My
First Success.’270
The “splutter” of laughter by the children breaks the photographic enclosure that connects the
children to the photographer. The break results in the separation of the children and the singling
out of one child, Annie. It is to this now displaced photographic subject that Cameron makes her
appeal by placing herself as photographer in the third-person. It is as if she has steps out of her
role as photographer like one removing a mask or costume. The photographer becomes a third
person figure with only the property of photographic chemicals to her name: “poor Mrs.
Cameron’s chemicals.” She then takes a step back behind the camera. Her son, the
photographer’s assistant, readies the lens and her “first success” is realized.
The scene as seen traces a complex series of moves in, again, what Azoulay calls the
“arena” of photography.271 Cameron moves out from behind the camera to the space of the
photographed subject, Annie, and back again. This movement re-codes a series of intimate
relations relative to the unmoving observer – the camera. The mediating presence of the camera
recodes the mother-son relation as photographer and assistant. At the same time it recodes Annie
as photographed subject. But when Cameron moves out from behind the camera and approaches
her subject a shift in subject positions occur. Who is it that speaks to Annie of “poor Mrs.
Cameron’s chemicals?” And who, figuratively speaking, is it that Hardinge sees speaking to
Annie? Does he see his mother, a photographer, or some other figure? And who does Annie
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Plate 5. Julia Margaret Cameron, Annie, 1864. Digital image courtesy of the Getty’s Open Content Program.

encounter when this figure approaches her? Does she see a photographer, Mrs. Cameron, who?
And who does Cameron see if she glances back at Hardinge from Annie’s perspective? Does she
see her son or her assistant? The camera here is like a May Pole that sets a group of subject
positions in motion. The photographic arena as seen here is “a montage of heterogeneous
viewpoints.”272 The “success” of the photographic event occurs in the scene through a narrative
remapping of positions within the photographic arena. It is within this very movement, and in the
renegotiated subject-positions it effects, that the act of photography is seen to take place. The
camera is at the centre of the photographic action, but it is not where the action of photography is
seen to take place.
The Annals’ de-privileging of the camera as the determining actor in the photographic
situation reflects Cameron’s career as a whole. As already noted, Cameron came into
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photography initially by making albums, perhaps serving as an assistant to Rejlander, and on
occasion posing as a model herself. She thus encountered photography as a variety of actions,
including the operation of the camera. The camera in Cameron’s case must be seen as
contributing actor in a larger and complex set of photographic situations and not what it has
become in modern histories of photography – the central historical figure.
Azoulay has done the most in recent years to pioneer a way out of the paradigm in which
the camera has dominated the field of photography studies. For Azoulay, the camera should be
seen as simply one actor in a complex ensemble of actions that take place within, while holding
open, the social space of photography. The arena of photography delimits the space of action in
which photographer and photographed reside. But it also marks the space of a photograph’s
future spectators. The arena of photography thus covers a very wide spatio-temporal expanse and
encloses within its theoretical grasp all the acts that produce and perpetuate the existence of a
photograph. Only a fraction of this space, however, can be seen in the frame of the photograph.
Never does a photograph show the totality of its viewers who further the life of the image by
reproducing it through memory, conversation, or otherwise. As Azoulay notes in The Civil
Contract of Photography, the arena of photography is a “complex theatre of relations...only some
of which are manifested in the single photo...The photograph always includes more or less than
what they [photographers] seek to deposit in it.”273 The photographer cannot control how the
arena of photography will expand. How the arena will expand and what spaces of signification it
will create over time are contingent matters from the moment the act of photography begins.
Azoulay has provided a much needed critique of the prevailing image of photography in which
the camera and the photograph are seen as the two poles between which all photographic

273

Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 389.
143

meaning is created and contained. As impressive and unique as Azoulay’s insight is, however,
Cameron seems to have reached a similar view in the late nineteenth century.
Through her innovative photographic practice, Cameron came to see that the site or arena
of photography is not wholly circumscribed by the camera and its cognate operations: it is an
expansive arena of social action, as well as chemistry, and optics. Olsen captures the point
precisely. She writes:
Cameron’s photographic career did not begin behind the camera. Nor, for that matter,
was it the invention of the camera that inaugurated the field of photography—it was the
discovery of photochemicals that could fix the image. Likewise, it was not necessarily the
gift of the camera that marks the official beginning of Cameron’s career as much as her
experiments in printing and album making. To privilege the camera is convenient for the
field of photography because it emphasizes the moment of interaction between artist and
subject.274
To reduce the conception of photography to the moment of photographing is to fix and freeze
(like a photographic image itself) the relation between photographer and photographed.
Cameron’s Annals (and her practice) depict the act of photography as a fluid exchanging of roles
that involves, but is not wholly subsumed by, the camera. The arena of photography for Cameron
revolves around the camera only in the sense that it is the unmoving pivot around which a
dynamical movement of bodies and subject positions occur.
5.5 Motion Pictures
Motion was central to Cameron’s conception and practice of photography. Cameron’s
style of un-focused images resulted both from her purposeful use of soft-focus and because she
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allowed her sitters to move during the long exposure time. One should briefly pause to note the
unprecedented quality of the un-focused image in the history of photography prior to Cameron.
The idea that focus was to be focused in photography was (and still largely is) assumed.
Cameron reflects on her use of soft-focus in the Annals by noting: “when focusing and coming to
something that to my eye was very beautiful, I stopped there instead of screwing on the lens to
the more definite focus which all other photographers insist upon.”275
Cameron’s speaks here to a desire to plumb the depths of the photographed subject, a
desire to see the physiological and psychological depth of the subject before her lens. She wanted
to see beyond the “topographic” form of the body. Only a year after beginning her career, she
remarked in a letter to a friend that “conventional topographic Photography” results only in
“skeleton rendering of feature & form without that roundness & fullness of form and feature, that
modeling of flesh & limb which the focus I use only can give.”276 For Cameron, soft focus was a
technique for giving life to the photographic image. She saw in the sharply delineated focus
favored by most of her fellow photographers little more than dead figures – skeletons – lifeless,
stiff impostures of living flesh.
The body in its fullness and motion as a corporeal entity of flesh and bone is the figure on
which Cameron’s re-conceptualization of photography turns. She dismisses the reduction of
photographic seeing to the semblance or skin of the world. The dimensional fullness of the body
is the axiom through which focus emerges as a question of phenomenological import. It becomes
a problematic through which the fact of the corporeal body becomes photographically rethought. Central to Cameron’s photographic conception of the body – as evidenced by her
photographs – is a phenomenological grasp that the living body is always a body in motion
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through space and time. And as Cameron shows, space and time are not abstract measurements
from the standpoint of the body. Maurice Merleau-Ponty seems to speak for Cameron when he
beautifully observes in Phenomenology of Perception:
In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and time are not, for
me, a collection of adjacent points nor are they a limitless number of relations
synthesized by my consciousness, and into which it draws my body. I am not in space
and time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them and include them. The scope
of this inclusion is the measure of my existence.277
For Merleau-Ponty the body that one has, and through which one experiences the world, is not
merely in space and time. It is taken up in it. The bodily experience of moving through time and
space cannot be likened to observing a ball rolling down an inclined plane. The distances and
times traveled by one’s body are experiential phenomena. One, for example, can observe
someone taking a walk, and the distance travelled can be measured. But how the travel is
experienced by the walker is disclosed only to her on account of her having the body, life, and
memories she has. Space and time are measurable units. But the bodily experience of space and
time is the measure of one’s existence. Cameron’s desire to grant her subjects psychological
depth through movement and soft-focus opens a space for the subject to preserve their existential
autonomy and mystery. In order to further explore this it will be helpful to turn to one of
Cameron’s best known and most complex images – Pray God Bring Father Safely Home of
1874. The photograph depicts a scene set in a sparsely furnished living room.
On the left, brightly illuminated, sits the mother in whose lap, appearing slightly blurred
in the photograph, sits her daughter who prays urgently for the safe return of her father. The
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Plate 6. Julia Margaret Cameron, Pray God Bring Father Safely Home, 1874. Public Domain Image.

mother, eyes open, gazes into the child’s plaintive face. On the right stands the father. His torso
is shrouded in nets suggesting that he is a fisherman and at present away perhaps on a fishing
expedition. His son, also somewhat blurred out in the photograph, wears a boyish naval uniform.
He stands at a slight angle in front of his absent father, but remains symbolically connected to
him by the fishing net that partly wraps about his torso. Between mother and father spans the
hearth. On the mantle, and above on the wall, are objects of utility and mementoes: a fire
bellows, a kettle, a jug, an iron, a hat (the father’s perhaps). The hearth visually spans the spatial
distance between mother and father, suggesting that domesticity stretches across time and space
uniting the family during a time of separation. This connectivity is echoed by the fishing net that
spills across the floor and wraps around the pedestal on which the daughter wistfully kneels. But
of course, and this is strange, the father is not absent. He looks directly out at the viewer. He is
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not depicted as a spirit, but as a presence every bit as material as the netting he holds. It is the
mother, by contrast, who appears spirit-like, aglow as she is an atmospheric haze of bright light.
Pray God Bring Father Safely Home depicts a seeming reversal of presence and absence.
The mother is supposed to be present in the home, yet she is depicted as an ethereal emanation,
whereas the father who is supposed to be absent is shown as solidly present. Cameron gives a
clue for how to read this when in the Annals she notes that a photograph can be likened to “the
embodiment of a prayer.”278 Cameron here presents an image of photography as a medium in the
literal sense: a vehicle through which a prayer or incantation achieves materiality as if the act of
photography is an act of conjuration. What relation is Cameron building between memory,
prayer, concern, absence and embodiment? How is one to think this strange non-rational
dialectic in which absence becomes material presence by a concern on the part of the mother,
son, and daughter, but seemingly at the expense of their own visual materiality as signified by
the bright glow of the mother and the children’s blurred faces? Here again the ideology of
separate gender spheres surfaces.
The space between the mother and father is almost a hyperbolic illustration of the
Victorian ideology of the separate spheres of the paternal and maternal. Mothers were to stay at
home and raise the children while fathers were to go out into the world and make a living for the
family. It was thought that the domestic space was necessary to protect and nurture women’s
“natural” maternal instincts just as it was thought that men were “naturally” suited for the
demands of work and public life. What Mary Poovey calls “the ideological work of Victorian
gender” stabilized and concretized not only a sexual, but also an economic order. She notes:
“The ideology of separate spheres...positioned women as moral superiors and economic
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dependents.”279 Women were thought morally superior from a male perspective on the grounds
of the presumed sanctity and innocence of children which it was the mother’s duty to raise
properly.
The world of work and public life was seen by contrast as morally inferior, but necessary
to support, maintain, and protect the domestic enclosure. Work was thought to be tied up with
the brute masculine materiality of the outside world whereas the domestic sphere was coded as
“feminine,” a space of softness, innocence, and spiritual renewal. On this point it is interesting to
note the remark made by the novelist William Makepeace Thackeray, a close friend of Cameron.
Recalling a social occasion at Cameron’s home, he remembers Cameron as a “strange apparition
in a flowing red velvet dress...welcoming us to [her] fine home.”280 Thackeray’s comment
illuminates the fact that the ideology of separate spheres of masculine and feminine could also
cut along the materiality and spirituality axis.
This ideological work of gender is reproduced in Pray God Bring Father Safely Home
through the figuration of the children. The son and daughter figure the promise of reproduction
as the sign of the “bountiful” marriage and also signify the promise that the ideology of separate
spheres (masculine and feminine) will be reproduced and perpetuated. This reproductive
narrative is of course materially underscored by virtue of the fact that photography is a
reproducible medium. The ideology of family reproduction and the reproduction of the ideology
of the family is materially ramified through the reproductive medium of photography. It would
appear from this vantage that the photograph’s arena of meanings is foreclosed by the theme of
reproduction and with it the gendered significations of masculine materiality and feminine
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spirituality. One element, however, distorts this hyper-thematic of reproduction: the blurriness of
the children’s faces.
The blurriness of the children’s faces introduces a visual trace that materially distorts the
readability of the photograph and thus disturbs the placid surface of its ideology. The blurriness
is the registered trace of the children’s movement during the exposure time. The trace of their
movement introduces a third term between the materiality of the father and the ethereality of the
mother. The children are photographically captured in movement through a liminal space
between the poles of absence and presence, maternal and paternal, feminine and masculine, and
spirit and body. Their movement opens a space within the arena of the photograph, which is
bounded by, but not subordinate to, the polarized and fixed coordinates of Victorian domesticity.
It is this blurriness of movement that marks a zone of autonomy. What the viewer sees and what
the children saw are not the same. The viewer does not and cannot know what the children saw
or what they experienced in moving as they did. Neither their vision nor their movement can be
read clearly by the viewer. It reads only as a blur. With Merleau-Ponty, one might say finally that
the viewer can take the measure of their movement – he or she can read the signs of movement
in the blurs – but only the children know what it meant to inhabit and live that movement. The
blurs signify the gap between what the viewer sees and what the children experienced.
The blurs of the children’s faces in Pray God Bring Father Safely Home also render
material Azoulay’s insight that a photograph is a material tracing of the “heterogeneous
viewpoints of those who participated in the act of photography.”281 Here Azoulay echoes
Merleau-Ponty’s crucial observation: “The space and time which I inhabit are always in their

281

Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 384.
150

different ways indeterminate horizons which contain other points of view.”282 Pray God Bring
Father Safely Home likewise opens an indeterminate horizon made of a plurality of perspectives
within the otherwise frozen monologic ideology of separate spheres.
Cameron’s prizing of motion radically displaced the entire nineteenth-century framework
that linked photography with the so-called “still image.” Cameron’s emphasis on motion
countered standard nineteenth-century photographic portraiture epitomized by the use of cold
metal neck clamps and back straightening rods that held the photographed subject sill in what
Barthes calls “the mortiferous layers of the Pose.”283 Barthes capitalizes the word pose because it
is a proper name for a specific genre of photography. The head-on, profile, and three-quarters
view are types of the Pose genre. The head-clamps and back rods are material traces that signify
with brutal clarity that there is nothing natural about posing for the camera: posing always
involves real or virtual “constraints” or norms that discipline the body to conform to the “look”
of the photographed subject and the social norms that maintain the repertoire of poses by which
that look is represented.
It is in this sense that the visible artifice of works such as Pray God Bring Father Safely
Home should be understood. Cameron’s staged photographs demonstrate with almost ironic
clarity that photography involves elements of what Barthes calls “primitive theatre.”284
Paradoxically by allowing for movement, Cameron’s photographs show up the artifice of the
forcibly restrained body of the posed and poised photographic subject.
Cameron’s practice put movement into photography and in so doing put focus in
question. Her intervention remade the image of photography: the still image is displaced for a
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moving body. In this sense, Cameron’s photographs might be called “motion pictures” in the
literal sense. Paradoxically, Cameron’s blurry images render clear a simple but powerful insight:
the living body is always a body in motion. Even the still body still moves. Blood pulses through
the arteries. Lungs inflate and deflate, etcetera. This has of course long been known. But
Cameron’s photography introduces this fact into the problematic of the still-image. The body in
motion, for Cameron, is her chosen medium and means for breaking the link between the still
body and the photographic image. Her work shatters the illusion that the “realist” photographic
image perpetuates: that a body is still. It shows that behind the posed and poised body of the
photographed subject lie real or virtual constraints.
5.6 Fluid
The traces of movement in Cameron’s photographs lend her subjects a sense of fluidity.
Cameron refuses to atomize movement as did other nineteenth-century photographers such as
Eadweard Muybridge (1830-1904). Cameron figures movement as flow. Movement for the
mover is not a discontinuous atomized itinerary of gestures. It is fluid. Focus is her technique for
rendering visible this fluidity. Many of Cameron’s critics, however, opposed her use of softfocus. In a letter Cameron responds to this criticism by asking: “What is focus and who has the
right to say what is the legitimate focus [?]”285 In posing the question of who has the right to say
what focus is the correct one, Cameron gestures towards the same problematic that Azoulay has
recently unfolded: neither the rights of the camera operator nor the spectator nor the
photographer takes priority in a photographic situation. There are always multiple viewpoints
and differing perspectives that are actively negotiated within the situation. Focus for Cameron is
the index of the dimensionality of bodies (camera, photographer, and photographed) that
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comprise a photographic situation. The photographic situation is understood by Cameron not
only as an image-space but also as body-space. It is by virtue of the dimensionality of this space
that movement and fluidity are possible.
Fluidity and movement are also reflected in the fluid movement between subject
positions in the Annals as is seen in the studio scene of her “first success” photographing Annie.
Cameron’s emphasis on fluidity also has a gendered dimension: the lived experience of the
fluidity of “femininity.” Cameron negotiated the problem of being identified in various contexts
by different gazes: wife, mother, hostess, Mrs. Cameron, the photographer, and so forth. For
women of the nineteenth century, the experience of being identified according to criteria not of
their making or choosing had the effect of all but emptying out the “feminine” of anything but
the meanings projected onto it by men. Luce Irigaray notes in her essay “The ‘Mechanics’ of
Fluids” that playing multiple roles as “woman” is only “feasible by virtue of her ‘fluid’
character, which has deprived her of all possibility of identity with herself.”286 For Irigaray, the
“feminine” is a space upon which identities are projected (usually from men) but precisely
because of this it is a “fluid character.”287 Feminine fluidity is the un-thought apparition that
haunts the presumed stability of solid (phallic) masculinity. The masculine bias for solidity,
argues Irigaray, appears in the rhetoric of forms, grounds, and objects of philosophy and the
postulates of the “hard sciences.”
Nineteenth-century photography was similarly governed by stiff bodies, rigidly posed
portraits, sharply delimited and delineated forms. Cameron’s work visually proposes an answer
to Irigaray’s difficult question: “how are we to prevent...the subject from being prorogated as
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such, indeed diminished in its interpretation, by a systematics that re-marks a historical
‘inattention’ to fluids?”288 Cameron’s work and words re-think the language of solidity through
its necessary (albeit spectral) other. Cameron’s work and words re-mark (and deconstruct)
photography’s complicity with the masculine language of solidity and rigidity.
The sense of motion, mobility, and fluidity that mark Cameron’s work does not, however,
undermine its insistent materiality. Rather it is precisely the materiality of the moving body and
the materiality of photography that underwrites Cameron’s aesthetic. Cameron’s work (and
thought) points up the fact that much of what has been (and continues to be) thought about
photography tends towards what might be called photographic idealism. Despite the fact that
nineteenth-century photography was a material and very physically demanding practice—heavy
cameras, dangerous chemicals, fragile glass plates, and more—the obsession with the image
tended to blind commentators to this physicality.
Part of this had to do with a persistent belief that the camera shares some kind of
resonance with mental processing (as seen in Freud). There was and continues to be a seemingly
natural linkage between concepts and images and hence between photographic images and
mental pictures. An iconic example of this view is found in the American philosopher George
Santayana’s (1863-1952) essay “The Photograph and the Mental Image” of 1907. Although
written in the early twentieth century, Santayana’s view of photography was formed by the
nineteenth-century context. The essay abounds with the familiar earmarks of nineteenth-century
photographic idealism. Santayana writes: “The eye has only one retina, the brain a limited
capacity for storage; but the camera can receive any number of plates, and the new need never
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blur nor crowd out the old. Here is a new and accurate visual memory, a perfect record of what
the brain must necessarily forget or confuse.”289
The camera, Santayana thought, would surely complement and improve the faculties of
human cognition and memory. Human thinking would be improved by photography with its
mechanical eye, brain, and memory. Santayana notes, “a photograph is produced by a machine,
just as the images of fancy and memory are reproduced by a machine; both the camera and the
brain transform their impressions in many ways.”290 The nineteenth-century camera with its
seemingly magical power of reception and impression catalyzed a whole series of false analogies
between the mind and the camera, the eye and the lens, pictures and memories, photographs and
mental images. Santayana’s essay epitomizes the forgetting of the body in the work of
photography (as well as in the work of thought). Indeed it forgets the work of the work of
photography. It forgets the physicality of the process. Santayana’s view – still popular today in
the era of digital speed – relegates photography to a kind of non-physical, automatic reflex,
something that happens in the blink of an eye.
The Annals, by contrast, bring to light the physicality of photographic action. Cameron’s
language emphasizes the point when she writes (as already noted) “from the very first I handled
my lens with tender ardour and it has become to me as a living thing.” The camera was a body
for Cameron. It was a physical thing, not a disembodied recording machine. When she speaks of
her first efforts in photography, she quite literally comes to grips with photography. As she says,
she “effaced” her first picture by accidentally “rubbing my hand over the filmy side of the
glass.”291 By giving voice to the physicality of the process, Cameron underscores the presence of
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the laboring body within the photographic situation and in so doing her autobiography “remarks” the idealist conception of photography with an embodied and materialist accent.
This re-marking of photography as an embodied and materialist practice flows into the
theme of fluidity when in the Annals Cameron writes:
Personal sympathy has helped me on very much. My husband from first to last has
watched every picture with delight, and it is my daily habit to run to him with every glass
upon which a fresh glory is newly stamped, and to listen to his enthusiastic applause.
This habit of running into the dining room with my wet pictures has stained an immense
quantity of table linen with nitrate of silver, indelible stains, that I should have been
banished from any less indulgent household.292
Of course it is doubtful that Cameron’s husband watched over the creation of every photograph.
The presence of her husband in the scene functions as another “permission slip” in Olsen’s sense
that allows for the assumption of Cameron’s autobiographical “I” to revel in the delight of
photographic creativity. The “indelible stains” of silver nitrate that spoiled the table linen
materially signify the physicality of photography. That material sign remarks and recodes the
domestic enclosure. The dining room is forever stained with the fluids of Cameron’s fluid
practice of photography.
The image of Cameron the photographer, wife, and mother running through the dining
room with a new picture still wet with photochemicals encapsulates the three central elements of
Cameron’s theory and practice of photography: fluidity, movement, and embodiment. It is the
penultimate image of a thorough-going conceptual revolution in photography. The static camera
and its correlate the still-image are displaced for a moving body carrying an image suspended
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like a photographic embryo in its filmic sac. Cameron here represents the photographer as a
subject of becoming who re-marks the architecture of the enclosure of Victorian domesticity
with an “indelible” and fluid signature. Her photography provided Cameron with what she
memorably calls a “transport of delight.”293 The photographer of the Annals is an embodied
actor: a subject of movement, a “transport,” a medium who reanimates the frozen stillness, the
“skeleton rendering,” of nineteenth- century photographic imagery. Through her fluid conception
and practice of photography, Cameron slipped the restraints of Victorian photography and
femininity through a slyly subversive strategy of ideological conformity and contestation.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This

concluding

chapter

argues

that

Robinson,

Rejlander,

and

Cameron’s

autobiographical desire to narrate their emergent selves as photographers was, in part, a response
to the imperious de-subjectivizing power of nineteenth-century photography. Their effort, then,
was partly an effort to house or re-shell (pace Sloterdijk) their sense of self in the face of the
very thing that did so much to shatter it – photography. I conclude with a comparative analysis of
the nineteenth-century photographer with that of the contemporary epoch. My example is my
mother. I argue that her example shows that identifying as a photographer and doing
photography are no longer urgently linked matters. I argue further that the contemporary
photographer is a performative subject that emerges through photographic practice. This shift
represents a “pragmatic” resolution, in William James’ sense, to the question of identity that
preoccupied the nineteenth-century photographer. The chapter concludes with a retracing of this
project.
6.1 The Death of Topaz
The texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron demonstrate that the question of what it
meant to be a photographer was an urgent problem for the nineteenth-century photographer. This
problematic is humorously echoed in the story of “Topaz, the Portrait Painter” found in a
collection by P-J Stahl, illustrated by J.J. Grandville, and published in 1887. “Topaz, the Portrait
Painter,” tells the story of a monkey who fails as a portrait painter, but later finds success, albeit
short-lived, as a photographer. The story is worth recounting here for it captures the existential
import of the question of identity that marked the early photographer.
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Topaz was taken from his home somewhere on the Amazon. He ended up as a pet in the
house of wealthy Parisian socialite. All went well until the day Topaz bit the lady’s husband. For
this, he was sent packing. His new master was a portrait painter. Topaz decided to try and follow
in his master’s footsteps, but he found he had no talent for painting. Around this time, Topaz
heard of Daguerre’s new invention. He decided to give photography a try. One day he stole a
purse belonging to one of his master’s clients. With the money Topaz bought a camera and a
boat ticket. He sailed back to his home on the Amazon.
On arrival he set up shop. After some initial disappointments, his fame spread. Topaz
became a successful and critically admired photographer. The elephant-king, having heard of his
fame, invited him to his court to serve as his royal highnesses’ portraitist. Upon arriving in the
elephant-king’s court, Topaz wasted no time in taking his first portrait. In short order, he
presented the king with his image. The king was mystified and outraged, having expected the
image to be life-size. He exclaimed: “it is owing to my great size and strength that I have been
chosen king. Were I to exhibit this miserable portrait to my subjects they would imagine I was an
insect, a weak, hardly perceptible creature, only fit to be dethroned and crushed.” 294 Humiliated
by the great king, Topaz, with camera around his neck, hurled himself into the waters of the
Amazon and sank to his death. The story is both comic and tragic. The final image of Topaz
drowning himself with his camera fittingly pictures the photographer as a prosthetic subject:
camera and monkey go down together. The story of Topaz is one of the first popular stories of
the death of a nineteenth-century photographer. Not merely a profession, the photographer here
is a figure of life and death.
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Grandville, the illustrator of Private and Public Life of Animals, was part of that fated
generation of lithographers, miniaturists, and engravers whose livelihoods would all but
disappear by the end of the nineteenth century. The story of Topaz marks a brief historical
moment in which photography existed peaceably alongside other popular image making
technologies. It was a brief peace. In “Little History of Photography,” Benjamin notes: “Things
developed so rapidly that by 1840 most of the innumerable miniaturists had already become
professional photographers, at first only as a sideline, but before long exclusively...This
transitional generation disappeared very gradually.”295 With the disappearance of engravers,
lithographers, and so forth, photography also suffered a loss. As photography gradually diffused
into popular culture photography’s identity crisis of identity began to subside. It was
“naturalized” by habituation. Through diffusion and habituation, the figure of the nineteenthcentury photographer dogged by doubt, anxiety, and ambivalence gradually disappeared. The
death of Topaz in a sense foretells the death of the nineteenth-century photographer for whom
one’s identity as photographer was a matter of social and cultural crisis (if not life and death).
6.2 Identity Crisis
The photographer was not a unified historical subject position, and its evolution did not
follow a discrete trajectory. The photographer of the nineteenth century, like photography itself,
was multiple. It was split and fractured along deep and divisive lines: art and non-art, aesthetics
and science, highbrow and middlebrow, masculine and feminine. Robinson, Rejlander, and
Cameron experienced these divisions in unique ways to differing degrees of intensity. But in
their effort to register their experience in words, each photographer sketched out a position that
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provides a rough guide to what it meant to identify as a photographer at that time, as well as what
it was possible to say about that identity.
Robinson staked out the position and promise of the pictorialist photographer. Pictorialist
technique promised to at last set the photographer upon a firm foundation of clearly defined rules
and aesthetic standards derived from the traditional arts, particularly painting. But Robinson’s
texts, especially the Studio, ultimately (unknowingly) demonstrated the limits of this approach.
The entire question concerning the identity of photography and the photographer was obviated
through a passionate and misplaced identification with the fine arts. Robinson’s pictorialist
orientation sought to quiet the very identity crisis out of which pictorialism emerged.
Pictorialism sought to resolve a question that it was not really prepared to raise: what does it
mean to be a photographer? It is this question that Rejlander (and photographers like him) sought
to answer.
Rejlander hoped to legitimate the cultural claim of art-photography not by codifying a set
of rules and procedures as Robinson did. Rejlander rather sought a justification for his own
practice of photography, and by extension to find or found a justification for creative
photography as a whole. He reasoned that by examining his own life he could find a general
justification by which anyone might legitimately take up the practice of creative photography.
But the use of multiple personae and sudden shifts in location trouble Rejlander’s
autobiographical account. The “Apology” neither provides a clear autobiographical picture nor
does it make good on its titular promise to provide an apology or rational defense for artphotography. But this failure renders apparent the identity crisis that underwrote pictorialism.
The “Apology” brings that identity crisis to the surface.
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Cameron by contrast explored and exploited the ontologically ungrounded condition of
photography to powerful effect. Becoming a photographer meant becoming precisely something
culturally fluid and indefinite. It was that very fluidity that provided an opening in which
Cameron’s persona developed within the otherwise restrictive spaces of self-constitution
available to a woman in Victorian England. What Robinson and Rejlander saw as photography’s
chief problem –its identity crisis – was for Cameron an open space in which she could carve out
for herself a new sphere (pace Sloterdijk) to inhabit. Each case study illuminates an important
facet in the historical constitution of the photographer, and each case showcases the important
role that writing played in that constitution.
6.3 Who am I?
The advent of the self-conscious photographer occurred at the historically non-localizable
moment when practitioners looked out through the camera onto a new vision of the world and
asked themselves: What am I doing? What have I become? Who am I? It was at that moment that
the subject position space opened by the camera was inflected and inscribed by an ongoing
process of self-understanding and self-constitution in and through photographic practice. It was
at that moment that photography and those that practiced it became the subject of a series of
questions and controversies that are now readable as the history of the nineteenth-century
photographer. That is to say that the advent of the photographer as a self-conscious subject was
neither synonymous nor synchronous with the advent of photography. There was a delay or an
interval between the technology and the production of the self-identified photographer. Here
what Jonathan Crary says of the nineteenth-century observer applies with equal justice to the
case of the photographer. Crary writes that if there was a “revolution in the nature and function”
of vision in the nineteenth century, it did “not happen independently of the remaking of the
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subject.”296 But this in turn must be supplemented with the following: if there was a remaking of
the subject, then there was a remaking of the discursive and technological space out of which it
emerged. Neither a historical survey of nineteenth-century photographic discourse nor its
technological topoi is sufficient to explain the peculiar particularities of the texts by Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron. The figurations of the photographer that animate the Studio, the
“Apology,” and the Annals have no one, single, or discrete genealogical origin. The figures that
animate these texts are born of a tangled web of prosthetic relations between memory, self, the
unconscious, and photography. It is this complex of relations that historically constituted the
nineteenth-century photographer: a historical subject position constructed of words, images,
memory, the (optical) unconscious, and technologies of vision and capture.
6.4 The Photo-Sphere
Sloterdijk argues that the story of the modern subject is a story of de-shelling. The
sequence of metaphysical disenchantments called modernity produced a new subject that sought
to insulate itself from the cold indifference of the world its own reason made. Sloterdijk writes:
“To oppose the cosmic frost infiltrating the human sphere through the open windows of the
Enlightenment, modern humanity...attempts to balance out its shellessness in space, following
the shattering of its celestial domes.”297 The writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron when
seen through Sloterdijk’s lens appear as texts seeking to re-establish an insular conception of
selfhood through the very technology that in many ways shattered that conception, namely,
photography.
Many scholars, including Alan Sekula and John Tagg, have pointed out that the origins of
nineteenth-century photography stem from the need to track and control the then newly mobile
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and expansive population of the modern metropolis.298 Following events such as the Paris
Commune of 1848, State authorities were eager to develop seemingly more reliable forms of
surveillance for the tracking and management of social and political “deviance.” The work of
French police officer Alphonse Bertillon (1853-1914), for example, proved crucial in the
development of criminological photography or what became known as the “mug-shot.” The
standardization of mug-shot aesthetics, and the use of archival methods for organizing a criminal
database for cross-referencing images and deeds according to a method of comparative
taxonomy, enabled law enforcement agencies to at once produce, capture, and control social
“deviance.” Sekula writes that “photography came to establish the terrain of the other, to define
both the generalized look—the typology—and the contingent instance of deviance and social
pathology.”299 Photography therefore became a means of pronouncing State judgment: the
camera functioned as the presumed panoptic seer and judger of its subjects, and its sight was
thought to be purely mechanical, impartial, sound, and even perfect. Photography instituted a desubjectivizing gaze by positing an image of the subject as available to sight. Yet subjects also
wrote back against this by seeking to remake the image of photography as something other than
the imperious unblinking eye of technological reproduction. The writings of Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron could be morphologically figured in Sloterdijk’s terms as cases of
bubble building – the building of immune spheres – in which photographers sought to develop a
humane counter-image to panoptic photographic discourse. These fragile spaces were
constructed at the nexus point of photography and its conceptualization and autobiographical
encirclement. They were spaces in which a re-thinking of the human interior became possible
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precisely and paradoxically through the externality of photographic apparatuses: a new inside – a
new bubble. Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s writings transform the gaze of photography
into a medium of self-making, or as Foucault might call it, a “technique of self.”
The texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron are stories and studies in the historical
adaptation of the body and the psyche to the invasive technologies of modern photographic
surveillance and the corresponding levelling of the social down to the modern anonymous mass.
They are texts that confront the gaze of mechanical automation with the gaze of psychical
introspection. These texts counter the calculus of mass re-production with the idiosyncratically
singular temperament of existential doubt and self-searching. The photographer, as Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron understood it, came into being at this interstice between the human and
the machine. This space of collusion, combination, and conflict provided the crucible for their
self-understanding as photographers. One may object to the humanist impulse of Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron but one cannot deny that this humanism was (perhaps paradoxically) the
medium through which the relation to the machinic realm of photography became
autobiographically possible. Humanist sentiment, insofar as it was the means for relating to the
camera, is part and parcel of the social history of the emergence of the photographer. As Neil
Gross notes, social history is in part determined by the “cognitive and affective processes”
among which “actors’ conceptualizations of themselves and their lives figure prominently.”300
Gross does not advocate reducing the social to a plurality of persons, but neither does he see the
social as something utterly distinct from that plurality. His position does not exclude the thesis
that actors often “act in instrumental” ways in accordance with the norms and policing policies
of a social order, but “instrumental action of this sort, just like every other form of social action,
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is mediated by interpretations of the action environment coloured by actors’ past experience and
self-understandings – experiences and self-understandings to which they may and often do give
conscious attention.”301
The texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron are in effect testimonies to, and a poetics
of, interiority. The interiority figured in these texts is not that of classical metaphysics – the
indestructible selfsame kernel of the subject. Rather these are texts that testify to an effort to
“cultivate interiority” as Irigaray says.302 These photographers, and many more less famous than
they, sought to cultivate interiority not within the irretrievably narcissistic spaces of selfhood, but
in the peculiarly prosthetic spaces that open between operator and machine: the spaces of the self
as prosthetic autobiography. These texts speak to the interior world of selves formed at the
intersection of external photographic prostheses and the “reflective” spaces of autobiographical
narration. It is this dual world – what Sloterdijk calls the “dual bubble” – that formed the interior
space of the photographer.303 For Sloterdijk as for Irigaray there can be no possibility of
imagining the self without instituting a division in the self. The heart of interiority for both
Sloterdijk and Irigaray is not the undivided, singular, univocity of selfhood. Rather the self
comes into being qua self-consciousness only by way of the necessary division of the singular
self. To understand oneself as a self is to institute a “double dialectic” of oneself to oneself.304 By
producing photographs and reflecting on that production in writing, each photographer practiced
what Sloterdijk calls “the profession of the wild interior designer.”305 The bubble model, as
argued in chapter two, departs from the Cartesian concept of interiority. It preserves the lessons
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of the poststructuralist deconstruction of the subject in that it proposes to figure interiority as a
hollow center around which selfhood is manufactured. It is by virtue of its hollowness, its
openness, that the bubble is morphologically possible. Sloterdijk thus rethinks interiority – the
core and coring of the subject – in terms of a profound hollowness, as a radical absence, as the
product of a division, spacing, and splitting of the subject: it is this very interior spacing that
makes the construction (as much as the deconstruction) of selfhood possible. Sloterdijk wagers:
“Should we not understand the strongest subject as the most successful metabolic agent – the
person who makes the least secret of his hollowness, penetrability, and mediality.” 306 Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron might then be understood as profoundly mediated figures in Sloterdijk’s
sense. Opening their identities to the radical alterity of photography, and photographic seeing,
enabled them to metabolize the new technology for the purposes of creating precisely what Lury
means by a “prosthetic autobiography.” Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron each became a
photographer by turning their photographically mediated view of the world upon themselves.
That is, each interiorized his or her sense of self by dividing that self into a pre and postphotographic self. The self of Robinson’s Studio asks only after it enters the space of
photographic production: what am I to do? Reflecting back on his career after he took up
photography, Rejlander is able to ask: what have I become in becoming a photographer.
Cameron’s history of herself qua photographer – her Annals – chart the story of herself as told
from the perspective of her glass house.
6.5 Mother
What has happened to the figure of the nineteenth-century photographer – that figure of
introspection and existential doubt? The context in which photographers work today has changed
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radically since the time of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. By the mid-twentieth century,
photography was at last officially endorsed by the museum and the art world. It also continued to
service evidentiary demands of the courts, the police, and journalists, as well as an expanding
public that continued to use it to remember. Today the question of photography and the
photographer continues to be a question, but it is not one that is likely to provoke the joy,
despair, and anxieties of the nineteenth century. The ontological status of photography, the
cultural legitimacy of art-photography, and the question of photographic truth still command the
interests of specialists, but these issues have lost much of their former urgency. Today it is
commonly understood that there are many ways to practice photography and therefore many
ways to identify (or not) as a photographer. And it is the latter – the non-identification of oneself
as photographer – that is ascendant.
My mother, to give into my own autobiographical impulse, exemplifies the contemporary
photography practitioner. My mother grew up in an artistic household. Her father was a painter.
Her father also loved taking photographs, although he never considered this his art. He converted
most of his photographs to slides for the Sunday slideshows that took place in the family room of
my youth. My mother surely inherited her passion for taking pictures from her father. But like
him she never believed or thought it necessary to stake an identity – much less an artistic identity
– on her practice of photography. If asked about the subject, my mother will say something like:
“You know me, I like taking pictures.” Indeed she does. Her camera is never far from her. It’s
usually in her purse so she can quickly fish it out when the moment strikes her. Her practice
appears to confirm Bourdieu’s thesis regarding what he calls “canons of ordinary practice.”307
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This practice consists in the use of photography chiefly as a means of “solemnization.”308 When
my mother takes out her camera, the moment becomes a family event. It ceases to be simply an
occasion. The gesture of photographing solemnly particularizes the birthday, the first day of
school, anniversary, holiday, graduation, etcetera. But despite the vast number of photographs
my mother has taken and will no doubt take in the future, she remains a photographer in practice
only. She does not identify as a photographer. She never calls herself a photographer. It would
be wrong, however, to construe a contemporary photography practitioner like my mother as
simply someone who thoughtlessly takes pictures. Rather practice is today the means by which
the question of what it means to be a photographer is resolved. The existential question of the
photographer’s identity is resolved by the immanent practice of photography as it happens in the
moment. Contemporary practitioners, like my mother, resolve the question of the photographer’s
identity “pragmatically.” To clarify this, a brief detour into pragmatism will be helpful.
In his 1907 lectures on pragmatism, William James defines pragmatism as a philosophy
that springs from the “pragmatic method.” The pragmatic method consists in settling
philosophical disputes by tracing what consequences if any follow from taking one view rather
than another. James argues that in cases where no consequences follow from taking one side in a
philosophical dispute rather than another the matter should be deemed quite literally
“inconsequential.” James writes:
It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insignificance the
moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can
be no difference anywhere that doesn’t make a concrete difference elsewhere – no
difference in abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in a difference in concrete fact and
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in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere,
somewhen. The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite
difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants in our life, if this world-formula
or that world-formula be the true one.309
James argues that thought is a form of action that takes place in the world and not in
some imaginary realm sealed off from the contingencies of everyday life. Practical action is not
for James a secondary “reflection” of philosophical truths, but a space in which praxis as
thinking is contested and new modes of thought-action are developed. Practice is socially
embedded and embodied thinking. One of the consequences of pragmatism is that philosophy
ceases to be the special province of professional thinkers, universities, or books. Philosophy,
says the pragmatist, occurs in the seemingly mundane practice of daily life. Hence one way to
study philosophy is to study the practice of everyday life. James captures this sentiment
beautifully when he notes in his lecture:
I know that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, and that
the most interesting and important thing about you is the way in which it determines the
perspective in your several worlds. You know the same of me.... [But] the philosophy
which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is more or less a dumb
sense of what life honestly and deeply means. It is only partly got from books; it is our
individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos.310
Freud too (a contemporary of James) shares this “pragmatic” respect for the practice of daily life
as itself a profound philosophic riddle for which observation of everyday actions provides some
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clues. To understand the psyche, Freud advised that one listen to how people talk about everyday
experience. Likewise James advocates the study of philosophy via the study of everyday life.
In a like manner it might be said that the contemporary photographer can be
conceptualized by simply observing the plurality of ways in which photographers work today.
Here however it is important to stress a Jamesian point: contemporary photographic practice is a
philosophical practice. Practitioners like my mother are therefore in this pragmatic sense also
thinkers whose thinking-practice, among other things, importantly de-couples the photographer
from the field of identity questions that haunted nineteenth-century photography. If my mother,
and contemporary photographers like her, have a philosophy embedded in their social action, it is
one in which the whole idea of the photographer as a singular identity has been displaced for a
pluralistic conception based on the contingent operations forged moment to moment in the
shifting photographic field of action. My mother takes out her camera when the situation strikes
her. My mother does photography. She doesn’t think about being or not being a photographer.
The photographer today in practice embraces its contingent formation. This is part and
parcel of a larger epistemic shift away from essentialist conceptions of subjectivity towards ones
based on shifting performative contexts. The neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty captures
this shift economically when he notes in “The Contingency of Selfhood” that today it is
commonplace to regard the self as a “tissue of contingencies rather that...a well ordered system
of faculties.”311 People like my mother who do photography without identifying as a
photographer represent a lived realization of the historical shift towards thinking identity in
terms of practice rather than being. The current paradigm of the photographer thus stakes its
ground at a considerable distance from the territory of nineteenth-century photography ruled as it
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was by the implicit or explicit claim of the sovereignty of the photographer as a conscious agent
working through the pull and pressure of contested social, cultural, and philosophical debates.
The relative ease with which my mother (and those like her) do photography while not
identifying (or feeling the need to identify) as a photographer speaks to a significant workingthrough of the problem of identity in relation to photography in the manner of what again Lury
would call the prosthetic re-conceptualization of the self.
The photographer as a historical figure has passed out of the nineteenth-century world of
photographic controversy. Nobody worries much anymore about the cultural or scientific status
of photography. What matters today is less the status of the photographer or photography itself
than the workings and effects of the photographic situation, as Azoulay conceives it: the social
arena of bodies, places, and times that the event of photographing contracts together. The
contingent and spontaneous movement that organizes and punctuates the photographic situation
has pressured to the point of dissolution the nineteenth-century conception of the photographer
as a unique historical actor: the figure of the contemporary photographer is seen as inextricably
tied to the field of actors and sites of seeing, which make the production and dissemination of
photographs possible. Arguably this was always the case. But in the nineteenth century, the
photographer’s relation to her subjects and to the present and future spectators of the image was
philosophically mediated by a questioning after her own status within the cultural field. Today
that philosophic mediation has been substituted for a thinking of the act of photography as more
or less a fully habituated means of making relations: relations that knit bodies, times, places, and
images together. The photographer of the nineteenth century – the photographer for whom the
question: what does it mean to say “I am a photographer?” was an urgent question – has, like
Topaz, passed away. But while the question of what it means to be or become a photographer
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may have receded with the general acceptance of photography as a fact of cultural life,
photography remains a powerful and popular medium for the construction of selfhood today
6.6 Coda
In this dissertation I have argued that the photographer can be understood at two distinct
but inseparable levels of generality: the photographer and a photographer. The former names a
novel subject position that came into being with the advent of photographic technologies in the
mid-nineteenth century. The latter refers to a particular photographic practitioner. It is my
contention that the photographer qua subject position emerged in and through the intersection of
photographic technologies, discourses, practices, and modes of self-understanding, particularly
autobiography. This prosthetic, mixed-media assemblage provided a medium through which
individuals came to see themselves as photographers, and in so doing simultaneously re-inflected
the space of the subject position opened by photography.
It is this dynamical process that the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron
illuminate. Robinson opens to view the photographer as a figure in search of the ontology of
photography. Despite having codified a system of photographic aesthetics called pictorialism,
Robinson was unable to settle the haunting question of photography’s identity. In turn he could
not fully settle the cultural identity of the photographer despite his attempt to carve out a space
for the photographer in the regime of settled, middle class life. Rejlander’s account of how he
entered into photographic practice promises to offer a defense, an apology, for art-photography.
But his text ultimately fails to deliver a coherent aesthetic theory of the kind found in Robinson’s
writings. Despite its theoretical failure, Rejlander’s “Apology” reveals the difficulty early
photographic practitioners faced in understanding themselves as photographers. The plurality of
figures and the branching narrative trajectories of the “Apology” reflect the ungrounded,
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multiplicitous nature of photography. In Cameron’s autobiographical Annals, the ontologically
ungrounded condition of photography becomes itself the ground for a destabilization of the rigid
roles prescribed by Victorian norms. In the studio, her glass house, and within the spaces of
writing, Cameron could slip the confines of family and domesticity. Cameron saw the
ontologically open space of photography not as Robinson and Rejlander did –as a crisis to be
resolved – but as a “transport” beyond the rigidly defined world of nineteenth-century
photographic aesthetics, and Victorian gender and class norms. Her practice of photography
enabled Cameron to challenge both.
These texts offer three stories of the nineteenth-century photographer: the photographer
in search of photography (Robinson), the photographer in search of himself (Rejlander), and the
photographer as self-creation (Cameron). Like a triptych, these instances of the photographer are
a series of snapshots: stations of the photographer, episodes in the emergence of a novel subject
position, a mode of subjectivity, and a figuration of selfhood. It has been my aim throughout this
study to show that to properly theorize the photographer, it is necessary to go beyond the
confines of hard-line Foucauldian imaginings that would reduce the photographer to an effect of
discourse. I have sought to counter this by showing how Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron
were not only fashioned by the discourse of photography, but fashioners of it as well. Robinson,
Rejlander, and Cameron as figures of the photographer must be understood as intersectional
figures that exist at the border of photography and life-writing: from a position at once on the
outside of photography and the psychical inside of autobiographical imagining. My effort has
been to show that to conceptualize the photographer necessitates a rethinking of the concept of
interiority, which, however, does not necessitate a retreat into the dark night of the Cartesian
metaphysics of the subject. Finally I have sought to demonstrate the historical importance of the
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nineteenth-century photographer to any understanding of contemporary photographic
practitioners for whom, on the whole, the question of photography and the photographer are no
longer matters of existential import. But now (as then) the photographer figures the effort to
construct a personal relation to the technological present in and through the very means of
technological reproduction afforded by photography. It is this process, and the attempt to come
to grips with that process, that Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s writings illuminate: writings
born of the personal and paradigmatic effort to ask what it might mean to be or become a
photographer.
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